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Abstract 
The research attempts to answer the question: What has been the effect of 
privatization on fiscal and firm performance, and how can privatization effectiveness 
be accounted for in Uganda? The study contributes to understanding of privatization 
process in Uganda by including variables previously ignored by earlier studies such as 
corporate governance and regulation.  
 
From a population of 117 firms privatized, a sample size of 31 enterprises was chosen 
basing on similar studies’ sizes. Individual firms studied were chosen were selected 
according to data availability.  Data sources included enterprise records and trade 
unions officials’ interviews. Firm-level data was collected mostly from the Finance 
Ministry, libraries and firms themselves during the last quarter of 2002 and the entire 
2003. Trade unions interviews took place in March to May of 2006. While the fiscal 
impact of privatization straddles macro levels, firm performance and privatization 
effectiveness analysis were micro. Non-parametric-methods tested for differences in 
firm performance before and after privatization, and comparisons between state, 
private and mixed-owned firm. Cost analysis tracked changes in transactions and 
other firms’ costs before and after privatization.  
 
The fiscal impact of privatisation generally contradicted the theory regarding 
subsidies, but supported taxation and sales proceeds behaviour as found in other least 
developed countries (LDCs): a) While Madsen (1988) argues that subsidies fall with 
privatisation and Rolands (1994) maintains that falling subsidies reduce the budget 
deficit; the Uganda experience contradicted this theory. In Uganda, subsidies in 
nominal prices remained more or less the same over the period 1992/3 to 2004/5 
explained by bail-out operations, government guarantees to energy sector, and state 
contracts.  In addition, after 1998, central government budget rose although it de-
linked from subsidies explained by factors other than subsidies; b) Taxes from 
privatised state owned enterprises (PSOEs) increased due to increased business; c) but 
failed to achieve the World Bank State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)’ sales proceeds 
target of US$500, managing only US$172 m in 2006 due to assets undervaluation and 
stripping.   
 
While privatization theory argued that impact on firm performance was neutral, 
positive and at times negative; the Ugandan evidence supports the views of a zero 
effect. The results of privatisation impact on firm performance indicated that with the 
exception of when state firms were combined with mixed firms and then compared 
with private ones, there was no difference in firm performance between public and 
private firms. First, comparing the firms’ performances both before and after 
privatization or state owned with private ones showed no difference in performance 
between the two groups. The failure for privatization to show impact was attributed 
to: a) Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs)/ Tariff Barriers (TBs) regulation that caused 
contradicting results in the industrial sector that improved firm performance for the 
protected but caused industrial decline for the unprotected firms tending to cancel out 
the gains; b) excluding fresh entrants (non-PSOEs firms) that came after privatization 
from the study that had spectacular non-profit contributions in terms of new 
investments, product variety and innovations in banking and telecommunications; and 
c) failure to access funding by most PSOEs after privatization. Second and on the 
other hand; when, the state firms where combined with mixed owned firms and their 
performance compared with private firms, however, private firms tended to perform 
 xvii 
better than state firms.  In this exception case, FDI presence was responsible 
attributed to state subsidies, falling wage and superior products. 
 
While Galal et al argued that in order for privatisation to influence firm performance 
it depended on how the public firms were managed, how the private firms were 
regulated and how the public firms were motivated; the Uganda evidence was mixed: 
having no impact on corporate governance unlike with regulation and motivation.  
 
First, with the exception of the only case when the SOEs-developer (Uganda 
Development Corporation-UDC) was wound-up creating insufficient investments or 
neglected sectors; corporate governance did not influence firm performance after 
privatization. Corporate governance  failure was attributed to lack of change in 
objective-setting in the partially privatized firms; a failure to improve strategic 
management in the  Previously State Owned Enterprises (PSOE)  due to colonial past 
that kept Africans as peasants or political appointments that recruited inferior staff; 
and a failure for transactions costs to change after privatization.  
 
Second, and true to Galal et al projections, regulation impact on firm performance 
was mixed.  NTBs/TBs improved firm performance for the protected category 
justified for purposes of job creation, to allow investment and tax revenue 
contribution to the government treasury; removal of protective tariffs in the rest of 
firms caused general decline although results also depended on whether a firm 
controlled a market or not with the former limping but the latter closing shop.  
Licensing impact displayed gains including innovations in banking and new 
investments in telecommunications but failed to deliver competition, product quality, 
and development explained by monopoly positions, politics, and corruption. 
Minimum Financial Requirements (MFRs) through Minimum Cash Requirements 
(MCR) limited entry improved bank performance; but Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) 
impact depended more on structure: whereby price-takers deteriorated but price-
makers improved explained by passing over the high interest rates to borrowers. Price 
control improved firm performance in the energy sector but economy-wide impact 
was less clear since tariff increases favoured industries more than domestic consumers 
but threatened international competitiveness.   
 
Third and true to Galal et al projections, staff motivation influenced firm 
performance. While the total wage bill of 31 PSOEs surveyed fell from 14.9 to 9.1 
billion shillings due to lay-offs, lower salaries for temporary workers and bankruptcy, 
generally improved firm performance; attempts to reduce job security in sectors that 
required training such as in the tea and sugar cane plantations affected product quality 
and firm performance negatively. The explanation was that while laying off workers 
did not result into dissatisfaction since they were replaced by new ones who accepted 
lower wages and fringe benefits and thereby not affecting worker satisfaction, more 
temporary terms attracted and  favoured untrained staff leading to sub-standard work, 
hurting product quality and the firm revenue base. In the tea plantation sector, the 
selecting of leaves and failure to process sugar on the same day could be signs of 
general fall in quality, but this needed to be confirmed for all other sectors.    
  
Privatization in Uganda is a success or a failure depending on the criteria or objective 
to apply. First, if de-linking subsidies from the central government was the criteria, 
then privatization was a success. Second, if higher profits to the now privatized firms 
 xviii 
were the criteria, privatization was a failure. The profitability of industrial companies 
had decreased, whereas the profitability of trade and service companies remained 
constant. Third, if better working conditions for employees were the criteria, 
privatizations was a success for the active labour force who had obtained higher 
salaries, alternatively, the laid off personnel got a raw deal in terms of lay off 
packages. So in terms of employment rates, privatization was a failure. (Words 1111) 
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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction and Theoretical Framework 
On 25 January 1986, a guerilla army, the National Resistance Army (NRA), led by 
Yoweri Museveni stormed the capital, Kampala, and overthrew the Uganda National 
Liberation Army (UNLA) government led by General Tito Okello-Lutwa. This was 
the first time ever in African history, for a guerilla army to overthrow a government. 
Six months before, in 1985, the pressure by the guerillas had led to sharp 
disagreements within UNLA especially among Acholi and Langi soldiers resulting 
into an Acholi-led military coup.  Tito Okello-Lutwa, the Army commander, took a 
pre-emptive step to overthrow his boss, President Obote, hoping that this act would 
create avenues for dialogue between the government and the guerillas.  Despite the 
dialogue, nothing tangible was achieved. The five-year war continued ending on that 
day, and bringing with it several economic changes including privatization. 
 
Interestingly, this bush war was not the first military confrontation the country had 
faced. Sixteen years before and on the same day, the country had witnessed another 
fierce battle resulting into another change of government to military rule headed by 
Idi Amin Daada. The eight-year Idi Amin military government wrecked a 
comparatively good African economy amid these violent changes of governments, no 
tangible results showed in the economy even by January 1986. Today, the almost two-
decade NRA government has implemented several policies to rehabilitate the 
economy.  
 
In order to survive in leadership, President Museveni changed drastically from 
Marxist to capitalist. While in the bush the guerrillas were professed Marxists. 
Museveni emerged out of the bush with a ‘ten-point programme’ to rehabilitate the 
economy. Three years after assumption of power, however, he immediately 
abandoned it and was ready to implement the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) without reservations. One of the policies was privatization that 
began in 1992.  
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1.1 Brief review of Uganda’s economy before privatization 
Prior to privatization in 1992, the Uganda economy fared badly due to turmoil and 
insecurity of pre-1986 regimes. In 1979, GDP was only 80 % of the 1970 level. In 
particular, industrial output declined sharply due to scarcity of equipment, spare parts 
and raw materials. Although the country experienced a 17.3 % growth rate attributed 
to agriculture, little progress was made in manufacturing and other sectors. The 
economic and political destruction in the 1970s and 1980s caused a decline in GDP 
with negative growth rates of 4.2 % in 1984, 1.5 % in 1985, and 2.3 % in 1986.1  
 
1.1.1    Structure of the Uganda Economy, Size and Role of the Public Sector  
Uganda was predominantly an agricultural country. In 1980, the agricultural sector 
contributed 72 %, industry 4 % and services 23 % of GDP. In all sectors, the economy 
was just recovering from mismanagement by the military regime of the 1970s and 
civil wars of the 1980s. Amid the decay, the economy harboured a dominant public 
sector. 
 
1.1.1.1. The Emergence of the SOEs Sector in Uganda 
State owned enterprises (SOEs) emerged in Uganda mainly through the collapse of 
the colonial state after the Second World War and the nationalization policies of the 
1970s. 
 
The Colonial SOEs after Second World War 
The Second World War greatly hurt the financial clout of the British economy that in 
order to maintain a source of raw materials and a market for finished goods; she had 
to produce in the colonies using local capital (Marcussen and Torp, 1982). In Uganda, 
the colonialists established SOEs using local capital accumulated through savings 
from cotton and coffee sales between 1948 and 1953.  
 
From 1940 onwards, the British allowed the Uganda colonial government to retain a 
larger part of the earnings of the peasants in the form of a Price Stabilization Fund 
(PSF) amounting to nearly £10.55 m by 1948. Finance was mobilized out of the 
Second World War profits on cotton and coffee that was put in a fund. Money 
amounting to £0.5 million was put into coffee Price Assistance Fund (PAF), while 
another £6 million was earmarked for various public development projects. Despite 
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considerable transfers to the central government over the years for budget support, the 
balances accumulated to £37 million by mid-1954.The source of funds, as already 
hinted were export taxes on cotton and coffee of 15-20 % between 1948 and 1958, 
which dropped to 13 % in 1959 and 17 % in 1960 (World Bank, 1962:17-8). This 
money was channeled into development projects. A year after, £3.925 m was taken 
out straight into another “Price Assistance Fund” and between 1949 and 1953 had 
accumulated to £44.475m. In total, between 1945 and 1960, the state re-capitalized an 
amount equal to (£231.9-£112.9) £119.0 million.  
 
By independence in 1962, there were 24 SOEs including UEB, 16 subsidiaries and 7 
associated companies of UDC. UDC was charged with starting new enterprises. 
While the associated firms concentrated in food and beverages processing and the 
mining sectors, the subsidiaries were in manufacturing, building and property 
development, hotels and tourism, agriculture, banking and finance, and commerce. 
The British-owned subsidiaries controlled the Ugandan economy, ensuring a source 
of raw materials and a market for the finished British goods and the exploitation of 
agricultural and mineral wealth continued prior to independence unabated. But 
independence threatened this exploitation. 
 
Just two years to independence, in 1960, a plan was hatched to maintain control over 
the economy for the next post-independence 15-year era. The colonial government 
made a plan for the future "nationalist government". The Mission consisted of 9 
members including two World Bank staff, UNESCO and WHO helped recruit a 
specialist each for education and health respectively. The team2 of "specialists" 
mission objective as agreed upon by Britain, "Uganda" and World Bank was to 
present practical recommendations with supporting analysis and suggestions as to the 
specific actions to be taken as a basis for drawing a development programme from 
1961/62-1965/66 (World Bank, 1962: vii)]. 
 
The team recommended that since world market prices of coffee and cotton had 
dropped and could not be used as a source of development capital, government 
needed to borrow. In addition, the "team of experts" argued that mining was 
'insignificant' compared to other African countries. The chances for "expansion" 
where considered slim, for copper and wolfram, tin, gold and lead. However, 
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borrowing did not solve the problem of shortage of development capital neither in 
1963 nor later years [RoU, 1963:3; World Bank, 1962].   
 
The Obote Nationalization 
Between 1962 and 1970, the Obote government created several SOEs through UDC. 
However, a greater number of SOEs (78) were created by the 1970 Obote 
nationalizations. On International Labour Day, President Obote spelt out his socialist 
agenda termed ‘’the new all-embracing political culture of control of the means of the 
production and distribution for the decade.” Obote argued that the new government 
policy was that the Ugandans had to actively engage in every field of production, 
commerce and industry, manufacturing and plantation industry while continuing to 
guide the immediate implementation of the Common Man's Charter.  
 
Key policy pronouncements contained in the new agenda included: 
i) Only SOEs would carry out all import and export business although oil 
companies would continue to import and distribute petroleum products; 
ii) Government would acquire 60 % of the shares of each of these oil companies; 
iii) Transport was one of the services that would be run effectively by the 
beneficiaries (passengers) to make it adequate and improve on the required 
standards. Kampala City Council (KCC) and the Trade Unions (TU) in 
Kampala would acquire 60 % of the Kampala and District Bus Services (KDS). 
In upcountry regions of Uganda the District administrations, together with the 
Trade Unions and the Co-operative Unions of each of these regions would 
acquire 60 % shareholdings in the bus companies;   
iv) UDC was empowered to increase its shareholding to 60 % in Kilembe Mines, 
while the workers and SOEs would acquire 60 % in any other manufacturing 
and plantations units; and  
v) Lastly, government would immediately acquire 60 % of the shares of every 
Bank, credit institution and insurance company operating in Uganda. Since 
workers were owners, strikes were outlawed. The appropriated shares would not 
be paid for directly by government but from the profits made by the 
nationalized companies (RoU, 1970: 2-4; Uganda News, May 1st 
No.1607/1970:2-5).   
The media3 termed the address "stirring" and the Minister for Cabinet Affairs 
announced May 2, 1970 another public holiday on top of May 1. 
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Negotiations followed and 7 companies were dropped from the nationalization 
process. The Oil companies settled for 50-50 % shareholding alongside the 
government while the British Banks managed to get a better deal of 40-60 %. In the 
end, a total of 78 enterprises were nationalized. The British and Israelites, however, 
did not allow Uganda to exercise “The Move to the Left”. They organized a military 
coup, which ousted President Milton Obote from power on January 25, 1971. Obote 
was replaced with his Army Commander, Major General Idi Amin Daada (Mamdani, 
1983:30-1). Uganda thus remained firmly “Put to the Right.” 
 
The removal of Obote who was a Christian, socialist and who had encroached on 
foreign investments and replacing him with Amin who was a Muslim can have 
several interpretations. The first one is that to Britain economic interests were far 
more important than religious ones. According to Bade (1996:92), Britain had 
considered it important to give independence to a Uganda headed by an Anglican 
African President in 1962. But in 1971, just nine years later, this no longer mattered 
indicating either a shift in priority or policy in Britain. Secondly, the overthrow could 
be interpreted that besides the fear of military attack from communists by the West 
there were other genuine fears linked to African countries tending towards 
communism. That fear was the spread of socialism or communism in LDCs posed a 
threat to the capitalist advancement and expansion of the MNCs’ web of operations 
and accumulation. 
 
After the British and Israelites had installed Amin in power, he paid back 
handsomely. President Amin reversed Obote’s formula for government shareholding 
in the foreign investments. According to the military leader, “this was a vital 
amendment, which resulted into the return of confidence in the country’s economic 
progress”. Amin replaced Obote’s 60-40 % shareholding with the 49-51 % formula 
(RoU, 1972:67). However Amin was not completely out of support with the 
nationalization policies.  
 
Amin Nationalization 
Having abandoned the blanket nationalizations involving all foreign investments, he 
singled out the Asians and orchestrated probably the single biggest nationalizations in 
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the entire world involving 5655 businesses. In August 1972, Amin under decree 
17/1972 revoked the residence permits of Asians of Indian, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
origin and gave them 90 days to leave the country.  
 
Amin accused the Asians of several offences including:  
i) Abuse of Foreign exchange regulations resulting from export of goods and 
keeping the foreign exchange proceeds abroad. This also included undervaluing 
of exports and overvaluing of imports in order to keep the difference in their 
overseas accounts; 
ii) Hoarding and smuggling of commodities like sugar, oil and hoes creating 
artificial shortages in order to keep the prices in the country unreasonably high; 
iii) Undercutting African traders and unfair competition. Asians had been importers, 
wholesalers and retailers all in one. They ensured that business remained entirely 
in Asian hands. One trick they used was practising price discrimination against 
Ugandan African traders in that they supplied their fellow Asians with goods at 
low prices than those they supplied to Uganda Africans traders; 
iv) Employing family members in their businesses and if they employed the African 
they hid business secrets from him, mistrusted and did not give him authority; 
v) Tax evasion where they kept two different books of accounts one for Income tax 
department and the other showed the true and correct account of the business and 
in Gujarati or Hindu and ensured they paid less tax than they ought to; 
vi) Practising and spreading the dangerous disease of corruption. Asians believed 
that they could not get any service in the government department or parastatal 
without bribing their way; and lastly 
vii) Disloyalty to the country by the fact that Asians had been availed the facilities 
for both local and foreign training in medicine, engineering, law and other 
professions but many of them had either worked briefly for government or opted 
directly for private sector.4 Regardless of the truth of the accusations, the effect 
of the expulsion was to increase the number of SOEs and disrupt the Uganda 
economy. 
 
Jorgensen (1981:288-9) has refuted the nature of strategy used to chase Asians, 
arguing  that although Amin did not enact a decree to chase Asian Citizens, many left 
in fear of intimidation from the civilians and soldiers as well as the threat of being 
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dispersed in rural resettlement schemes. Jorgensen reports a total of 49, 000 Asians 
expelled. Great Britain took 27, 000; Canada 6, 000; India 4, 500, Pakistan, West 
Germany, Malawi and the USA each 1, 000, Australia 500, Sweden 300, New 
Zealand 200, Austria and Mauritius each 100; 3, 600 wound up in European refugee 
camps; 2, 500 Asian citizens of Kenya and Tanzania simply went home; and 4, 000 
Asians chose to remain in Uganda. 
 
President Amin announced that all people who had applied for businesses formerly 
owned by Asians would be interviewed by four cabinet sub-committees. In addition, 
Amin nominated 30 Army and Air force officers and posted them to the sub-
committees to check and distribute the businesses. The Minister of Information and 
Broadcasting, William Naburi chaired the subcommittee covering Kampala North; 
The Minister of Mineral and Water Resources, Erinayo Oryema headed the Kampala 
Central sub-committee; the Minister of Power and Communication, Lt. Colonel 
Obitre Gama chaired the Kampala South subcommittee and Engineer James 
Dhikusooka, the Minister for Works and Housing led the Entebbe sub-committee. The 
5, 655 Asian properties were subdivided into 5, 502 business firms and 153 ranches to 
be distributed together with household property. The distribution favoured individuals 
who received 5, 299 business firms and ranches as well as 144 estates. Even the 
charitable organizations also shared the spoils and received two business firms and 
ranches. Government departments and Ministries received 175 enterprises while 33 
went to parastatals [Jorgensen, 1981: 288-90; GoU, 1977:46]. 
 
Due to the immediate unplanned expansion in SOEs, UDC was given 45 more SOEs 
abandoned by the departed Asians in addition to her own 55 subsidiaries and 
associated companies. This act overstretched UDC’s skilled and trained staff who 
were scattered to go and run enterprises left by Asians. Even junior staffs were made 
managers in order to cope with the situation. Yet still, more SOEs of a commercial 
nature were created overnight (Kinyatta, 1989:5-6). In the end, Amin created more 
SOEs than any other regime that has been in power in Uganda; but because of lack of 
human and capital capacity, insecurity and the donor-SOEs link, the large SOE sector 
caused de-industrialization instead.  
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1.1.1.2. The Size and Role of the Public Sector in Uganda 1980-6 
Hence the SOE sector was made up of mostly remnants of government investments 
put in place in the 1960s and Asians’ assets expropriated in 1972. By 1986, when the 
NRM took power, government had a total of 146 SOEs, with 138 majority holdings 
and 8 minority state holdings (Ddumba-Ssentamu and Mugume, 2001:10). Most of 
the 146 SOEs existed only in the register. These SOEs made a sizeable contribution in 
employment, investment and value adding. 
 
SOEs contributed greatly to employment in Uganda. For instance, the five 
manufacturing firms under the UDC employed a total of 3,905 persons in 1963 that 
increased to 4,019 a year later. Comparing these figures with national employment 
levels of 19,220 and 20838 for the same period indicates that SOEs accounted for 
20% of total employment in each period. Employment increased rapidly over time 
whereby between 1954 and 1965 it grew by 22 %, fixed capital by 24 % and value-
added increased even faster than the two (Stoutsdijk, 1967: 37-8). Comparing the 
1963-64 Uganda data with the rest of the LDCs between 1978-85 shows that 
Uganda’s SOE share of 20 % in employment was close to the LDCs where Africa’s 
was 19.9 %, Asia’s 2.9 %, and Latin America’s 2.8 %. Uganda’s figure doubled that 
of the LDC average of 10.2 %, implying that Uganda was one of those countries that 
over-recruited in the SOE sector during the period.  The big size of the SOE sector 
also created macro-problems. 
 
1.1.2    General Problems of the SOE Sector  
The majority of SOEs performed poorly as a result of country’s violent political 
history and collapsed economy. SOEs suffered from low capacity utilization, large 
operating losses or low profitability, and being illiquid and indebted (Ddumba-
Ssentamu and Mugume, 2001:10). The UDC’s subsidiaries which were Joint Ventures 
(J-Vs) give the worst scenario of SOE performance.  
 
Before privatization and with the exception of 1988, the financial performance of 
joint venture companies returned an operating loss of shs.72 million (US$36, 000) 
between 1986 and 1988. The profit in the year 1988 was exceptional because of the 
Shs. 222 million (US$111, 000) made by Uganda Grain Milling Company (UGMC) 
through sales of wheat from barter trade. The loss before interest and tax (PBIT) was 
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Shs. 265 million (US$132,500) in 1988 and profit-sales ratio of negative 9.7 % 
compared to 6.4 % for other manufacturing enterprises in the public sector. Most J-Vs 
were insolvent and illiquid, and were operating below 50 % capacity.  They also had 
problems like obsolete plants, raw material shortages, under-capitalization, low 
motivation and morale, poor maintenance, failure of management to prepare alternate 
plans and strategies in a rapidly changing policy environment. The monopoly 
situation of most of the UDC group of companies did not encourage aggression and 
innovativeness (UDC, 1990:6-7).  
 
The 1992 study indicated that SOEs contributed little or nothing at all to the treasury. 
The study that covered 30 SOEs showed that of this number, only 11 were profitable 
and the rest not. The overall average ROCE was 5.4 % considered very low when 
commercial lending rates of 35 % and inflation of 30 % for the period was taken into 
account (ROU, 1993:148). Hence, SOEs displayed very bad project management 
skills. 
 
1.1.3   Macro-level Troubles of the Ugandan Economy 1980-6 
Between 1972 and 1986, the public sector, just like the overall Ugandan economy 
declined. In 1986, the economy suffered from severe shortages of supply of basic 
necessities, industrial bottlenecks of destroyed infrastructure and utility sector, lack of 
agricultural inputs and excess capacity, and continued insecurity that bred internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), orphans and widows.  
 
There was a huge budget deficit marched by an equally huge amount of money in 
circulation as a result of financing the budget deficits through money creation. 
Between 1981 and 1984, the budget deficit grew 1.9 times from Shs.26.9 million to 
Shs. 79.2 million. Most of this deficit was financed by money creation fanning 
inflation being 111.1 % in 1981 but fell to 42.9 % in 1984. The huge money supply in 
the economy caused hyperinflation and unfavourable Balance of Payments (BOPs).  
 
Attempts to finance budget deficits through borrowing generated external debt 
growing over the period by 53 % between 1980 and 1984 from US$0.696.4 billion to 
US$1.065 billion respectively (RoU, 1987b: 1; RoU, 1988b: 1). This general poor 
macro economic situation discouraged investment and called for a drastic solution. 
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The poor performance of both SOEs and overall economy paved the way for 
privatization in Uganda. 
1.2   Privatization Policy and Strategy and the Nature of Property Rights in PSOEs 
This sub-section explores the privatization policy and strategy that includes timing 
and speed of the process, objectives, movers and institutional arrangements, and 
overall strategy. 
 
1.2.1. Timing, Sequencing and Speed 
Privatization started unofficially in 1989 with the sale of some six firms. In 1992, 142 
SOEs were officially put on sale launching the project. The PERDS 9/1993 and its 
subsequent amendments classified enterprises in five groups. The first group (I) 
included those enterprises to be fully owned by government and comprised firms that 
were economically viable, politically sensitive, provided essential services and were 
tied to projects that had huge external funds acquired by government for their 
rehabilitation. The second category (class II) consisted of enterprises in which 
government held majority shares and comprised of viable, politically sensitive and 
that provided essential services but differed from the first group by the fact that 
rehabilitation costs funded by foreign donors. The third category (Class III) included 
enterprises where government was to hold minority shares. These were viable 
economically and high cost projects that attracted private equity and technology if 
government were to take up some equity holding in them. The fourth (Class IV) 
included those enterprises that were economically viable and commercially oriented 
while the fifth (Class V) categories included those enterprises slated for sell and 
liquidation respectively. They were economically unviable and defunct or non-
operating SOEs. The criteria of starting with small ones, to medium and later to large 
seem to have been at work and was intended to be cautious as they learnt by doing 
(RoU, 1993:148-161).  
 
The Government adopted and utilized a set of criteria to classify SOEs into those 
which would remain entirely, majority or minority Government ownership; those to 
be privatized, and those which would be liquidated.  First SOEs that were non viable 
would be liquidated since their continued operation was only a drain on the Treasury.  
Second, government would not operate any commercially-oriented SOEs unless it 
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was for security reasons politically sensitive or provided essential services.  Third 
Government would as a rule take minority shareholding only in new enterprises where 
high cost projects would attract private equity and technology. All other enterprises, 
except those falling in the second class above, would be privatized (RoU, 1993:148-
161).  
 
The Government would partly privatize the SOEs in Classes II and III, while fully 
privatizing those in Class IV and liquidating the rest (Class V). The classification was 
not completely rigid and SOEs could always be re-classified depending on any 
peculiar circumstances applicable to a specific SOE or at any specific moment in 
time. In reality, this was only a target classification, subject to review during 
implementation when more detailed technical evaluations of SOEs would be 
available. Henceforth, Government delegated the Divestiture Implementation 
Committee (DIC) to change the classification of individual SOEs based on strict 
application of the above Cabinet-approved criteria (RoU, 1993:148-161).  
 
The process delayed due to intervention by Parliament that halted it twice over issues 
of corruption. A timetable was drawn to sell all SOEs by 1995. By 2005, several years 
off schedule, some 38 parastatals remained including strategic ones such as the 
Uganda Railways Corporation (URC), National Insurance Corporation (NIC), 
Kinyara Sugar Works (KiSW), National Housing and Construction Company (NH 
&CC) and Uganda Diary Corporation (UDC).5 
 
1.2.2. Privatization objectives, policy and strategy 
The principal objective of privatization was to reduce the budget deficit arising from 
the loss-making SOEs (PERDS Act 9/1993).6 The majority of SOEs were commercial 
while the rest were loss-making and needed discontinuing.7 This was to be achieved 
through the reduction of the role of the government in the economy and a 
corresponding promotion, development and strengthening of the private sector 
development (PSD), reform of those SOEs still under state ownership and control8 to 
relieve financial drain and the administration burden, and raise revenue through SOE 
divestiture. The effect of privatization on the budget is handled separately under fiscal 
impact of privatization in Chapter Three. 
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The second objective of privatization was to increase efficiency in SOEs through 
rehabilitation and restructuring,9 promotion of local entrepreneurs,10 promotion of 
institutional arrangements, policies and procedures by ensuring efficient and 
successful management, financial, accounting, and budget discipline of SOEs;11 
separation of ownership from management functions12 and enforcement of 
accountability.13 The push for divestiture and reform generated a new set of property 
owners in Uganda. The effect of privatization on firm performance forms the basis of 
this study in Chapter Seven.  In addition, I also investigate what determines 
privatization effectiveness in Chapters Four to Six. 
 
To achieve the above objectives of divestiture and reform, the Government sponsored 
a programme of intensive preparation of a longer-term Public Enterprise Reform and 
Divestiture programme (PERDS) through sector-wide studies and planning to identify 
the most effective means of bringing about such a programme. This Action Plan for 
public reform and divestiture (APPERD) was defined, the first stage being a “five 
year APPERD”. Its major steps would include divestiture (including liquidation) of 50 
SOEs in the first phase of rationalization of the sector and adopt several other reform 
measures (RoU, 1993:148-161).  
 
1.2.2.1. Divestiture Policies  
The Government recognized that the effectiveness of the divestiture programme in 
attracting investors would depend upon the overall investment climate as well as the 
attractiveness of the sales package for a particular SOE. Separately the Government 
took measures to improve the investment climate including the enactment of a new 
vestment Code 1991. Government proposed to ensure investor interest in divestiture 
in four ways. First, in order to attract investments SOEs for divestiture would have a 
good profit potential. Second, the new owners would have access to term finance for 
PSOEs rehabilitation and autonomy to manage the operations on fully commercial 
lines. Third, government would freely permit Ugandans with funds held abroad to 
acquire equity in divested SOEs. Fourth and lastly, government would encourage 
commercial banks to provide credit for SOEs purchase and rehabilitation after 
divestiture by ensuring that the divested enterprises had sound management and 
strong prospects of adequate profitability (RoU, 1993:148-161).  
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Further, the implementation of divestiture policies would be flexible and designed to 
ensure optimal economic benefits to Uganda and the investors. In this context, 
Government would undertake an annual review of the divestiture program and its 
policies and modalities. Government’s broad guidelines for the divestiture program 
included valuation, joint ventures, FDI, legal technicalities, and subsidies.  
• Valuation would be based on market rather than book value;  
• in SOEs to be converted to joint ventures, private sector partners  would 
acquire a majority interest and had management control without government 
interference;  
• consider foreign investment where there was a need for external equity, 
management and/or technology;  
• all legal issues would be addressed before putting up a SOEs for sale; and  
• No undue advantage or protection would be offered to investors (RoU, 
1993:148-61). 
 
1.2.2.2. SOEs Reform Policies  
Retained SOEs reform would follow five basic principles:  (a) management autonomy 
(b) greater accountability,  (c) providing support for improved performance on a one-
time basis,  (d) rewarding good, and punishing performance, which included letting 
loss-making SOEs close down rather than provide them subsidy or other support, and  
(e) ensuring adequate competition to SOEs by not restricting entry of other enterprises 
into similar activities; and for natural monopolies, prompt the development and 
introduction of suitable regulatory mechanisms by the supervising ministries. The 
main elements of the reform process included autonomy, financial discipline, 
improved reporting, and financial measures (RoU, 1993:148-61) immediately 
elaborated. 
 
1.2.2.2.1. Autonomy: separation of ownership and management functions  
Government promised to separate ownership from SOE management role in four 
ways. First,  it would agree with SOE Boards of Directors on the SOEs’ general 
objectives and targets; granting explicit management autonomy to SOEs to achieve 
said objectives by running their operations in an optimally efficient and competitive 
manner and without interference; and making explicit provision for holding 
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managements accountable for the results achieved by them. Second, SOE Boards of 
Directors would be restructured in a manner that would stress their role as top 
management organs by selecting their membership from rosters of technically and 
managerially qualified persons to be set up for that purpose on the basis of candidate 
screening and authentication by a Committee of Eminent Persons (CEP); this action 
would be harmonized with the existing policy prescribing a minimum number of SOE 
board members to be selected from parliamentarians, by ensuring that the rosters 
would include adequate representation of parliamentarians. Third, systems for 
evaluating performance would be set up to ensure the necessary transparency and 
commitment in regard to all stakeholders. Fourth and last, UDC role would be 
redefined in various ways such as emphasizing it as an Industrial Promotion Agency 
and not as a holding company. UDC would be restructured to disengage its 
management from its delegated ownership functions and responsibilities over its 
subsidiaries and associated enterprises, thus equating UDC subsidiaries with the non-
UDC SOEs (RoU, 1993:148-61).  
 
1.2.2.2.2. Financial discipline  
Government promised to affirm and elaborate its existing policy against providing 
financial support to SOEs through an explicit hard-budget policy that would involve 
cessation of loans, subsidies and guarantees to SOEs. Exceptions, if any, to these rules 
would define and made on an a-priori basis at the same time as the details of the rules 
were defined and made, be limited without fail to cases clearly covered by them, and 
would in any event be subject to commercial terms.  Government promised to 
separate commercial from non-commercial objectives of individual SOEs. The non-
commercial objectives would be supported by government through transparent 
financial transactions. But the commercially-oriented SOEs would be expected to 
become financially self-sufficient, from internally-generated funds and commercial 
bank credit operating; failing which they would be liquidated (RoU, 1993:148-61).  
 
Third, direct government support  in form of equity contributions and loans would be 
discouraged and only within the context of approved corporate plans and the Public 
Investment Program (PIP) for major investment projects, and only to supplement 
internal funds and, where applicable, commercial loans. Given that many SOEs 
required assistance in preparation of corporate plans, these guidelines would be 
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applied in suitable phases (including removal of subsidies), pending completion of the 
corporate plans (RoU, 1993:148-61). 
 
1.2.2.2.3. Improving accounting, budgetary and appraisal processes 
Government promised to take steps to strengthen the appraisal, accounting and 
budgetary processes in retained SOEs. To that effect it would cause substantial 
improvements to be instituted in investment appraisal; record-keeping and follow-up 
procedures and guidelines of financial transactions of the SOEs; and accounting 
systems and procedures making possible efficient performance of all the above as 
well as other functions such as effective monitoring of performance (RoU, 1993:148-
61).  
 
A key element in the implementation of the PERDS program greater autonomy and 
accountability of SOE management was recognized as designing, implementing and 
operation of a SOE monitoring system to ensure that timely, pertinent, reliable and 
comparable financial and operational information be made available to all concerned 
decision-makers, both at the enterprise and at the ministerial levels (RoU, 1993:148-
61).  
 
Further, a performance evaluation and incentive system would be introduced to 
complement the SOE monitoring system for purposes of rewarding good and 
penalizing bad performers. In the short term, measures of performance would be 
based on such basic performance indicators as financial profitability and physical 
productivity with other, more complex, indicators, being devised and monitored as the 
system was refined at later stages in the process (RoU, 1993:148-61).  
 
1.2.2.2.4. Financial measures  
Government promised to take steps to improve the financial and especially capital 
structure not only of the retained SOEs but also the PSOEs, so as to provide both 
retention and privatization with the best potential for success. In all cases where these 
steps toward financial restructuring had a financial cost that could in the last resort be 
covered only by Government, on a one-time basis after which the SOE would seek 
further financial assistance form banks. This applied in particular to the resolution of 
situations characterized by excessive debt or deficient equity or working capital. 
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Government promised to create a restructuring fund to assist to the extent possible in 
the resolution of such situations, according to a set criterion to be put in place. For 
PSOEs, government would facilitate access to term finance through the banking 
sector by ensuring that commercial banks had such finance available for the private 
sector in general (RoU, 1993:148-61)..  
 
1.2.3. Institutional framework and Movers: World Bank and Museveni 
In order to implement the SOEs Reform and Divestiture programme, Government put 
in place two arrangements. The first was a Divestiture Implementation Committee 
(DIC), chaired by the Prime Minister who reported to the Cabinet. It was responsible 
for implementing the Public Enterprise Reform and Divestiture programme (PERDS) 
and was empowered to take all the policy decisions and approve all actions required 
to implement the programme.  The second arrangement was the PERDS Coordinator 
who reported directly to the Finance Minister (MoFPED) and implemented the 
programme on behalf of the DIC. The Coordinator would lead and coordinate the 
definition of specific action plans and their implementation. He also chaired the 
Policy Review Working Group (PRWG) that comprised the Permanent Secretaries of 
line ministries, which advised him on all relevant policies and programmes. He was 
directly assisted the co-coordinator by the Public Enterprise Secretariat (PES), and the 
Divestiture Secretariat (DS) (RoU, 1993:148-61). 
 
To facilitate PE Reform, Government promised streamlining operating systems for: 
(a) corporate planning and budgeting as a basis for greater financial discipline, 
culminating in a phased introduction of the hard-budget constraint; and (b) a 
Management Information System (MIS) for facilitating autonomy and accountability 
of performance (RoU, 1993:148-61). While these bodies were put in place, other 
stakeholders namely World Bank and President Museveni played leading roles in 
shaping and influencing outcomes. 
1.2.3.1. Role of World Bank 
IFIs tried to impress President Obote in early 1980s with their policies in vain. In 
response, the IFIs withheld the money. The overthrow of Obote and incoming of 
Museveni turned the tide. Right from 1989, President Museveni allowed the IFI 
experiment without any reservations so long as they provided him with finance to run 
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his government. In return, the IFIs lent Uganda to the tune of over US$ 5 billion in 
loans and also extended several grants in a period spanning close to a two decades. 
Towards the end of the two decades of Museveni’s rule, IFIs and other donors 
cancelled all Uganda’s debts. Hence, the IFIs dictated policies, such as maintaining 
interest rates at 5 % as well as liberalization of trade; and also financed the whole 
privatization project. 
 
The IMF maintained inflation at 5 % per annum and also controlled credit to banks 
through various legislations such as financial institution statutes.  Ironically, while 
IMF and World Bank concentrated on inflation and privatization since the 1980s, 
evidence indicated that developments in the financial sector had greater impact on the 
economy than the current donor focus. For instance, financial development and credit 
to the private sector impacted on growth in a mixed manner. While financial 
repression impeded growth, credit to the private sector promoted it. The implication 
of this was that government needed to set optimal targets for both growth and 
inflation programmes that optimized both. Evidence indicated that an increase in 
financial repression by 10 per cent led to stagnation by 7.2 per cent between 1967 and 
1996 explained by low levels of diversification of the financial assets and instability. 
On the contrary, an increase in credit to the private sector by 10 per cent increased 
growth by 9.2 per cent over the same period (Kasule Juma, 1998:89). This impact on 
growth was explained by fact that higher credit contributed to both purchasing power 
as well as in investment. Despite the reality, policy dictated by donor community 
underplayed investment in preference for price stability. 
 
Interestingly, inflation impact on growth in Uganda was not always negative with 
short and long-run effect contradicting, and with the long-run gains superseding the 
short-run losses. The effects of inflation on growth were in such a way that in the 
short run, an increase in inflation by 10 per cent reduced growth by 0.2 per cent. The 
negative effect was explained by erosion of profitability on investments, discouraging 
investments and reducing the level of economic growth. But evidence also indicated 
that, in the long run, inflation fuelled growth by 0.6 per cent between 1987 and 2000 
(Nuwamanya, 2004). By restricting credit, the IFIs definitely sealed the fate of the 
privatization process. 
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Lack of access to cheap loans was the biggest restriction for upcoming entrepreneurs 
and hampered growth. Uganda had about 6% of its US$6b GDP available to the 
private sector as credit, less than half the average for a country at that level of 
development. The real interest rate on that borrowing of between 18 and 20% was 
higher than a low-income country ought to be charging. Without easy credit, most 
entrepreneurs started with savings and built their businesses with retained earnings till 
they got to 50 or 100 employees when they needed the bank support. Comparatively, 
Kenya performed better in providing financing to the small and growing businesses.14 
Hence, despite being the world’s most entrepreneurial country, it lacked a cheap 
credit, thus dampening growth rates. While low inflation and macro-economic 
stability were the benefits of a good monetary policy, they should not be ends in 
themselves. The main criteria for judging monetary policy effectiveness should be the 
development of the country’s productive capacity and improvements in living 
standards. The IMF tight monetary policy resulted into inadequate manufacturing and 
export growth rates below development targets.15 
 
Lastly, and with respect to privatization, World Bank estimated SOEs sale proceeds at 
about US$500 million and a solution to the annual US$200 million subsidies to SOEs. 
Basing on the optimism of reducing the subsidies and a revenue haul, the bank 
supported the process beginning with a US$48.5 million loan in 2001.16 
1.2.3.2. Role of President Museveni 
Right from the start, President Museveni was key figure in the privatization process 
by likening non-performing SOEs to dead people that required burying, using the 
divestiture process to enrich party supporters, his relatives, supporting Asian 
investors, and operating bailout operations for selected PSOEs.  
 
During the privatization process at least seven (9 %) of 74 SOEs were undervalued 
and sold to government employees17 including ruling party supporters such as cabinet 
ministers, presidential advisers, National Resistance Movement (NRM) supporters 
and Members of Parliament (MPs).  These SOEs included Lira Hotel, ENHAS, 
UGMC, White Horse Inn Kabale, Printpak, Soroti Hotel and UMI Soroti.  Five SOEs 
were undervalued, one SOE defaulted, and one was undervalued and it also defaulted. 
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Such SOEs were either under-priced or they defaulted on payment explained by the 
politics that characterized allocations.  
 
In addition to party supporters, Museveni’s relatives helped themselves to the 
privatization spoils citing nationalism. Interestingly, in both cases, when Ugandan 
nationalism was cited, the first family of President Museveni was involved. Secondly, 
this nationalism rotated around very profitable SOEs such as ENHAS, UGMC and 
UCB. In the case of UGMC, that Ugandan Nationalism turned out to be speculation 
since re-sale took place on the very first day it was transferred. In both cases, the 
decisions also turned out to be inferior because the new owners lacked capital. While 
UGMC went into receivership, ENHAS offered an inferior service at Entebbe Airport 
charging a higher price compared to that offered in Kenya. 
 
Lastly, the President also operated bailout operations to PSOEs explained as “strategic 
intervention in vital sectors generating employment and fighting poverty through 
helping businesses that generated wealth.’’18 The most notable and frequent 
beneficiaries were three Asians, namely, Mehta, Madhvani and Sekhar Mehta. So far 
government had sunk a total of US$95 million since Museveni assumed power, 
divided between Mehta Group (US$68 m) and Madhvani Group (US$27 m).19  In 
contrast, government refused to bail out other PSOEs sold to local investors such as 
UAC, UMI Kampala, NYTIL and PAPCO that cried out for help. For instance, UAC 
needed Shs. 2 billion (US$500, 000) to fund her operations. On three occasions, it was 
bailed out to the tune of US$3 million (Shs. 3 billion). The fourth time, however, 
there was no alternative but to sell ENHAS shares in order to raise the money.20 
Several other PSOEs such as NYTIL, PAPCO and a private local Bank (ICB) 
solicited for support in vain. In only one case, the local exporter of hides and skins, 
government guaranteed the loan.  These activities of Museveni negatively impacted 
on the economy and the privatization process in particular. 
 
Both the media and opposition politicians explained this as a political strategy by 
Museveni to entrench himself in power. First, the media argued that government 
preferred foreign to local investors because in a crisis, the former were likely to 
support the government in power in order to protect their investments unlike the latter 
that could ally with the opposition to change government. But the opposition 
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politicians argued that the government policy, besides being strategic, was also selfish 
because it was targeted to impoverish Ugandans who did not belong to Museveni’s 
ethnic group (non-Hima) in general and non-clansmen (non-Basita) in particular so 
that they could respect them and also be easily governed.  
 
In September 2007, A World Bank (WB) Country Economic Memorandum warned 
that Uganda's economic growth strategy could fail if corruption, cronyism, waste and 
inefficiency among others in public spending were not checked urgently. Museveni’s 
leadership needed to develop a culture of compliance with regulations and 
accountability in the public sector. The report was launched by the Prime Minister 
Apolo Nsibambi at the Sheraton Kampala Hotel. The World Bank was, however, 
optimistic that the existing and future obstacles to growth could be overcome basing 
on the  country’s past record of recovery and growth which had been amongst the best 
on the African continent made possible by strong policy reforms and a stable 
macroeconomic environment.  However, more effort was needed to move the country 
beyond recovery to sustained economic expansion. John MacIntire, the WB country 
director for Uganda and Tanzania, argued the need to fundamentally re-think the 
overall market-friendly approach to growth outlined in the PEAP and the Medium 
Term Competitiveness Strategy (MTCS). Maintaining the past gains from a stable 
macro management and trade-friendly policy reform were vital as well as support to 
private sector development.  The country needed to maintain an investment climate 
that fostered market development and maintained prudent regulation to correct market 
failures. Government needed to avoid picking winners and certainly not to back 
losers.21  
 
1.2.3. Divestiture and Nature of Property Rights in the Private Sector 
Several methods were used to transfer ownership of SOEs to the private sector. But 
the most used two were asset and share sales although other methods such as 
repossession and management buy out (MBO) were applied. Out of 74 firms divested, 
23 (31%) were divested through asset sales; another 23 (31%) by shares sale; 7 (10%) 
by auction; 4 (6%) by MBO, contract and joint venture; 6 (8%) by pre-emptive rights; 
and, 4% through repossession. These methods were used for various reasons. 
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While asset sales were used mostly on industrial establishments and plantations, share 
sale was applied on trade and service enterprises mainly. In some instances, asset sale 
was used when they failed to get a core investor, as was the case with Coffee 
Marketing Board Limited (CMBL). CMBL could not be sold to a core investor as a 
going concern because its US $ 4 million capacity combined with private processors 
exceeded nine million 60 Kgs bags annually, which was twice the coffee production 
capacity of Uganda. As such, its assets were sold piecemeal. Repossession was 
applied on expropriated assets of Asians. These assets were returned to their owners 
free. Lastly, pre-emptive rights were used when the SOEs had private, minor 
shareholders who where given priority to purchase the remaining shares. Six firms 
where involved under this scheme. In one instance, however, that of Pepsi-Cola 
Limited, priority was not followed due to political preference in favour of some 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) party supporters. These diverse sale methods 
bred new and complex sets of ownership and property rights. 
 
1.2.3.1.Local-Foreign Ownership Pattern 
It was very difficult indeed to state exactly the number or types of property rights or 
ownership after privatization because of overlaps and cloning. An enterprise was 
capable of taking several forms including but not limited to local, foreign, state, 
mixed or joint ventures and private. For instance, local firms were either private or 
government. Some so-called private enterprises were parastatals (SOEs) in their 
countries of origin such as Eskom from South Africa that bought UEGCL. Lastly, all 
SOEs assumed a legal form on registration after privatization. The major ownership 
form, however, was local-foreign divide. 
 
Being local or foreign owned became the major category of property rights after 
privatization. During privatization, the majority of enterprises were sold to either local 
or foreign buyers. Out of a total of 74 enterprises sold, 41 went to local, 27 to foreign 
buyers and 6 to joint ventures, representing 55, 37 and 8 per cent respectively.  
 
The dominance of local over foreign ownership, in terms of numbers sold, was 
explained by political interference and a policy of local entrepreneur development. 
Government preferred Ugandans to FDI - a situation that tended to contradict FDI 
promotion efforts as shown in the sale of UGMC and ENHAS. In the case of UGMC, 
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the highest bidder for the enterprise was UNGA, a Kenya-based food company but it 
was sold to President Museveni’s brother, Salim Saleh, under a company called Caleb 
International on the argument that “Ugandaness” was the awarding criterion. 
Interestingly, however, Caleb International used foreign companies, namely, Tiger 
Oats and a South African company Number One Foods (PTY) Ltd as partners in 
securing the UGMC purchase. For ENHAS, the firm was22 sold neither to the highest 
bidder (Dairo Air Services) that offered US$6.5 million nor to the second highest 
bidder, South African Alliance Air that, bid US$ 4.5 million citing pre-emptive 
rights.2324 It was instead sold to Kutesa, a relative of the President by marriage. Saleh 
refuted allegations that he and Kutesa used their political influence to buy the airport 
ground handling company shares at the give-away price of Shs. 3.375 billion (US$1, 
687, 500) when the company had been valued at Shs. 5 billion (US$2.5 m) and Shs. 8 
billion (US$4m) by Ernest Young and DFCU respectively.25 Interestingly, in several 
of these cases, when Ugandan nationalism was cited as the key consideration, the first 
family of President Museveni was involved. Secondly, this nationalism rotated around 
very profitable SOEs such as ENHAS, UGMC and UCB. In case of UGMC, that 
Ugandan nationalism turned out to be speculation since re-sale took place on the very 
first day it was transferred. In both UGMC and ENHAS cases, the decisions also 
turned out to be inferior because the new owners lacked capital. While UGMC went 
into receivership, ENHAS offered an inferior service at Entebbe Airport charging a 
higher price compared to what was being charged in Kenya. Despite buying more 
enterprises, locals paid less money on average per enterprise compared to the foreign 
buyers. 
 
Although the majority of the buyers were local, foreigners tended to buy SOEs with 
higher values constituting 75 % of the total divestiture proceeds while the value of 
SOEs bought by locals accounted for 16 % (Ddumba and Mugume, 2001:39). While 
the locals paid a total of Shs. 39.68497 billion (US$19.8m), the foreigners paid Shs. 
187.05 billion (US$93.5m). The difference in payments was explained by government 
policy of promotion of local entrepreneurs as well as the limited capital base of the 
private sector. 
 
On the onset of privatization, government realized the need to support local buyers of 
SOEs. This was because all the local resources in banks were not enough to purchase 
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the available assets. For instance in 1989, while total bank deposits were Shs. 46 
billion [US$ 46 m], total SOEs assets were valued at Shs.200 billion [US$200 m] 
clearly showing that locals alone could not afford to purchase all the SOEs 
(Museveni, 1989). A detailed analysis of support is presented in Chapter Three. In 
the meantime, I present another ownership type - ‘state’. 
 
1.2.3.2. From state to ‘State’ Ownership 
At least two SOEs were sold to other local or foreign SOEs in a privatization-drive. 
This meant that essentially, the divestiture just replaced Central Government by 
another SOE or another state as in UCWL and UEDCL. First, before privatization 
Westmont Construction, a foreign company, owned 75 % and NH & CC (a SOE) and 
25 % of UCL shares. NH & CC was involved in the construction of houses in the 
country. On privatization in 1999, the company’s 500, 000 shares were offered for 
sale through public offerings (UCL Report, 2001:24). Out of a total of 60 % of the 
shares previously owned by government, over 45 % shares went to National Insurance 
Corporation (NIC) and National Social Security Fund (NSSF), both parastatals in the 
insurance and pension sectors respectively. In the study, UCWL is grouped as mixed 
state. 
 
In the second instance, the giant electricity provider Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) 
was sold to ESKOM, another SOE of South Africa. Before privatization, UEB had a 
sole monopoly of generation, transmission, distribution and regulation of electricity in 
Uganda. On privatization in 2000, however, UEB was split into 4 companies, namely, 
Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited (UEGCL), Uganda Electricity 
Distribution Company Limited (UEDCL), Uganda Electricity Transmission Company 
Ltd (UETCO), and a regulating body (ERA). ESKOM was a fully state-owned 
enterprise in South Africa but bought the Uganda Electricity Generation Company 
Limited (UEGCO). Essentially, this meant reducing the size of the Ugandan state but 
increasing the influence of the South African state in Uganda and also establishing a 
route of transfer of foreign exchange earnings since UEB was a net exporter of 
electricity.26  
 
Unlike other countries, Uganda had left her power sector, the engine of economic 
growth, with private investors. There were many examples in and outside Africa to 
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show that power sectors are best run by national governments and not private 
investors.  For instance, in Africa, Algeria produces 6,468MW; Morocco 4,687 MW, 
Ethiopia 1,200 MW and South Africa 4, 0676 MW but their sectors were still being 
run by the national governments. Elsewhere, Canada produces 104,371MW, China 
116,287 MW, Japan 268,287 MW and South Korea 54,673 MW but these 
governments still run their power sectors.27 In the study, UEGCL is categorized as a 
private foreign-owned firm. These firms were transferred to a new ‘state’ ownership 
because the buyers were not precluded to invest in SOEs. Theoretically, however, 
ethical questions were raised 
 
In summary, on the advent of privatization, the Ugandan economy was in a state of 
decay with scarcity of most of the essential goods needed in life; and the SOE sector 
was substantial. Government justified privatization on the grounds of budget deficit 
and efficiency in SOEs. The new ownership of the privatized enterprises was difficult 
to completely describe although the major ownership type was the local-foreign 
pattern. Next, I introduce what the study is about. 
1.3    Problem formulation, objectives and significance 
The study set out to answer the research question: What has been the effect of 
privatization on budget deficit and firm performance, and what factors have 
influenced privatization effectiveness on firm performance in Uganda?  
 
The reasons for undertaking the study are rooted in the fact that although three studies 
exist on the privatization assessment by ROU (1993), UMA (2000) and Ddumba-
Ssentamu and Mugume (2001), they tended to emphasis fiscal impact and firm 
performance but ignored what makes privatization to be effective including issues 
such as corporate governance, regulation and structure that Galal et al (1994) found 
important in the monopoly environments.  To a limited extent, UMA (2000) and 
Ddumba-Ssentamu and Mugume (2001) briefly looked at motivation and workers’ 
conditions on top of the fiscal impact and firm performance change. As such, this 
study contributes to Ugandan privatization assessment by focusing on fiscal impact 
and firm performance by using updated data from 1992 to 2003 and also investigates 
the factors that influenced privatization effectiveness and therefore firm performance 
such as corporate governance, regulation, structure and motivation.  Hence, empirical 
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work contains new micro-level information based on data from enterprise official 
records from 1986 to 2003.  
 
In the study, privatization was measured in two ways: first as ownership patterns of 
state-mixed-private (S_M_P) by comparing either privatized with state firms (S_P), or 
a comparing a combination of state with mixed against privatized firms (S/M_P), or 
comparison between mixed and private firms (M_P). Second, privatization was also 
measured as the movement from state ownership (s) to private (p) being before and 
after privatization. On the other hand, firm performance changes were approximated 
by three variables, namely: total factor productivity (TFP), returns on capital 
employed (ROCE) and return on sales (ROS) and their hybrid APCs and RPCs. Both 
regulation and structure were measured nominally by denoting different regulatory 
tools and industrial structure numbers from one (1) to (4) in each case respectively. 
Corporate governance was measured in two ways: as the processes by which 
companies are directed and controlled. It is the set of processes, customs, policies, 
laws and institutions affecting the way corporations are managed broken into 
directing, administering and controlling. Corporate governance was alternatively 
estimated as issues of accountability and fiduciary duty, essentially advocating the 
implementation of guidelines and mechanisms to ensure good behaviour and protect 
shareholders. Lastly, motivation was approximated by salary, fringe benefits as well 
as job security.  
 
The following research questions and hypotheses, which the data was specifically 
collected to answer, shaped the study.   
• What is the nature of property rights in the private sector? This question is 
answered in the ‘’introduction and theoretical framework’’ in Chapter One.  
• What are the linkages between public and private enterprises in Uganda?  
What were the constraints of SOEs on the budget? What happened when 
PSOEs become unviable? These questions are answered in Chapter Three on 
Fiscal impact of Privatization. 
• What are the legal aspects of management in the public enterprises on one 
hand and the private sector on the other?  What are the transaction costs of the 
negotiations between the managers and the bureaucracy? Could have an 
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internal restructuring been carried out? These questions are answered in 
Chapter Four on ‘corporate governance in the public and private sectors in 
Uganda;’’  
• How is the private sector regulated? What is the impact of regulation on firm 
performance change? These questions are answered in the Chapter Five. 
• What are motivation (salary, fringe benefited, and job security in the private 
and public sectors in Uganda? Could some wages or interest have been eased 
in some ways? These questions are answered in the Chapter Six on motivation  
• What happened to the performance measured by efficiency and profitability 
after privatization? This question is answered under ‘’Privatization, 
Ownership and Performance” in Chapter Seven. 
 
The study expects the answers to the above questions to be as follows: 
• Given the history of nationalizations, I expect the property rights in the private 
sector to be dominated by the local owners.  
• The linkages between public and private enterprises and constraints of SOEs 
on the budget after privatization are expected to be similar to those before 
privatization given the various obstacles faced by business in Uganda?  As 
such, I expect PSOEs to be bailed out when they become bankrupt. 
• I expect drastic changes in corporate governance in the fully privatized firms. 
Similarly, I also expect the transaction costs also to fall considerably after 
privatization in Chapter four.  
• I expect regulation took a very extreme position of opening up and 
dismantling tariff and non-tariff barriers with the advent of WTO. The null 
hypothesis (Ho) for each of these variables is that there is no difference in firm 
performance caused by structure or regulation resulting from a change in 
ownership changes or that state firms perform as well as the private ones. The 
alternative hypothesis (Ha) is that there is there is a difference in firm 
performance arising from ownership changes associated to structure or 
regulation.  
• I expect the conditions of hiring and firing in the private sector to be poorer 
compared to the public sector? This is because the government has since 1989 
supported investors at the expense of workers. At the same time, I expect that 
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there were possibilities of easing wages or interest in an attempt to restructure 
SOEs. 
• Lastly, the null hypothesis (Ho) is that there is no difference in performance 
caused by ownership changes or that state firms perform as well as the private 
ones. The alternative hypothesis (Ha) is that there is there is a difference in 
performance caused by ownership changes or that state firms (SOEs) perform 
differently from PSOEs ones in Chapter Seven. 
 
1.3.1   Objectives 
The study targets two separate sets of outputs including:  
i) To investigate the effect of privatization on: 
• . Subsidies, Public-private linkages; budget deficit and taxation;  
• . Firm performance change in general, FDI and sectors in particular; and 
ii) To investigate the determinants of privatization effectiveness including 
corporate governance including transactions costs, regulation, structure, 
motivation on firm performance.  
1.3.2   Significance 
This study is important in two ways as a showcase and to serve policy purposes. In 
the first aspect, Uganda has since the early 1990s till recently been a World Bank/IMF 
showcase. The country experienced high growth rates averaging 5 % since the early 
1990s. The study is expected to document leading sectors such as foreign-local and 
state-mixed-private ownership.  
 
Secondly, the study addresses key issues of pricing, efficiency and budget deficits in 
the privatized enterprises. Results of the study are expected to show the exploitation 
of consumers by private monopoly producers. The study identifies the role of the state 
as the custodian of justice and rights. It is interesting to demonstrate how the extent of 
monopoly power of the privatised enterprises infringes rights and justice in this era of 
democracy termed “popular capitalism”. All of these are expected to contribute to the 
perception of Uganda’s political and policy process as it affects industry in terms of 
regulation, control and taxation strategies to promote democracy, equity and 
economic growth.  
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1.4   Structure of the Thesis 
The study is divided into a theoretical framework; chapters extrapolating on 
methodological and empirical questions; and, a summary chapter. Chapter One is the 
introduction. It looks at the historical development   and contribution of the SOEs 
sector to development of the Ugandan economy; the problem statement, objectives 
and significance of privatization; and the nature of the new property rights. It gives a 
theoretical discussion of privatization. It also outlines the necessary factors for 
effectiveness of privatization such as corporate governance, regulation, structure, and 
motivation. Chapter Two is the methodology and shows how the variables were 
estimated and analyzed. Chapter Three has two parts of linkages between the private 
and public sectors and relates SOE subsidies to the budget deficits. Chapters Four to 
six are determinants of privatization. Chapter Four, in particular, is about corporate 
governance. It explores differences in management between the public and private 
sectors. Chapter Five covers post-privatization regulation and its impact firm 
performance.  Chapter Six is about motivation. It also investigates the relationship 
between firm performance and motivation. Chapter Seven looks at the impact of 
privatization on firms’ performance at the micro level and also FDI and sector on firm 
performance. While Chapter Three investigates effect of privatization on budget 
deficits; chapter seven explores effect of privatization on the efficiency of firms. 
Lastly Chapter Eight is the discussion of the study. A reader who is short of time can 
read Chapter Eight to get the gist of the entire study.  
 
1.5  Theoretical Analysis: Privatization, Budget Deficits and Firm Performance   
There are several reasons why growth is preferred as a strategy.  Through 
manufacturing, it offers higher value added, and the prices of manufactured goods are 
fairly more stable than primary products, it has higher employment potential 
compared to agriculture, it promises higher family incomes and improved quality of 
life especially for the growing numbers of workers who have little land (Pedersen and 
McCormick, 1999:109).  Only a few countries with small populations and great oil or 
natural resource wealth like Libya and Kuwait can achieve a very high per capita 
income without industrializing (Riendel, 1988:6). Over the last sixty years, a shift 
occurred on the thinking of which, between state and the private sector, should be the 
primary mover of this growth.  
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Privatization targets broadening the scope of the private sector, or the assimilation by 
the public sector of efficiency-enhancing, private sector techniques (Adam, 
Cavendish, and Percy Mistry, 1992:6). It involves either divestiture or reform of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). While divestiture involves the sale of SOEs to the private 
sector through private placement, public offerings or competitive bidding by a 
strategic investor; public enterprise reform on the other hand allows private operators 
to compete in sectors that had been the exclusive domain of the SOEs (de-
monopolize); break up a monopoly into various branches of activities to stimulate 
competition; and transfer of the management of SOEs from public to private hands 
through contracts, leases or concessions (Otobo Eloho, 1998: 23; Rwekaza 
Mukandala 1998:29; Cook and Kirkpatrick,  1988:4). What were the origins and 
trends of privatization? 
 
1.5.1. The Genesis of Privatization: From State to the Private Sector 
Before 1980s, privatization was not an issue. Instead, a crusade basing on 
modernization theory recommended a very strong state intervention in the 
development after the successful interventions of the great depression of the 1930s. It 
was thought that newly independent countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia 
lacked their own skilled manpower, entrepreneurs, technical expertise, infrastructure, 
other supporting services and private capital formation adequate to meet the needs of 
an accelerated national development. During the 1950s and 1960s, it was thought that 
what was required in development was to bridge the gaps.28 In order to identify the 
gaps, there was need for National Development Plans (NDPs).29Statism and planning 
were enthusiastically embraced in LDCs that saw it as a reaction against colonialism, 
the political appeal for development, rapid progress elsewhere and donors who 
demanded accountability for the use of funds. For instance, statism and development 
planning offered the African leaders chance to reverse the negative effects of 
colonialism where LDCs acted as markets or consumers of European manufactured 
goods and sources of cheap minerals, agricultural and wood commodities (Hyden, 
1995:1; Ayitteh, 1994:149; Hollis Chenery, 1971). Today, with the exception of the 
HPAEs, most LDCs still lack their own skilled manpower, entrepreneurs, technical 
expertise, infrastructure, other supporting services and private capital formation 
adequate to meet the needs of accelerated national development despite heavy state 
intervention in the economies in the 1960s and 1970s. The mistakes termed 
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‘government failures’ made during state interventions era paved the way for rolling 
back the state and privatization. 
 
1.5.2. The state and Development 
In 1970s, utilitarianism turned to government through the public choice theory. It was 
theorized that although it is assumed that the government, politicians, bureaucrats, 
voters and interest groups pursue public interest to secure the state, this does not 
always occur and instead these groups are motivated by self-interest. First, 
governments are neither democratic nor do they act benevolently to secure the public 
interest, provide public goods or maximize welfare of their citizens. Instead, they 
consolidate themselves in power. Governments are not committed to any particular 
policies and they change them in order to maximize votes.  Yet still, even if the state 
is well intentioned, it is not always an expert and in the process, and it just muddles 
through. It is also possible for government to fail due to the several uncertainties and 
limited capacity of institutions in considering large number of alternatives within a 
short period of time. On the other extreme, government may set itself a limited task to 
perform. Second, both voters and politicians are rational beings who seek to maximize 
their own welfare. Third, bureaucrats are also rational beings who seek to maximize 
their own personal, material gains and welfare such as income, power, prestige, votes, 
patronage, own convenience and popularity. Bureaucrats try to improve their own 
welfare in terms of salaries, esteem and influence by seeing to it that their offices 
become as large as possible; they make deliberate, aggressive budget demands and 
expansive re-organizations. They have neither the will nor the motivation to 
economize and are characterised by wastefulness of national resources through 
unnecessarily large budgets. Government agencies are different from business units; 
they continue to expand without any attempt at minimizing costs due to their 
monopoly positions. In order to eliminate the waste by governments, there is a need to 
keep down the size of the public sector [Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994:188; Dearlove, 
1987; Leif, 1991:3-6; Downs, 1957; Killick Tony, 1983; Vickers and Yallow, 1988; 
D. Lal, 1993].  This was the basis of privatization, which started with Britain in 1981. 
The public choice theory has been critiqued on management roles.30 Stretton and 
Lionel (1994:131) maintain that voters do not target material gains from elections but 
ideology; self-expression; family, racial, party affiliations; religious orientation, 
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nationalism and sentiments. Despite the empirical evidence, more theoretical attack 
spread to state involvement in public enterprises.  
 
1.5.3. Privatization and Budget Deficits  
Supporters of privatization suggest a wide, distinct rift between public and private 
sectors whereby the former is in the political and the latter in the economic arenas. 
They also suggest that the discipline of the private sector emanates from take-over, 
mergers and bankruptcy that may force shareholders to withdraw their shares if the 
enterprise were badly managed (Madsen, 1988). While private firms rely purely on 
private finance, and control is left to the shareholders and creditors who bear all the 
risks, SOEs are financed directly from the treasury and do not have access to private 
financial channels. Hence, loss-making SOEs do not close but are bailed out. 
Privatization, therefore, targets cutting the umbilical cord linking the state (treasury) 
from the enterprises and improving the budget deficits (Roland, 1994:1164). This 
theory of budget deficit-reducing privatization has been refuted due to the existence of 
public-private linkages.  
 
Opponents of privatization have refuted the uniqueness of the private sector. 
Commander and Killick (1988:111) argue that apart from the contractual transfers of 
tax supports and regional subsidies there exist other hidden transfers linking up the 
public and private sectors. They maintain that the state continues guaranteeing loans 
to the private sector particularly for more risky or subcontracted operations.  Besides, 
in LDCs where most SOEs are loss-making, divestiture is only feasible if combined 
with privileges to buyer like monopoly of the market and tax concessions. In many 
LDCs, there are high degrees of inter-independence between the public and the 
private sectors. In others, the private sector relies on state contracts for its 
accumulation, either through the supply of goods or services to the state or from the 
procurements of production sub-contracts. Joint ventures exist in several countries. 
The private sector is in search of a state that will nurture, re-enforce, insure and 
subsidize its development.  
 
Gibbons (1996:769) also refutes a purely private sector and exposes several examples 
of public-private linkages in both Africa and Europe including: 
i) Operational vertical and horizontal complementarities; 
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ii)  State connections in enterprises at all state levels with the private enterprise; 
iii) State support in terms of credit, land, subsidy, tariff barriers, guarantees of 
monopoly market, inputs and state contracts etc; 
iv) Illicit state connections involving siphoning off of start-up capital, corruption of 
taxing authority, continuous shielding of wholly illegal activities from police 
intervention; and, 
v) State as the employer of the owner of the enterprise. Even if linkages between 
state and private sector did not exist, budget deficits would still exist in many 
LDCs due to structural features of the world economy.  Empirically, I 
investigate public-private linkages and their effect on the budget in Uganda in 
Chapter Three. 
 
Methodically, the effect of privatization on the budget depends on how the sales 
proceeds are treated. Usually, the proceeds may be applied in two ways. The first is 
that the sales are taken as a flow, revenue or an income for spending. The second is 
when the sale revenue is taken as an asset to generate future incomes.  In the latter 
case, the asset is expected to generate streams of incomes over a long period of time 
and assessment of its effect must be through use of net present values (NPVs) or 
internal rates of return (IRR). In Chapter Three, I consider the sales revenue as a flow. 
 
Available empirical evidence on privatization and budget deficit shows mixed results 
in DCs and minimal results in LDCs. In DCs, the deficit increased in Hungary but fell 
for for utility companies in the United Kingdom. In East Germany, SOEs managed to 
move from the treasury to bank finance (Bos, 1993; Bager, 1993; Yallow, 1993). In 
the LDCs, only Mexico managed to reduce the budget deficit.   
 
For instance, a general problem facing privatized firms in transition economies was 
that of raising capital to ensure their economic survival especially if purchased by 
insiders (locals with a limited capital base) leading to a high level of liquidations. In 
such a case, government may prefer to subsidize many of its privatized firms to avoid 
liquidation. This action could mean either re-nationalization of a partial nature or 
guarantee bank loans to privatized firms (PSOEs) to solve credit rationing (Roland, 
1994:1163). Empirically, evidence from China and Africa supports the constraints 
theory. 
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In China, prior to the growth of rural industries, availability of knowledge and 
resources from overseas Chinese who supported market competition, institutional 
change and financial pressures made privatization work (Rawski, 1994:271). In 
Africa, however, Campbell and Bhatia (2001:85) report mixed results from 
privatization. In the majority of firms, additional investment after privatization 
exceeded the sales values particularly in PSOEs sold to foreigners. A few enterprises 
that closed down were constrained by insufficient funds, difficulties in raising 
additional capital and competition in the liberalized markets.  
 
In Uganda, Ddumba and Mugume (2001) consider the effect of privatization and tax 
revenue on the one hand and firm performance on the other. They, however, do not calculate 
the extent to which SOE subsidies contributed to the deficit, although they mention that 
government made substantial savings from privatization. In addition, they do not 
show the linkages that still existed between the state and private sector. In Chapter 
Three, I show the extent to which SOE subsidies contributed to the deficit before and 
after privatization and also how the state continues to intervene in the PSOEs. 
 
1.5.4.  Privatization and Corporate Governance  
Current preoccupation with corporate governance is due to two events: The first was 
the East Asian Crisis of 1997 that saw the economies of Thailand, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Malaysia and The Philippines severely affected by the exit of foreign capital 
after property assets collapsed. The absence of corporate governance mechanisms 
highlighted the weaknesses of the institutions in these economies. The second event 
was the American corporate crises of 2001-2 which saw the collapse of two big 
corporations, Enron and WorldCom, and subsequent scandals and collapses of Arthur 
Andersen, Global Crossing and Tyco. 
 
Corporate governance is a multi-faceted subject that has come to mean two things. On 
the one hand, it is the processes by which companies are directed, administered and 
controlled. It is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting 
the way corporations are managed broken into directing, administering and 
controlling. Management is the act of directing and controlling a large group of 
people for the purpose of coordinating and harmonizing the group towards 
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accomplishing a goal beyond the scope of individual effort and encompasses the 
deployment and manipulation of human, financial, technological, and natural 
resources.31 In the study, I represent corporate governance by objective setting; the 
size and composition of the board, how it is appointed, and how it functions. The 
second meaning of the term refers to a field in economics, which studies the many 
issues arising from the separation of ownership and control.  This is a relationship 
among the stakeholders and the goals for which the corporation is governed. While 
principal players are the shareholders, management and the board of directors, the 
minors include employees, suppliers, customers, banks and other lenders, regulators, 
the environment and the community at large. An important theme of corporate 
governance deals with issues of accountability and fiduciary duty, essentially 
advocating the implementation of guidelines and mechanisms to ensure good 
behaviour and protect shareholders.32 In this section, I represent corporate governance 
by transaction costs. 
 
The concerns for corporate governance for this study, however, arises from the 
argument by Galal et al (1994:10) that in uncompetitive market situations, the effect 
of privatization depends on how the private sector is managed. Several other writers 
explain why privatization triggers off performance change. These include the 
differences in objectives, board appointments, and transaction costs (Cockery, 1992; 
Galal et al, 1994; Larson, 1997, Eggertson, 1990; Toye, 1995), which are elaborated 
on immediately. 
 
1.5.4.1. Corporate Objectives  
Unlike the private company that targets profit, the SOEs have several roles they 
perform in the economy including producing or provision of a public good, 
distribution of the national cake through balanced regional development, regulation to 
bring about fairness and equity, social welfare by hiring a large number of redundant 
workers, and planning for the economy. Larson (1997:131-3), therefore, stresses that 
privatization is based on a wrong assumption that the relationship of the state to its 
citizens is basically similar to that existing between private business and its 
customers. On the contrary, the differences between private and public in any country 
are not an accident but intended because governments unlike business enterprises 
need to offer equal treatment, fairness and equity to people and not necessarily to 
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make a profit out of each and every venture. Hence public bosses cannot have a 
customer focus in the same way that private enterprises do.  
 
The performance of SOEs, therefore, is not a result of ownership per se but lies in 
both the objectives of public and private enterprises. Whereas private enterprises 
pursue profit, SOEs may pursue whatever the government wants and is able to finance 
such as the promotion of social welfare by not exploiting monopoly position or by 
hiring a large number of redundant workers (Galal et al, 1994:10). Privatization 
materially affects management behaviour with important implications on efficiency. 
Ownership is, hence, important because it affects performance indirectly through 
management and the objectives of owners of the firms and the systems of monitoring 
managerial performance (Vickers and Yallow, 1988). So ownership is important, but 
observers have to look at objectives more than the mere ownership set-up.  
 
1.5.4.2.  Who Appoints the Board, its Functions and Size 
Board size and who appoints members were two major issues influencing differences 
between the public and private enterprises in the world. Whereas Board size in the 
private sector company is normally small and is appointed by shareholders who have 
a quantifiable stake in the enterprise and the Board is responsible for seeing the 
business of the company is conducted in their best interests, this was not the case in 
SOEs. Public enterprises keep large boards comprising members who are appointed 
by politicians. . The Board then appoints the chief executive of the company who is 
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. Second, in the private 
sector, the traditional view of the main functions of the board includes three activities 
of establishing corporate objectives and strategies of achieving them, monitoring and 
evaluation of the enterprise performance and hiring and firing of chief executives 
(SHOME) (Corkery, 1992).  The big boards can partly be explained either by the 
multi-purpose nature of SOEs and the need to include as many disciplines as possible 
on the one hand, or the need for representation of the various stakeholders on the 
other. 
 
In the SOEs, however, ownership with quantifiable investment is difficult to identify. 
Control of enterprise operations is complicated as a result of difficulties in identifying 
ownership that may be represented by groups such as the community, electorate and 
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taxpayers in parliamentary systems. Control is difficult because whether the Board of 
a public enterprise reports to a Minister, to Parliament or governing party, it is still in 
effect reporting to another representative body. At the same time, problems crop up in 
the governance structure of public enterprises. Several groups including executive 
management, board members, political heads of the parent ministry, civil servants and 
other officials of the other organs of central government such as the finance ministry 
have a role in policy decisions of the individual enterprises. The nature and degree of 
interest of each group differ and thus create inconsistencies in objectives (Corkery, 
1992).  
 
Empirically, I investigate who appoints the board members, size, and functions of the 
board in SOEs in Chapter Four on corporate governance. The agency theory, 
however, argues that those management problems in firms are not unique to SOEs 
alone but occur even in private firms that separate ownership from management. 
 
1.5.4.3. Transaction costs 
The most important issue was not ownership per se but rather the separation of 
management from ownership. Although economic analysis normally assumes that the 
main objective of private enterprise is to maximize profits, the separation of 
ownership from management can make this impossible. The existence of shareholders 
and managers brings about the problems of principal-agent relationships (Rees, 
1985).33 An agency relationship is established when a principal delegates some rights 
over a resource to an agent who is bound by a contract to represent the principal’s 
interest in return for payment. The problems arise from the differing objectives and 
availability of information of the shareholders and managers (Eggertsson, 1990). 
While the principal tries to induce the agent to act in the principal’s interests, he lacks 
information about the circumstances and behaviour of the agent, which causes a 
monitoring problem (Vickers and Yallow, 1988). Since the agent collects more 
information, he is in most cases more knowledgeable than the principal, causing 
“opportunistic behaviour” and agency costs. One solution to opportunistic behaviour 
was to carry out audits or sharing profits (Eggertsson, 1990). Empirically, I 
investigate the monitoring and transaction costs in public and private sectors in 
Chapter Four. But one observable effect of separation of ownership from management 
are agency or transaction costs. 
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1.5.4.4. Transaction Costs Arising Out of Agency 
Transaction costs involve finding out what the relevant prices are, negotiating and 
concluding contracts and monitoring and enforcing these transactions. They are 
information, travel and communication, hospitality, default risks and contract 
enforcement costs. A common theory is that transactions cost increase with 
decreasing clarity of property rights (Harriss et al, 1995; Harriss-White, 1995).34 
Basing on the Harriss theories, it is argued that privatization reduces transaction costs. 
Alternatively put, SOE transaction costs exceed those of the private sector. 
Transaction costs can be measured using cost-effectiveness analysis comparing 
market with government.  This is explained by the fact that the private sector is more 
cost-effective than SOEs or government. If government operations turn out to be 
cheaper, this rare situation then requires explanation. The bigger transaction costs of 
government can be explained by the budget-maximizing behaviour of the bureaucrats 
already explained. 
 
Comparatively, the DCs are in a better position to enforce contracts than LDCs 
because of an effective judicial system and well established bodies of law and agents 
like lawyers, arbitrators, mediators and cases can be settled on the basis of merit 
(North, 1990:52-3). There was no similar evidence in LDCs. Empirically; I 
investigate the effect of privatization on transaction costs in Chapter Four. But 
differences between SOEs and private firms are not always due to internal factors of 
the firm, but may also be due to industrial structure in which the firm operates. 
 
1.5.5. Privatization, Regulation35 and Firm Performance   
Galal et al (1994) argue that for both DCs and LDCs privatization bears automatic 
payoffs in competitive markets; but in non-competitive markets it dependents on how 
the private sector is regulated.  
 
In the private sector, regulation36 performs social functions of connectivity between 
one private provider of a service and another, creating a level playing ground like 
granting licenses to old and new entrants, correcting market failures and ensuring 
equity, and health, environmental and other social reasons. In case of social 
regulation, individual companies may not consider the total social costs of a firm 
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necessitating intervention to correct the anomaly [Guasch and Hahn, 1999:2; Otobo, 
1998:24].  
 
The empirical evidence of the 1990s between privatization and regulation is 
contradictory.  On the one hand, Sunita Kikeri et al (1992) argue that privatization 
yields immediate positive benefits to productivity and consumer welfare in 
competitive environment in the tradable sectors like industry, airlines, agriculture and 
trade in the DCs (column 2, Table 1.1). On the contrary, the sale of enterprises in non-
competitive markets like natural monopolies in the utility sector such as water, power, 
and telecommunications requires a property, competitive, corporate, dispute 
resolution and environmental law, and consumer protection regulatory system 
(column 3, Table 1.1). A regulatory framework is necessary to separate competitive 
activities, establish a tariff regime, clarify service goals, minimize costs and monitor 
the process.  
Table 1 1 Privatization Implementation, Decisions and Performance 
Enterprise Conditions (Market Conditions) Country Conditions 
Competition37 Imperfect Competition 
High Capacity to regulate; 
market friendly.38 
Decision: Sell Decision: Ensure or install 
appropriate regulatory environment; 
Then consider sale 
Low capacity to regulate; 
Market unfriendly. 
Decision: Sale, 
with attention 
to competitive 
conditions. 
Decision: Consider privatization of 
management; Install market friendly 
policy framework; Then consider sale. 
Source: Sunita Kikeri et al, 1992. 
Despite the ‘intervention’ aura, regulation was not always a job by the state and self-
regulation has taken place in insurance, professions like medical, legal, the press and 
aviation. When self-regulation occurs by transferring power to a trade body or 
voluntary association, it can be beneficial in reducing government costs, and public 
bureaucracy, and places in office people who know the activity (Madsen, 1988:186-
7). 
 
Water Science and Technology Board (WSTB, 2002:87) explained why regulation 
could cause change in firm performance.  It is argued that recent regulation tends to 
focus on performance issues and their limitations in producing performance-
incentives, performance-based rate-making, or benchmarking, price-caps, that may 
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not only change the regulatory environment for privatization but also create avenues 
for utilities to benefit from innovation and efficiency.39 
 
Economic efficiency is promoted if utility rates more accurately reflect the true cost 
of services. Rate structures can improve economic efficiency by reflecting marginal 
costs, including the opportunity costs of the good associated with alternative supply 
options. Private contract providers have incentives to increase operational efficiency. 
State regulation requires cost-based pricing to ensure that cost savings from 
privatization will be passed along to ratepayers (WSTB, 2002:87. In this way, 
regulation may influence performance change in a forward direction. But this is not 
always the case. 
 
However, there is no assurance that utilities will pass along such savings. In such a 
situation, the prospect of higher rates may discourage asset privatization and can 
contribute to some instances of “reverse privatization,” or “municipalization”. 
(WSTB, 2002:87). When this occurs, regulation will influence performance change in 
a backward manner creating a cause-effect relationship. 
 
Empirically, I investigate the nature and existence of a relationship between 
regulation and performance change. I estimate regulation nominally by four types of 
regulation including tariffs (TBs) and non-tariff barriers (NTBs); minimum financial 
requirements (MFRs) such as MCR and CRR; price control and licensing. I also 
discuss self and public regulation in Chapter Five.  
 
1.5.6. Privatization, Structure and Firm Performance  
The differences between public and private enterprises are in such away that in 
monopoly markets, the predictions of theory are ambiguous (indeterminate) and 
depend on how the private sector is structured (Galal et al, 1994:11). This is so due to 
the fact that privatization is assumed to enhance both productive and allocative 
efficiencies, leading to lower-cost production (production efficiency) and forcing 
down of consumer prices (price efficiency) so that they are closer to the marginal cost 
of production (p ≅ MC) (Christopher Adam et al, 1992:12). This, however, may not 
always occur as a result of lack of competition. 
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In imperfect competition, producers try to keep things a little scarce and charge prices 
above marginal costs (P>MC) with intention of maximizing profit (MC=MR). Hence, 
society gets less of the product at a higher price than it should be (Samuelson, 
1976:500). The restriction of output and charging higher prices causes divergence 
between efficiency and profitability. While profitability increases, efficiency falls due 
to lower innovations (Akyuz and Gore, 1994:3; World Bank, 1993: 215-7).  
 
Market structure (market form) which is measured by the concentration ratio of an 
industry is used as measure of the relative size of leading firms in relation to the 
industry as a whole. One commonly used concentration ratio is the four-firm 
concentration ratio, which consists of the combined market share of the four largest 
firms, as a percentage, in the total industry. This may also assist in determining the 
market form of the industry. In general, the N-firm concentration ratio is the 
percentage of market output generated by the N largest firms in the industry. Higher 
concentration ratios were related to greater market dominance of the leading firms. 
Market forms can often be classified by their concentration ratio. Listed, in ascending 
firm size, they are: 
• Perfect competition, with a very low concentration ratio, 
• Monopolistic competition, below 40% for the four-firm measurement, 
• Oligopoly, above 40% for the four-firm measurement (such as car 
manufacturers); 
• Monopoly, with a near-100% four-firm measurement. These characteristics 
are summarized in Table 1.2. 
Table 1 2  Basic Market Structures 
Market Structure Seller Entry Barriers Seller Number Buyer Entry Barriers Buyer Number 
Perfect Competition No Many No Many 
Monopolistic competition No Many No Many 
Oligopoly Yes Few No Many 
Oligopsony No Many Yes Few 
Monopoly Yes One No Many 
Monopsony No Many Yes One 
Source: http://www.wikipedia.org  
The imperfectly competitive structure is quite identical to the realistic market 
conditions where some monopolistic competitors, monopolists, oligopololists and 
duopolists exist and dominate the market conditions. These somewhat abstract 
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concerns tend to determine some but not all details of a specific concrete market 
system where buyers and sellers actually meet and commit to trade. 
 
The correct sequence of the market structure from most to least competitive is perfect 
competition, imperfect competition, oligopoly, and pure monopoly. The main criteria 
by which one can distinguish between different market structures are: the number and 
size of producers and consumers in the market, the type of goods and services being 
traded, and the degree to which information can flow freely (see Table 1.2). 
 
Market share may differ from market dominance. Although there are no hard and fast 
rules governing the relationship between the two, the following are general criteria: 
• A company, brand, product, or service that has a combined market share 
exceeding 60% most probably has market power and market dominance. 
• A market share of over 35% but less than 60%, held by one brand, product or 
service, is an indicator of market strength but not necessarily dominance. 
• A market share of less than 35%, held by one brand, product or service; 
neither shows strength nor dominance and cannot raise anti-monopoly 
concerns of government regulators.  
1.5.7. Privatization, Motivation and firm Performance  
Galal et al (1994:11) argue that in uncompetitive situations such as under monopoly, 
the theoretical predictions of the effect of privatization on firm performance are 
ambiguous and depend on how the public sector is motivated. This is explained by the 
fact that SOEs are normally overstaffed, constantly increased labour costs, and 
employ uneconomic working practices that emanate from the monopoly positions 
(Madsen, 1988;   Nellis, 2002). 
 
Motivation is having the desire and willingness to do something. A motivated person 
can be reaching for either a long-term or a short-term goal. In the work place, motivation has 
been developed by Herzberg. Herzberg (1968) in his "Motivator-Hygiene Theory’ 
distinguishes between Motivators and Hygiene factors. He argues that Motivators include 
things such as challenging work, recognition, responsibility which give positive satisfaction. 
On the other hand, Hygiene factors included aspects such as salary, fringe benefits, job 
security, and status which do not motivate if present, but if absent would result in de-
motivation.  The word Hygiene is used because, like hygiene, the presence would not make 
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you healthier, but absence can cause health deterioration.  A study of over 50 companies 
found relationship between low hygiene and low employee engagement. Employees 
consistently recorded low scores against management - Employees were optimistic 
about success but happy to complain about leadership since their hygiene factors had 
not been addressed. The implication was to sort the hygiene, then drive the 
motivation. Empirically, I measured motivation using salary, fringe benefits, and job 
security in Chapter Six on motivation and firm performance. 
 
Hygiene factors can cause dissatisfaction if missing but do not necessarily motivate 
employees if increased. They have mostly to do with the job environment and notable 
only when they are lacking and are extrinsic from the job itself. They included salary, 
company policy and administration, supervision, working conditions, interpersonal 
relations, status, and job security. Hertzberg called them hygiene factors because they 
prevent dissatisfaction only when present instead of increasing satisfaction; just as 
hygiene prevents disease only when present rather than increasing well-being.40 
 
Wages are often the key difference in efficiency between the public and private 
sectors with former especially vulnerable to increases in labour costs that are then 
passed on to the taxpayers.  These are due to monopoly positions of most of these 
SOEs and the unusual powers given to trade unions by the state as SOE owner. 
Unions in the public sector enjoy a higher leverage than those in the private sector. 
The public sector is characterized by restrictive work practices, agreements specifying 
that only certain tasks be performed by certain classes of employees and that unions 
are able to limit work at unpopular hours for their members. For instance, in Britain 
the unions in the public sector prohibit private firms from using use of part-time 
labour to cope with peak demand forcing public firms to hire permanent staff to 
handle extra demand. The private sector lacks such leverage since prices have to be 
kept competitive (Madsen, 1988:23-4). 
 
Available evidence on the effect of privatization on motivation shows that in Hungary 
and the United Kingdom wages increased in the executive ranks but not for other 
cadres (Bos, 1993; Yallow, 1993). Empirically, I investigate how privatization 
affected wages, fringe benefits, and job security in Chapter Six on motivation. I 
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particularly investigate whether they were missing before or after privatization and 
also attempt to trace the impact of motivation on firm performance.  
 
1.5.8. Privatization and Firm Performance 
Empirical evidence of the effect of privatization on firm performance is inconclusive. 
At times it has no effect (Omran 2002; Yallow, 1993), positive (Boardman & Vining, 
1989; Boycko, Schleifer & Vishny, 1993) and at times negative (Aharoni, 1986; 
Caves and Christensen, 1980). All these studies confess that privatization is more 
successful in trade and services than other sectors. The evidence creates a reason to 
consider sector as a factor influencing privatization effectiveness. 
 
1.5.8.1.  Are Local firms Inferior to Foreign-owned Ones? 
Graham (2000:88) suggests that foreign firms may be superior to local ones in aspects 
like out-sourcing foreign markets, superior goods, processing technologies, superior 
management skills, and access to markets not possessed by the local firms. 
Empirically, in Chapter Seven, I investigate the effect of FDI on firm performance 
change, and also whether sector and local-foreign ownership matter in post-
privatization performance change.  
 
1.5.8.2. Sector 
Studies in Eastern Europe have linked privatization with industrial development or 
structural transformation. The studies show that SAPs in general and privatization in 
particular in a fairly industrialized setting can either leave the industrial base the same 
or reduce it in preference for services and other sectors. Particularly, the studies show 
that with the exception of Czechoslovakia, all other countries of Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary 
and Rumania that undertook privatization in late 1980s and early 1990s resulted into a shift 
from industry to services and other activities. Between 1988 and 1991 following privatization 
in these Comecon countries, industrial shares in GDP were constant in Czechoslovakia at 72 
%, but fell for Bulgaria 63-61 %; 31-28 % in Hungary; 44-33 % in Poland; and 54-46 % in 
Rumania. In all instances, except Czechoslovakia, services improved but the agricultural was 
not conclusive - at times falling, constant or improving. In the relatively industrialized 
Czechoslovakia, agriculture was constant, improved in Bulgaria and Poland where the land 
belonged to the people but fell in Hungary where the industrial development was 
lowest (Roman, Rapaczynski, Earle et al, 1993:4&41). All the Comecon countries 
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had a relatively better industrial base of at least 30 % of GDP compared to Uganda 
with 20 %. These findings have two limitations of the short period considered, as well 
as the nature of growth path. 
 
First, the period between 1988 and 1991 was too short to rely on. Second, and of 
greater importance, was that the sector’s change was characteristic of growth path 
whereby economies moved from an agricultural setup, to industry and then services. 
Attributing sector changes solely to privatization or SAPs was simplistic and 
unrealistic. But there were other reasons for sector changes during reform. 
 
Hoj et al (1995:2) explain the superiority of services to industry as due to lack of 
exposure to international competition, strategic advantage, and specific market 
outlets. First, while trade is effective in shaping competition for manufactured goods, 
many services are not exposed to a high degree of competition. Therefore, de-
regulation and privatization remain key to shaping competition for services and the 
main elements in structural reform. Second, even if services are exposed to 
international competition, domestic producers tend to have a strategic advantage over 
foreign investors such as closeness to market or dominant market position. Third, 
since services are produced at the same place as they are consumed; international 
competition may depend on the number of outlets in the specific market. Empirically, 
in Chapter Seven, I investigate the effect of privatization on sectors (TRSE) on the 
one hand and firm performance change (APC & RPC) on the other hand. 
 
Lastly, Stretton and Lionel (1994:83-5) caution against too much investigation as to 
whether public enterprises are superior to private enterprises, because there is a 
possibility that at one time SOEs are better that PEs and at another PEs may be 
superior to SOEs. As such, acting on such results led reformers to concentrate on 
shifting activity from one mode to the other without improving the quality of either. 
In so doing, socialists concentrate on nationalizing while liberals concentrated on 
privatizing. The more important thing is to question the best role that each sector 
should play in a mixed economy in particular circumstance and given particular social 
purposes. Christian (1980) supported the danger of such comparison. 
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Empirical evidence supports the spatial nature of ownership forms. The Caves and 
Christian (1980) study supports the Lionel and Stretton hypothesis of dynamic 
efficiency over time. They compared TFP private (CP) and public (CN) Canadian 
railroads from 1956 and 1975 in competition. Using TFP41 as the measure of 
productive efficiency represented by real output per unit of real resources expenditure, 
their findings indicate that in the 1950s and 1960s CN lagged behind than CP, but this 
gap closed in the 1970s when there was no significant difference.  
1.6   Summary 
Although several theories explain privatization, I consider three different approaches 
for the three separate problems at hand. First, the theories of Commander and Killick 
(1988:111) on public-private linkages are important for analyzing fiscal impact of 
privatization. Second, the Cook and Kirkpatrick summaries of privatization effect 
being positive, negative or non-existent lend a firm foundation for analyzing 
privatization and firm performance. At times it has no effect (Omran 2002; Yallow, 
1993), positive (Boardman & Vining, 1989; Boycko, Schleifer & Vishny, 1993) and 
at times negative (Aharoni, 1986; Caves and Christensen, 1980).  They also hint on 
the superiority of services to industry, suggesting the role the sector plays in 
influencing privatization outcomes  explained by Lens Hoj et al (1995) as due to lack 
of exposure to international competition, strategic advantage, and specific market 
outlets of services. Third and last, theories of Galal et al (1995) are central in 
analyzing the effectiveness of privatization on performance change since they 
consider corporate governance, regulation and motivation. In Chapter Two, I show the 
scientific processes I went through to arrive at results presented in the Chapters Three 
to Seven and summarize the findings in Chapter Eight. 
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Chapter 2 
 
2. Methodology 
This chapter has eight parts including research design,  population and sample choice, 
data sources and types, methodology limitations, determining the privatization date of 
state and private ownership period, a statement of how the variables were measured, 
testing techniques and analysis, and the scope. 
2.1. Research Questions and Design 
2.1.1. Research Questions: Where I could and could not answer 
In Chapter One, I theoretically argued that privatization is influenced by transaction 
costs, the way the public sector is managed and motivated, and the way the private 
sector is structured and regulated. In this chapter, I phrase the various questions and 
also prepare to answer them empirically.  Data was specifically collected to answer 
the following research questions:  
• What is the nature of property rights in the private sector? This question is 
answered in the ‘Introduction and Theoretical Framework’ in Chapter One.  
• What are the linkages between public and private enterprises in Uganda?  
What were the constraints of SOEs on the budget? What happened when 
PSOEs become unviable? These questions are answered in Chapter Three on 
‘Fiscal Impact of Privatization’. 
• What are the legal aspects of management in the public enterprises on the one 
hand and the private sector on the other?  What are the transaction costs of the 
negotiations between the managers and the bureaucracy? Could have an 
internal restructuring been carried out? These questions are answered in 
Chapter Four on ‘Corporate Governance in the Public and Private Sectors in 
Uganda’.  
• How is the private sector regulated? What is the impact of regulation on firm 
performance change? These questions are answered in the Chapter Five. 
• What are motivation (salary, fringe benefited, and job security in the private 
and public sectors in Uganda? Could some wages or interest have been eased 
in some ways? These questions are answered in the Chapter Six on 
’Motivation’.  
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• What happened to the performance measured by efficiency (TFP) and 
profitability (ROS and ROCE) after privatization? This question is answered 
under ‘Privatization, Ownership and Performance’ in Chapter Seven. 
2.1.2. Research Design 
The study is non-experimental in approach. First, non-experimental refers to research 
that lacks manipulation of the independent variable by the researcher. Hence; the 
researcher studies what naturally occurs or has already occurred; and how variables 
are related. I chose non experimental because human beings are not subject to 
experimental manipulations or randomization (Kate Ann Levin, 2006:24-5). 
2.2    Data Collection Techniques and Instruments 
2.2.1 Population and sample size 
In 1992, out of a total of 146 enterprises, 39 were either struck off the company 
register or liquidated, leaving 117 that were then listed for privatization. By January 
2004, 78 SOEs were sold.  
Table 2. 1  Population of SOEs in Uganda 
Serial Privatization Activity Number of SOEs % Of Total 
1 Sold by January 2004 78 50.6 
2 Struck off Company register/Liquidated 39 25.3 
3 Cancelled Transactions** 3 1.9 
4 Awaiting Divestiture 31 20 
5 Residual* 3 1.9 
 Total  154 99.7 
Note:  *=Printpak, Uganda Spinning Mills Lira, Uganda Hotels Ltd; **=Nile hotel, PrintPak U Ltd,     
Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB). 
Source: Privatization Unit Records as at 21 March 2004. 
 
The Sample 
From a population of 117, a sample was 31 PSOEs was selected from firms that had 
audited books of accounts to enable comparison before and after privatization. The 31 
firms were divided into 22 industrial and 9 trading and services chosen on the basis of 
the available data. The sample size was justified basing on similar studies at the same 
academic level and in countries similar to Uganda.  Grosh (1988) in Kenya and 
Chirwa (2002) in Malawi did similar studies covering 77 firms over two years and six 
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firms over five years respectively. By the same measure, the current study had 31 
firms over 17 years which looked good enough. Company records were considered 
more reliable than interviews that would harbour value judgments. 
                                                                                              
2.2.2    Data Sources and Types 
2.2.2.1.   Primary data 
Primary data concerning firm performance and other variables such as staff 
motivation, corporate governance, and regulation was collected from PSOEs using 
questionnaires 1 a by three research assistants from September 2001 to December 
2002. Most of the questionnaires, however, were returned empty since respondents 
did not want to reveal financial matters. Out of 40 questionnaires supplied, only 28 
(70 %) were returned and those returned lacked a lot of significant details. I, 
therefore, resorted to the use of company data got from documents based on 
questionnaire 1b, also displayed in appendix.   
 
Primary data was extracted from companies’ annual reports and audited accounts. The 
annual financial reports of enterprises collected from various sources including the 
Auditor General’s Office, Privatization Monitoring Unit in the Ministry of Finance, 
Planning and Economic Development, line ministries, Makerere University Main 
Library, Uganda Revenue Authority, Registrar General’s Office in the Ministry of 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs and the enterprises themselves. Financial records 
were thought the best approach because of the sensitivity of replying to questions on 
financial matters in a questionnaire. Access to information in Uganda was difficult 
even in government departments. 
 
Although the law in Uganda requires limited liability companies to provide returns to 
the Registrar General in the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
periodically, few firms did so. The required returns include, among others, the 
turnover of the company and the audited accounts. Locally, audited books of accounts 
have three advantages in accessing bank loans, taxation allowable allowances, and 
government contracts. 
 
When applying for a loan, banks ask for records for the last three to four years to 
gauge income stability. Since the records are either inconsistent or unavailable, people 
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gamble with figures and in the end fail to qualify for loans. Second, good records help 
business identify sources of income, tax savings, and provide information on financial 
position and economic trends in other parts of the world. In Uganda, many local 
business people think that records are only for tax purposes. Proper record keeping 
informs an entrepreneur of his business losses and also protects businesses with 
regard to allowable expenses. For instance, if you supply services to government, 
there is withholding tax chargeable. But due to lack of records, this cannot be offset 
from the final tax and the business ends up paying more. Third, in order to qualify for 
a government contract, audited accounts are required. Yet failure to keep books of 
accounts was not the only problem; releasing them was another. 
 
There was difficulty of accessing government records even between government 
departments, as can be seen from an incident between the Inspector General of 
Government (IGG) and Solicitor General (SG) in 2004. The details involved a request 
by the IGG for a file from the Solicitor General’s office but the latter refused to 
comply. The action on the part of the Solicitor General indicated reluctance on his 
part to expose corrupt public officials to scrutiny and censure. It also exposed a 
problem where one government department could withhold vital information from 
another government department.42   
 
2.2.2.2.   Validity and Reliability 
Internal validity is an estimate of how much the study measurement is based on clean 
experimental techniques to enable clear-cut inferences about cause-consequence 
relations. One could choose experimental designs without random assignment of 
subjects or (if that is not possible) one would counterbalance for interfering variables 
then get an experiment with high internal validity.  External validity, on the other 
hand, concerns the extent one may safely generalize the conclusion derived from a 
statistical evaluation to the population outside the confines of the experimental 
situation.43 The validity was measured by a content validity index (CVI) that included 
the number of valid questions divided by the total number of questions in the 
instrument. Questionnaire 1 had 195 valid out of a total of 203 questions, giving a 
CVI of 0.95 that exceeded the cut-off point of 0.70 as required. Hence the 
Questionnaire 1 was valid. 
 
 50 
Reliability is the consistency of a set of measurements or measuring instrument. This 
can either be whether the measurements of the same instrument give (test-retest) or 
are likely to give the same measurement, or in the case of more subjective 
instruments, whether two independent assessors give similar scores (inter-rater 
reliability). Reliability does not imply validity. That is, a reliable measure is 
measuring something consistently, but not necessarily what it is supposed to be 
measuring. For example, while there are many reliable tests of specific abilities, not 
all of them would be valid for predicting, say, job performance. It is the extent to 
which the measurements of a test remain consistent over repeated tests of the same 
subject under identical conditions. An experiment is reliable if it yields consistent 
results of the same measure and unreliable if repeated measurements give different 
results.44 Practically, valid instruments are also reliable ones. Hence, using the fact that 
the instrument was valid, I also concluded that it was reliable.  
 
2.2.2.3    Secondary data: Legal and Trade Union Documents 
Secondary data was collected from the Ministry of Finance PU, PMU, the PERDS, 
Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), Uganda Investment Authority (UIA), Uganda 
Manufacturers’ Association (UMA), National Social Security Fund (NSSF), National 
Union of Commercial, Clerical, Profession and Technical Employees (NUCCPTE), 
National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU, Bank of Uganda (BoU), Company 
Registrar’s office in the Ministry of Justice, and the Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
(UBOS). Other sources of data included libraries at Centre for Basic Research (CBR), 
Makerere University Kampala (MUK), Ministry of Finance (MOF), World Bank and 
IMF offices in Uganda and CDR and Roskilde University in Denmark, CSSSC in 
Calcutta India, and the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) in Sweden.  
 
Legal document were collected from Barya and Company Advocates, while data on 
trade unions was collected from NOTU as well as the individual trade unions 
themselves such as Plantation (NUPAWU), NUCCPTE, Beverages and Tobacco 
(UBTAWU), Building and Construction (UBCCAWU), Electricity (UEAWU), Hotels 
and Foods (UHFAWU), Textiles, Garments and Leather (UTGLAWU) and 
Communications Union (UCEU). 
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2.2.3  Limitations 
Major problems encountered with the data included proxies, different accounting 
methods, and interpretation of profitability and efficiency results immediately 
elaborated. 
 
i)     Proxies 
A major problem encountered was that a number of variables could not resolutely be 
quantified. For instance, many enterprises providing services could not quantify their 
outputs.  Hence, the study used sales data as proxy for output.  This measure can be 
problematic if inventories are changing, in which case, sales would be a poor measure 
of output. For other variables such as regulation, motivation, management and 
structure I resorted to ordinal numbering for lack of an adequate measure. 
 
ii) Different accounting methods 
Most of the information was obtained from company-audited records. However, 
different enterprises have different auditing techniques especially in treatment of 
assets. The study took the information as given.  
 
iii) Limitations of Measurements of Efficiency and Profitability  
Productivity ratios (TFP) do reflect not only technical efficiency but also effects of 
firm size. Secondly, comparisons assume the same product mix and thus general lack 
of technical progress and the demand conditions for different products. Thirdly, there 
is a problem of assessing different inputs and outputs when firms use several inputs 
and produces heterogeneous products (UNCTAD, 1995:263). 
 
Efficiency means producing at the least cost, but this is problematic in that there are 
no products or goods, which are exactly the same. Alternatively, least cost may mean 
poor quality or that producers do not face the same input costs. Cheap products may 
be a result of underpayment of workers; marketing may improve production 
efficiency if it increases economies of scale and volume. It may also be that producers 
underpay their suppliers of inputs and overprice their products in situations of 
imperfect competition. Lastly, when production has multiple purposes, judgment of 
overall efficiency depends on value judgments (Stretton and Lionel, 1994:83-5). 
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Cost efficiency calculates cost per unit of output directly and then compares cost per 
unit under public and private ownership. The main limitation of cost efficiency 
measures is that differences in costs also reflect differences in input prices, efficiency, 
and changes in sale activity if ratios to scale are not constant (UNCTAD, 1995:264). 
 
Profitability might differ from efficiency for a number of reasons. Firstly, an 
inefficient firm might be profitable due to its structure or benefits from preferential 
arrangements like subsidized inputs or tax exemptions. Secondly, efficient firms may 
exhibit lower profitability due to controls on price or their output. Thirdly, differences 
in profitability might arise due to different accounting procedures in relation to 
treatment of items like depreciation, inflation and subsidies. In the study, all PSOEs 
were beneficiaries of tax incentives except companies like UETCL, UEDCL and 
UEGCL that were split from UEB. 
 
Lastly, there was a possibility of the impact not being detected due to time lags. The 
effect of privatization may not be felt for a long period of time. Secondly, the before 
and after method assumed that all changes were attributed to privatization without 
taking into account other factors like economic liberalization and deregulation which 
establishes a more competitive market environment (UNCTAD, 1995:265). 
 
iv)   Position of Researcher on Difficulty of Getting Data 
On several occasions, I was asked whether I would go back to my home country after 
the research. Unsuspectingly, I answered in the affirmative. The refusal to tell a lie in 
most cases resulted into denial of information in such places as the Bank of Uganda 
and the Privatization Unit. It occurred to me that the officials in government positions 
would have wished to give the information but feared the political implications should 
the research come out in the open. This gave me an impression that the privatization 
process in Uganda was highly political and not transparent. One fact, however, was 
that, an apolitical foreigner could have found it easier to collect data on privatization 
than a Ugandan.  
 
The effect of nationality on research results was that facts based on opinions such as 
in the Ddumba Ssentamu and Mugume (2001) were likely to be less accurate than 
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company records that I used. Hence, this study used mostly company files and its data 
is, therefore, relatively more stable. 
 
v) Non-Parametric analysis Limitations 
Non-parametric analysis has problems that results must be taken with caution because 
even significance values between 0.05 and 0.01 (0.01>p>0.05) are not to be taken as 
very strong indications of anything. Hence, non-parametric analysis requires very 
high significant p-value equal or less that 0.01 (p ≤ 0.01). Normally acceptance levels 
under non-parametric are higher than under parametric tests. 
2.3   Setting Privatization Date and Measuring Variables 
Privatization officially set off in 1992. But before this date and passing of the law, six 
enterprises where sold. Hence to talk of the period before privatization generally 
means 1986 to 1992 while the period after privatization is taken to mean 1993 to 
2003. Strictly, however, since enterprises were not privatized on the same date, 
privatization varied with the type of firm in question. 
 
The principle of majority months was used to determine when a firm was sold. For 
instance, where an enterprise was sold in a month of a year, it was taken to be either 
state or private depending on where the larger part in the course of the year or the 
month it was sold fell. An enterprise privatized in September 1992 was taken to have 
been privatized in 1993, while one sold in March 1992 was taken have been 
privatized in 1992. Those sold in either June or July also were determined by where 
the larger number of days fell. 
 
2.3.1. TFP, ROS, ROCE Variables and APC and RPC Derivatives 
Performance was measured using three variables, two of which were profitability and 
an efficiency measure. The profitability measures included return to sales (ROS) and 
return on capital employed (ROCE). While efficiency was approximated by total 
factor productivity (TFP), ROS was calculated as the annual profit before interest and 
tax (PBIT) divided by sales. The return on capital employed (ROCE) was estimated 
by the profit before interest and tax (PBIT) divided by capital.  
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Total factor productivity (TFP) is the ratio of net output to the sum of associated 
capital and labour factor (inputs). Net output is the output minus intermediate goods 
and services purchased (Ramamurthy, 2004). The factor productivity (TFP) was 
approximated by annual sales divided by annual total costs. The TFP is positive and is 
one when efficient (TFP =1), inefficient when less than one (TFP <1), and more than 
efficient when more than one (TFP >1).  
 
In order to enable comparison of performance both before and after privatization, the 
data was adjusted from TFP, ROS and ROCE to their derivatives of Absolute 
Performance Change (APC) and Relative Performance Change (RPC). The 
calculation of the Absolute Performance Change (APC) of each firm was taken to be 
1−−= tt ppAPC  where APC is the absolute Performance Change, Pt and P t-1 are the 
mean or median performances in the post and pre-privatization periods respectively. 
Since Absolute changes can be problematic when the measure of performance itself is 
absolute, I also calculated the Relative Performance Change (RPC) as 
11 −−−= ttt pppRPC  with Pt and Pt-1 defined as in APC.
 
 
2.3.2.  Measuring Variables 
In this section, I show how I measured and computed all variables in the study 
including firm performance, ownership (S_M_P), local-foreign ownership, regulation, 
structure and sector.  
 
i) Privatization and Ownership  
Privatization policy is approximated by either a change in performance before and 
after, or by comparing performance of ownership forms of state-mixed-private 
(S_M_P). The results in this variable are expected take any form from positive, 
negative or zero (APC, RPC >, < =0). If it is zero (APC, RPC =0) it implies that 
privatization had no impact on enterprise performance. If, on the other hand, the 
coefficient is positive (APC, RPC>0), it implies that privatization had a positive 
impact on enterprise performance.  But if negative, privatization had a negative effect 
(APC, RPC<0).  
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Table 2. 2 Categorization of firms by State-Mixed-Private (S_M_P) Ownership 
 Enterprise Name Ordinal 
number 
State UP &TC/UPL, UP &TC/Posta, KiSW,  1 
Mixed KSW, SCOUL, UGIL 2 
Private Shell, NBL, LVBC, TUMPECO, Hima Cement, 
ULATI, UMI, NYTIL, Total, UPL, Kibimba Rice, 
ENHAS, Barclays, BATU, Grindlays/Stanbic, 
Baroda, UCWL, UP&TC/UTL, UEB/UEDCL 
3 
 Source: Author’s Categorization, 2004. 
 
Local-Foreign ownership 
Foreign or local ownership also took on ‘ordinal values’. The local firms assumed 
numerical value 1 while the foreign was denoted by “2”.  
               Table 2. 3  Sample Categorization of firms by Foreign–Local Ownership    
 Enterprise Name Ordinal 
number 
Local (L) Century Bottling Company, TUMPECO, UGMC, UCWL, 
UAC/ENHAS  
1 
Foreign (F) Bank of Baroda U Limited, Barclays Bank U Limited, 
BATU, KSW, UGIL, Kibimba Rice Scheme, Nile 
Breweries Limited, NYTIL, Grindlays/Stanbic Bank U 
Limited, Total U Limited, Shell U Limited, Tororo Cement 
Factory, Hima Cement 
2 
  Source: Author’s Categorization, 2004. 
ii) Regulation 
Regulation was measured `nominally’ and firms were grouped according to the four 
Table 2. 4  Categorization of Firms in the Sample by Regulatory Tools 
Regulatory Tool Enterprise Name Number 
Tariff Barrier & Non Tariff 
Barriers (NTB) 
Uganda Breweries Limited, Nile Breweries Limited, 
Crown Bottlers Limited, Century Bottlers Limited, 
BATU, Tororo Cement Factory, Hima Cement, 
ULATI, UGIL, Kibimba Rice Scheme, KSW, KiSW, 
SCOUL, UGIL, NYTIL, ULATI  
1 
Minimum Capital 
Requirements (MCR) 
Bank of Baroda U Limited, Standard Bank U Limited, 
Barclays Bank U Limited, Grindlays/Stanbic Bank U 
Limited 
2 
Price Control UEB /UEDCL 3 
Licensing Only UCWL, UP & TC (UPL, Posta Uganda), 
UAC/ENHAS, TUMPECO, UMI/UMPL,  
UAC/ ENHAS, Total U Limited, Shell U Limited 
4 
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           Source: Author’s Categorization, 2004. 
categories. Regulation tools assumed values 1, 2, 3, and 4 whereby import tariffs and 
bans was denoted by ‘1’, Minimum Financial requirements (MFRs) by ’2’, Price 
controls by ’3’ and Licensing only by ’4’.  
iv)  Motivation  
Motivation was measured using hygiene factors including changes in salary, fringe 
benefits, and job security both before and after privatization.  
 
v) Management 
Management was measured in two ways: first as the management roles of 
administering, control and direction. In this category, I investigated how public and 
private firms went about making objectives, board appointments and functions. 
Second, corporate governance was estimated as the result of separating ownership 
from management whereby issues such as transaction costs reign. 
  
vi)    Sector -Trade and Services (TRSE) and Industry  
Sector was also measured ordinal whereby trade and services took on ‘1’ while 
industry was ‘2’.  
Table  2. 5   Sample Categorization of firms by trade and services and industry  
Sector Enterprise Name Number 
Trade 
and 
services 
Grindlays/Stanbic Bank U Limited, Total U Limited, Shell U 
Limited, Bank of Baroda U Limited, Barclays Bank U Limited, 
BATU, UAC/ENHAS, Standard Bank U Limited, 
1 
Industry UGIL, Century Bottling Company, Nile Breweries Limited, 
TUMPECO, Tororo Cement Factory, Hima Cement, UGMC, 
BATU, ULATI, Uganda Breweries Limited, Nile Breweries 
Limited, Crown Bottlers Limited, Century Bottling Company, 
Tororo Cement Factory, Hima Cement, UMI/UMPL, UCWL, 
NYTIL, Kibimba Rice Scheme, KSW, KiSW, SCOUL, 
2 
Source: Author’s Categorization, 2004. 
2.4. Data Analysis  
The analysis of data involved differences tests using SAS packages respectively. One 
can note that mere ownership did not mean privatization. Hence a measure of 
privatization, before and after had to be employed and hence the difference measure. 
The study investigated the differences in means and medians of APC, RPC (or TFP, 
ROCE and ROS) before and after privatization.  Further relationships between 
ownership (S_M_P) and performance change (APC and RPC) were investigated. 
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2.4.1. Normality and Difference Tests 
First, I tested the study sample for normality. Normality tests are necessary in 
determining the type of analysis to apply on the data. If the variables are normally 
distributed, then parametric tests are possible. If, on the other hand, the variable is 
non-normal, then non-parametric testing is necessary. In comparative studies, both 
variables of ‘before’ and ‘after’ must be normally distributed in order to use 
parametric tests. But if one is not, then the remedy is the non-parametric analysis. The 
test revealed that most of the data was generally non-normal. 
 
I used the Shapiro-Wilks (S-W) and Lilliefors significance corrected Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) tests to ascertain the statistical normality assumption. The null 
hypothesis was a normal distribution while the alternative hypothesis was non-
normality. A significant test meant that the tested variable was not normally 
distributed while an insignificant result meant that the tested variable was. Both the 
variable before and after had to be normally distributed in order to carry out 
parametric tests. While the TFP and ROCE results were clearly non-normal, ROS 
displayed elements of normality. 
 
Like for the means, I performed the K-S and S-W tests for medians of the 
performance measures before and after privatization. Once again, the null hypothesis 
was normality while the alternative hypothesis was non-normality. A significant 
normality test meant that the tested variable was not normally distributed while an 
insignificant result meant that the tested variable was normal. The K-S and S-W tests 
results showed mixed results for the TFP and ROCE on one hand and the ROS 
measures on the other hand, just like the means also shown in Appendix 3 and 4. 
 
The effect of ROS before being normally distributed while ROS after was non-normal 
needed taking any of the two options available, either: 1) cleaning the non-normal 
ROS in order to perform a parametric test; or (2)  perform non-parametric tests with 
available data since it was difficult to clean the data any further. The latter option, 
however, had to realise the weaknesses of using non-parametric tests on a normally 
distributed ROS before privatization. I opted for the non-parametric tests for the 
statistical assessment of difference between the two samples. 
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2.4.2. Difference Tests 
Existence of relationships was investigated by both the Kendall Tau correlations and 
non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests. Relationship tests were carried out between 
privatization, ownership and performance change (APC and RPC) on one hand and 
variables of regulation and structure on the other. The aim was to investigate whether 
the dependent variables were related to performance change and to what extent. The 
measures for performance change were the APC and RPC on the one hand while the 
dependent variables of regulation and structure were measured in the ordinal sense on 
the other hand.  The ‘before’ and ‘after’ introduced were responsible for the 
difference testing for differences in performance before and after privatization. 
 
The major usefulness of non-parametric, parametric-free or distribution-free methods 
is that testing does not require that the sample follows a normal distribution pattern. 
The only requirement for most of these methods is that the continuity density 
functions; although others also require the low order moments (Hoel, 1971:309). Non-
parametric analysis was therefore handy in at least three instances:  
 
• When the objective of the study does not require a parameter in the 
population.  
• When it is difficult to quantify the variable exactly or where the level of 
measurement used or required of one of the variables is nominal, ordinal, and 
interval or ratio (i.e. enumerate data).  
• When the distribution of the data just satisfies only continuity and symmetric 
population (Dickson, 1976:22).  
 
I chose non-parametric methods practically for two reasons.  First, many of the 
variables used in the sample could not be quantified and therefore assumed ordinal 
numbering. The variables included privatization policy that took on a ’before’ and 
’after’ stance on the one hand; and ownership (S_M_P) on the other hand. The other 
variables that took on categorical values included regulation, structure, sector (TRSE) 
and foreign-local. Second, all of the measures of profitability and efficiency before 
and after privatization, with the exception of ‘’mean and median ROS before” were 
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not normally distributed and there was no scope for cleaning data to make it more 
normal. Hence, choice of method of analysis came much later at the analytical stage.  
Table 2. 6 Levels and Interpretation of Significance  
Significance :       P-values Meaning 
Weak 0.01 < p <= 0.05  Rare 
Moderate 0.001 < p <= 0.01  Unusual 
Strong   p <= 0.001                 Improbable 
                  Source: Kreiner Svend, 1999. 
The study adopts the levels of measurement of statistical significance by Kreiner 
Svend (1999) who argues that the interpretation of the p-value should not rely only on 
whether or not it is higher or lower than 5 %. The 5 % is only a convention and may 
as such be more or less useful depending on the study at hand. Instead of a very rigid 
interpretation based on the 5 % convention, Kreiner suggests a more pragmatic 
approach that allows for a better distinction between different significant p-values as 
in Table 2.6. 
2.5.  Scope 
The study covered state-owned, mixed ownership, and fully divested enterprises for 
the period from 1986 to 2003. The SOEs definition excludes regulatory bodies formed 
to solely regulate economic activity. Instead, it also concentrates on enterprises 
formed with an objective of profit and excludes social institutions such as schools, 
health units or housing schemes. In subsequent Chapters Three to Seven, I present the 
results and also re-cap in Chapter Eight.  
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Chapter 3 
 
3. Fiscal Impact of Privatization 
It should be recalled that a major objective of privatization in Uganda was to reduce 
the budget deficits through divestiture and also generate some revenue for the 
Treasury. The government targeted cutting the annual US$280 million SOE subsidies, 
and also anticipated raising US$500 million sales proceeds. As such, this chapter 
investigates the fiscal impact of privatization by looking at subsidies as expenditure 
and taxes from PSOE as well as sale proceeds from divestiture as revenue.  The 
chapter has three sections. Part one deals with subsidies and budget deficits. Part two 
covers tax revenue and privatization moneys from sales proceeds, while Part three is 
the conclusion.  
3.1    SOEs Subsidies before and after Privatization 
Tracing the impact of privatization on subsidies and budget deficits suggests that in 
nominal terms subsidies have remained constant from 1991/92 to 2004/2005 and have 
been almost de-linked from the central government deficit, especially since 1998/99 
when the central government deficit started rising; but its origin would have to be 
identified in other areas of the government expenditures other than the allocation of 
subsidies to the SOEs.   
  
3.1.1. Subsidies before privatization 
Tracing the link between subsidies to the budget deficits show a fall from 37 to 9 per 
cent in 1992/3 and 2004/5 respectively explained by increasing budget deficit. The 
budget deficit itself multiplied four times from Shs. 427.3 to Shs. 1692.9 billion in 
1992/3 and 2006/7 respectively while the subsidies remained more or less the same. 
The rise in budget deficit after 1998/99, unlike between 1991/2 and 1997/8, seem not 
to have been linked to subsidies but other factors [See Figure 3.1].   
 
The impact of the subsidies on budget deficit is displayed in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1. 
The subsidies appear in row 2, budget deficits in row 3 while the impact of subsidies 
on budget deficits is in row 4. 
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Table 3.1 Impact of SOE Subsidies on Budget Deficit in Billion Shs. 1994-2004 
Year 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
Subsidy 5 91 15 209 209 207 210 186 214 79 84 49 72 134 127   
Deficit 78 196 427 457 385 438 381 421 550 791 1051 1311 1336 1467 1363 1319 1693 
%  6.6 46 37 46 54 47 55 44 39 10 8 4 5 9 9   
Notes: 91 (90/91), 92(91/92) etc 
Source: MOFPED (2002) Report Tables 5 and 7; MOFPED (2006) Draft 
Report 
 
 
Figure 3.1     SOE Subsidies & Budget Deficits 1994-04
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The rising budget deficit was partly due to low tax collections. Tax revenue, as a 
percentage of GDP was one of lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), standing at 11.3 
% in 2001. Targets for a better tax revenue output focused on improving tax 
administration as a strategy. On the prodding of the IMF and the World Bank, URA 
set a new target of achieving a tax-GDP ratio of 17 % by 2006/2007 from 12.3 % in 
2002, in order to reduce the dependency on external resources for government 
budgetary expenditure. However, this was a very difficult venture since introduction 
of new taxes could be misunderstood by investors as a tax policy reversal. The 
government believed that there were no easy tax policy options to enhance tax 
revenue through introducing new taxes or increasing existing tax rates since that could 
signal a policy reversal discouraging investment (MOFPED, 2001: 14-5, 22). World 
Bank advice and inability to raise internal funds left SOEs with state subsidies as the 
only option. 
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3.1.1.1. The Origins and Need for Subsidies 
The need for government transfers arose partly from World Bank advice as well as 
limited capital base of Ugandan firms. 
 
3.1.1.1.1. The World Bank advice 
During the colonial period industrialization in particular and development drive in 
general used local finances but this changed to borrowing after independence and on 
the advice of the World Bank. Marcussen (1973) argues that the Second World War 
greatly hurt the financial clout of the British economy such that in order to maintain a 
source of raw materials and a market for finished goods, Britain had to produce in the 
colonies using local capital.45 From 1940 onwards, the British allowed the Uganda 
colonial government to retain a large part of the earnings of the peasants in the form of 
“Price Stabilization Fund” (PSF). Between 1948 and 1953, the colonialists established 
SOEs using local capital from the accumulation of savings from the sales of cotton 
and coffee during the Korea war.  In total, between 1945 and 1960, the state re-
capitalized an amount equal to £119.0 million of which £44.5 million was earmarked 
for investment. The colonial government levied an export tax of 15-20 % on cotton 
and coffee between 1948 and 1958, 13 % in 1959 and 17 % in 1960. Despite 
considerable transfers to the central government over the years for budget support, the 
balances accumulated to £37 million by mid-1954.46 This nice method of financing 
could have continued were it not for independence. 
 
In 1960, two years to independence, the British colonialists hatched a plan to link the 
Uganda economy to the British one in terms of capital, technology and market. The 
colonial government of Uganda requested for experts to make a 15-year development 
plan for the country.  The nine-man strong mission recommended that since the world 
prices of coffee and cotton had dropped, and could not be used as a source of capital, 
the country needed to borrow (World Bank, 1962: vii).  Contrary to British 
expectations, Britain lost her monopoly over Uganda and borrowed capital opened the 
country to greater imperialist exploitation. 
 
Before independence, the country had been a British enclave as a source of raw 
materials, a market for finished goods and source of monopoly capital. Using 
borrowed capital, however, opened the country wider to both bilateral and multilateral 
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imperialism than before. For instance, Italian firms established base in steel; Britain 
maintained its position in banking, distilleries, and chemicals; and Japan competed 
with the British and Russians in textiles (Mamdani, 1983:13; Abider, 1998:113). 
Despite borrowing, more money was needed for development. 
 
3.1.1.1.2. Inadequate generated Funds from operations 
Although most of the SOEs started with optimism of ‘determining the charges to 
ensure coverage of expenditure, loses and depreciation of assets’ this never occurred 
due to inflation, embezzlement and non-payment. A number of statutory bodies 
identified good sources of internal finance. For instance, UTDC had interest earnings, its 
successor UTB the tourism levy, UTGC the tea levy, CMB the coffee Price Assistance Fund 
(PAF) and NSSF a series of NSSF contributions, income on investments, fees, fines, penalties 
and interest on dues; while UDC had management fees, dividends and secretarial and 
other services rendered to her subsidiaries.47 This internal funding was problematic 
due to inflation, embezzlement and default. 
 
First, the rates were kept fixed for long periods of time without review during an 
inflationary period and could not cover costs as was with UTGC. Second, 
uncontrolled embezzlement termed ‘ghost workers’ became a major problem for some 
firms, as was the case in the UTGC and UP & TC.  UP & TC, at one time, could not 
ascertain the actual labour force during the year due to maintaining names of retired, 
dead and other ex-staff on her payroll. Third, government was the biggest user of SOE 
services but always failed to pay in time. Hence, government used SOE services that it neither 
promptly cleared nor paid interest on the long-outstanding debts. Interestingly, when 
government lent SOEs money it attached interest, but SOEs such as UAC, did not charge 
interest on the government debts. Although government charged UAC interest on the 
government loans, UAC did not charge interest on money the government owed the airline. 
On one occasion, UAC requested the Ministry to offset a debt of approximately Shs. 4 
billion (US$2 m) that government owed UAC, but this was rejected.  
 
3.1.1.2. Subsidy types before Privatization 
All established SOEs had a similar financial set-up including government grants that 
formed the greater bulk of the subsidies and loans or guarantees, none of which was 
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adequate. All this money was deposited in Bank account (s) approved by the 
supervising Minister.  
 
3.1.1.2.1. Government Transfers  
Although all SOEs required government transfers, the extent varied in three ways that 
also depicted SOE types. The first was whereby an enterprise’s capital base also 
depended entirely on the Treasury as were most statutory firms including the NTB, 
UPA, UTGC, UTDC and the UTB [See Table 3.2]. The second type was where 
government apportioned an initial amount but the firm could also generate moneys of 
her own such as BOU, NIC, and UCB with capital of Shs. 30 billion; £250, 000; and 
£2 million respectively. These firms were either partially or wholly commercial. The 
third and last group included ‘commercial’ SOEs such as CMB, URC, UP & TC and 
NIC that, on top of the initial grants, generated money from commercial activities.  
 
Interestingly, although government transfers played a major role starting relatively 
bigger firms than the private sector, it was not sufficient to meet SOEs’ financial 
needs because government rarely fulfilled her financing obligations due to financial 
limitations despite the clear regulations. The effect was poor service delivery and 
limited service by SOEs that found themselves short of funds to run their operations 
constantly. For instance, UAC was under-capitalized to the extent that it neither could 
afford to buy jets of its own nor acquire modern equipment to run cargo handling on 
international standards at Entebbe Airport. In order to cope, it turned to the expensive 
option of plane leasing and sold shares in cargo handling (to ENHAS) to inject in 
more capital and improve the services.48 Another SOE, UP&TC, simply scaled down 
operations before privatization. Although the firm had initially started operations 
without discrimination, limitations of capital forced it to slowly narrow its 
transmission of communications operations to cater for government priorities only.49 
UP & TC later conceded that it lacked enough funds to cover the entire country to 
people’s satisfaction. A third example of inadequate government financing was the 
1970s ‘’nationalization on credit’’ where government nationalized private enterprises 
without paying for the shares. All these pointed to the poor financing of the SOE 
sector, suggesting that it could have paid dividends to allow some private competition 
in order to attract additional financing and improving service delivery. Neither the 
grants, nor the loans were easy options. 
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3.1.1.2.2.  Guarantees and Loans 
Although borrowing was generally authorized, loans were not an easier option either 
due to collateral and credit biases. Borrowing was deemed authorized if approved by 
both finance and supervising Ministers, a supervising Minister alone or by the Board. 
In the regulations, government promised to guarantee loans on behalf of the SOEs and 
even fixed limits. For instance, NH& CC and UTGC were allowed temporarily 
amounts not exceeding £100, 000 and £400, 000 while long-term limits were set at £5 
million and £3 million respectively. For UCB, it was the Finance Minister who had 
the discretion of setting the limit. Lastly, URC was allowed to sell stock but this was 
mockery since no Stock Exchange existed between 1970s and 1990s (See Table 3.2). 
 
First, the unsettled issue of ownership posed a problem to many SOEs to raise loan 
capital. A good example of such deadlock was the Uganda Hotels and the DAPCB in 
the 1990s. While UDC set up Uganda Hotels, control was transferred to Ministry of 
Tourism; but the ministry could not borrow because it could not mortgage assets that 
legally belonged to UDC (FEF, 1990:25). Second, Uganda’s banking sector frustrated 
export trade and industry due to the unrealistic collateral demanded. Traditionally, 
bank credit discriminated against industry due to the nature of the security borrowers 
offered. Although banks normally demanded land, the business community possessed 
other types of security; partly leading to sector bias in credit allocation. Banks 
demanded land titles and factories as collateral (security) for export guarantees in 
particular and credit in general, and refused export confirmed orders or mineral 
reserves as mortgages. The irony was that no land in Uganda could guarantee the 
huge export values usually involved. Some Banks in Africa like the EXIM Bank in 
Cairo, Egypt, were innovative and accepted confirmed orders as guarantee. Mining 
faced similar discrimination as exporters, 50,51 and miners were equally frustrated. Local 
banks refused to accept mineral reserves as collateral security. Bias against lending to 
the mining sector created the problems of under-exploited mineral deposits due to 
lack of capital to invest in the sector and needed to explore the viability of confirmed 
export orders and mineral reserves for loan security in order to boost export and 
mineral sector growth.52,53  
 
The effect was that while trade and other service sectors held the lion’s share of bank 
credit, claiming 54.3 %, manufacturing accounted for 23.2 %, agriculture constituted 
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8.8 %, Transport, Water and Electricity sectors 10.5 %, the building and construction 
sector remained at 3.3 %, while mining and quarrying activities remained low at 0.2 
% of the loans portfolio in 2003.54 The bias against industry was general and 
historical. 
 
The failure to mobilise cheap development capital was racial and historical and not 
general. While the Asian businessmen in the country managed to solve capital 
problem by pooling resources together for investment, this was not the case with 
black Africans in Uganda. There was lack of mutual trust among African traders 
leading to failure to cooperate to form partnerships and companies, unlike the Asian 
businesses which thrived on family partnership, and this sort of spirit needed to be 
inculcated among African traders (RoU, 1968:3-4). Ironically, while black Africans 
found it easy to contribute to social events, this was not the case for business. Hence, 
there was need for campaigns to educate the African communities in the country to 
cooperate and form companies in preparation for growth and industrialization. 
Mobilization of the local masses could be done using the existing institutions in which 
people had trust like the kingdoms, churches or clans. But probably the colonial 
government that created African peasants and Asian traders did the biggest harm that 
has not been rectified by subsequent regimes.  
 
During the colonial and post-colonial times the European and Asian commercial 
banks which existed, did not extend credit to Africans although they gave credit to 
other racial groups. The cause for the segregation was not clear but might have been 
lack of collateral security. The government loans to aspiring businessmen and 
industrialists were also inadequate (RoU, 1968:3-4). In order to enable Africans 
access loans, the UCB was started in 1950 by the colonialists. As it has been argued, 
the reason for which it was created is even greater now than in the colonial times55 
Instead of selling UCB, government should have considered other alternatives like 
reducing staff, closing some loss-making branches, contract management and maybe 
selling some shares to Ugandan businessmen.56 Hence, capital became one of the main 
contending issues to enterprise development. Just like loans, internally generated 
funds were equally inadequate. 
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Despite their inadequacy subsidies created a big impact in SOE financing and 
development. SOE capital on average was bigger than that of their private 
counterparts and SOEs filled the gap of large-scale enterprises. A private enterprise 
had a smaller capital base averaging as little as Shs. 30, 000= (US$15) to 50, 000= 
(US$25) for micro firms and Shs. 300, 000= (US$150) for medium-sized ones. In 
comparison, SOEs had bigger capital. For instance, UCB and NIC had capital of 
US$2 m and US$250, 000 respectively. The Treasury made the difference in 
financing and development, so much so that privatization proved doom for PSOEs. 
After privatization, the majority of PSOEs were unable to raise further capital as 
evidenced by the reduced interest in total annual expenditure such as those in Beer, 
Soda, Meat, Pharmaceuticals, Energy, Transport & Telecommunications with 15.7, 
20.5, 0.6, 4.3, 27.2 and 8.6 percentage point reduction respectively. On the contrary, 
those that were comfortable included BATU and UCWL that managed to secure bank 
financing as evidenced by increasing borrowing by 17.9 and 14.5 percentage points 
respectively; the sugar companies that continued with government financing; the UEB 
split firms that enjoyed government guarantees;  and the banking sector that had it 
easy due to falling deposits rate.57 Subsidies, therefore, made possible the existence of 
some sectors that would not have emerged at all under pure market system that pursue 
a profit. 
 68 
Table 3 1 Examples of Statutory SOE Financing  Types before Privatization  
Enterprise Sources of Funds Borrowing Expenditure Investment 
NTB 1) Government grants, 2) 
Loan; 3) Any other moneys 
received in discharge of 
duties Bank approved by 
Minister 
Approved by both 
Finance & Supervising 
Minister 
1) According to 
budget and approved 
by Minister, 2) 
supplementary funds 
Approved by both Finance 
& Supervising Minister 
UTDC -do- + interest earnings + 
treasury advances 
Approved by Finance 
Minister 
 Approved by Finance 
Minister and may invest in 
consolidated fund 
USC -do- -do-  -do- 
BOU Authorized Shs. 30 b subject 
to review; Issues & paid up  
Shs. 20 b 
n/a    N/a 1) Bank/government to 
Share profits in ratio of 
25:75; 2) transfer to 
consolidated fund½  
NHC -do- Approved by 
Supervising Minister 
1) Temporary loans 
Limit <£100, 000; 2) 
long term loans Limit 
<£5 m 
n/a n/a 
UCB 1) Authorized £2 m subject 
to review; 2) general reserve 
fund where transfers of 
profits are made. Transfers 
are ¼ profits if <RF is <paid 
up capital or 1/8 profits if 
<RF is < 2 x paid up capital; 
3) Consolidated Fund 
receives the balance 
Limit Determined by 
Supervising Minister 
n/a n/a 
UTGC -do-  + tea levy Approved by 
Supervising Minister 
1) Temporary loans 
Limit <£400, 000; 2) 
long-term loans Limit 
<£3 m 
n/a Board with approval of 
minister invest money not 
readily needed required in 
any securities approved by 
the board 
UP&TC -do- Approved by Finance 
Minister 
n/a In any project with 
approval by both Finance & 
Supervising Minister 
UTB -do- + tourism levy + interest 
earnings 
Approved by 
Supervising Minister 
n/a n/a 
Uganda Air 
Cargo Corp. 
-do- n/a Determine a charge 
to ensure coverage of 
its expenditure, 
losses & depreciation 
of assets 
n/a 
NIC Authorized capital =£250, 
000 all by government 
divided into £50, 000 shares 
and subject to review by 
Supervising Minister 
n/a n/a n/a 
URC -do- + interest on savings  Borrow through issue 
of stock and limit 
approved by Finance 
Minister 
n/a n/a 
CMB -do-+ Coffee price assistance 
fund 
Approved by both 
Finance & Supervising 
Minister 
The board shall 
perform its functions 
in a balanced budget 
way including 
provision for 
depreciation & 
renewal of assets 
Board temporarily invest 
money not readily needed 
required in any legally 
accepted venture or other 
money approved by 
treasury 
NSSF 1) Contributions, income on 
investment, fees, fines, 
penalties and interest on 
dues; 2) loans etc 
Approved by Board n/a All monies in the fund not 
immediately required shall 
be invested by board with 
approval with Minister 
Source: Various Decrees, acts and Statutes. 
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3.1.2. Subsidies After privatization 
As already stated, subsidies to unsold SOEs remained more or less the same between 
1994 and 2004/5.  These results, however, had problems that the official records 
ignored other government transfers to the PSOEs and private sector. The subsidies, 
therefore, while pronounced constant, could be indeed rising. 
Table 3 2 SOE Subsidies in Billion Shs. in 1993/94-2004 
Subsidy 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 
∆
 
SOEs #     41 41 38 21 31 38 36 36 + 
Direct 19.4 56.2  52..3 100.3 8.8 8.9 11 24.4 9 27.6 52.5 22.7 - 
Equity 78.7 55.3 52.1 3.4 40.4 41.2  1.7  -  25.8 + 
Financial 57.0 65.9 72.8 71.6 74.7 82.5 56 56.6 32.7 42.4 80.1 75.4 - 
Fiscal 18.0 20.5 89.7 7.7 45.0 57.5 12 0.8 0.6 1.4 1.7 2.9 - 
Others 35.3 10.5 20.3 26.9 17.0 23.6   6.8     
Total 208.5 208.6 206.6 210.1 186.1 213.9 79 83.6 49.3 71.5 134.4 126.9 - 
   Notes: # =number, + is rising subsidies, - is falling subsidies;∆  =change 
   Source: Background to the Budget, 1999/2000: MOFPED, (2006) Draft Report. 
While general subsidies remained more or less the same, individual subsidies impact 
was mixed: some rising such as for direct and financial while others were falling such 
as for equity and fiscal terms. Subsidies that reduced were equity and fiscal, while 
those that increased were financing and direct terms. The financial terms included 
loan arrears, interest payments and low interest loans. The fiscal terms included tax 
exemptions on imports, and zero interest rates on arrears of tax payments and counter 
subsidies were government used services of SOEs on credit. Lastly, equity included 
grants or equity funding from either donors or government (Ddumba Ssentamu and 
Mugume, 2001: 46-7). This failure for the overall general subsidy to fail to change 
was explained by bailout operations performed by President Museveni, government 
guarantees to UEB split companies, undervalued assets during privatisation, and state 
contracts discussed next.  
 
5.1.1.1.Bailout operations: Client-patron relationships 
Despite privatization and government attempts to pull out of business, the state 
covered the losses, particularly those belonging to three Asian businessmen. President 
Museveni operated bailout operations to PSOEs explained as “strategic intervention in 
vital sectors generating employment and fighting poverty through helping businesses 
that generated wealth’’.58 The most notable and frequent beneficiaries were three 
Asians, namely, Mehta, Madhvani and Sekhar Mehta. For instance, in August 1998, 
 70 
government paid US$4 million of the first Mehta debts owed to two foreign banks. So 
far government had sunk a total of US$95 million since Museveni assumed power, 
divided between Mehta Group (US$68 m) and Madhvani Group (US$27 m).59 The 
Madhvani Group is a multi-million-dollar empire that extends to the entire EAC 
region, India and Canada. In Uganda, it was active in the sugar, oil, beer and steel, 
electricity production and tourism, accounting for 10% of Uganda’s GDP and 
employing over 15,000 people.60 In addition to picking the Asians’ debts, government 
gave them other sweeteners through inflated payments.  
 
The Asians also received inflated payments for shares of several PSOE companies 
such as KSW and Cable Corporation. In 1972, government nationalized firms without 
paying for the 51% shares taken over. Government explained that during the 1970 
nationalizations it took over several private firms including the Mehta Group on credit 
terms and was paying for the shares at the time of privatization and re-possession.61 
While reason for payment was not contested, the inflated amount eventually remitted 
was. Government made a payment of Shs. 47 billion (US$23.5 m) in KSW for shares 
valued at Shs. 4.2 billion (US$2.1 m) by Price Waterhouse. In 1971, government 
acquired 49 % shares in Madhvani Sugar Works Limited (MSWL) on nominal terms. 
In 1972, in order to capitalize its shares, government agreed to invest in Madhvani 
Sugar Works (MSW) only US$2.4 m through promissory notes paid over two years. 
This arrangement collapsed in 1972, however, after the military coup and expulsion of 
Asians. But negotiations resumed in 1986. The monthly payments from January 1992 
to December 1999, inflated the original US $2.4 m to £30 m (about US$ 36 m).62 , 63 
Financial bailout was not for all but Asians and not local investors. 
 
In contrast and with the exception of only a local exporter of hides and skins, 
government refused to bail out other PSOEs sold to local investors such as UAC, 
UMI Kampala, NYTIL and PAPCO that cried out for help. For instance, UAC needed 
Shs. 2 billion (US$500, 000) to fund her operations. On three occasions, it was bailed 
out to a tune of US$3 million (Shs. 3 billion). The fourth time, however, there was no 
alternative but to sell shares to ENHAS in order to raise the money.64 Several other 
PSOEs such as NYTIL, PAPCO and a private local Bank (ICB) solicited for support 
in vain. In only one case, the local exporter of hides and skins, government 
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guaranteed the loan. Unlike these local investors who failed, UMI Kampala 
succeeded.  
 
In what appeared to be political campaigning, President Museveni in 2004 guaranteed 
a local exporter of hides and skins that had gone bankrupt to the tune of over a 
US$22m to pay his debts. Museveni had exhausted his two-term constitutional service 
and wanted the constitution amended to open the limit. At a public rally in Western 
Uganda, the President disclosed that he had asked the Bank of Uganda Governor to 
rescue UMI Kampala (a PSOE). Before his bankruptcy, the local exporter, 
Basajabalaba, was among the leading exporters of hides and skins and his enormous 
assets included hotels and a private university.65 66 The hides and skins business 
generated $20.25m (about sh34b) annually. The tycoon received Sh20b (US$10m) to 
resuscitate his business empire under Government guarantee.67 Government favoured 
Asians to local entrepreneurs for political reasons. 
 
Both the media and opposition politicians explained the Asian preference to local 
investor as a political strategy by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
government to entrench herself in power. First, the media argued that government 
preferred foreign to local investors because in a crisis, the former were likely to 
support the government in power in order to protect their investments unlike the latter 
that could ally with the opposition to change government. Second, opposition 
politicians stated that the government policy, besides being strategic, was also selfish 
because President Museveni wanted to impoverish Ugandans so that they could 
respect him and also be easily governed.  
 
5.1.1.2.Government Guarantees to the PSOEs in Energy Sector 
Despite privatization, government guaranteed loans totalling close to US$1 billion  
representing 3.3 times of the 1992 Uganda budget deficit in the name of development 
since privatization kicked off in 1992 (Table 3.4).  
 
The biggest beneficiary of guarantees was Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) (a PSOE 
in the energy sector). Before privatization UEB, produced, distributed and regulated 
energy in Uganda, hence combining commercial and non-commercial activities. On 
privatization in March 2000, UEB was broken into separate liability companies for 
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generation, transmission, distribution and regulation. The successor companies were 
UEDCL, UETCL and the UEGCL, all operating under the direction of the Electricity 
Regulatory Authority (ERA). While the UEDCL owns and operates the grid 
connection electricity supply infrastructure operating at 33 KV and below, the 
UETCL owns and operates the transmission infrastructure above 33 KV.  The 
UEGCL owns and operates the Kiira and Nalubaale hydropower stations at Jinja 
(UEB, 2000:7). Despite privatization of UEB, the split companies still enjoyed 
enormous state guarantees due to lack of working capital, rural electrification and the 
need to export power. The subsidies to the energy sector were explained by upgrading 
and refurbishment of sub-stations, rural electrification and extension of the national 
grid, and improving the BOP. 
Table 3.4 Government Guarantees to PSOEs & Private Sector since Privatization 
 Lender/Borrower Date 
approve
d 
Purpose Sector Amount 
in ‘000 
US$ 
1 European Investment Bank 
(EUB)/ 
March 
1997 
Availing long-term financing long 
to small and medium sized 
investments by private sector 
companies or ventures in Uganda 
Multi-
sectors 
33,000 
(ECU 
25,000) 
2 Svenska Handelsbanken AB 
Sweden /UEB 
June 
1997 
Co-financing contract 6 of Owen 
Falls Extension under the Third 
Power Project 
Energy 15,000 
3 Eksport Finance of 
Norway/UEB 
Dec. 
1998 
Refurbishment of the 132kV Sub-
Station under the third power 
project implemented by UEB 
Energy 1,280 
4 CDC/AES Nov. 
1999 
Build power station at Bujagali Energy 430,000 
 World Bank/   Energy 375,000 
5 IFAD 2004 Oil palm growing (BIDCO) Agriculture 112, 000 
Total     591,280 
Source: Parliament of Uganda 
 
First, although government had constructed the grid lines, it lacked finance to 
refurbish and upgrade three 132KV primary substations costing US$6.35 million. The 
Norwegian Government came to rescue and gave Uganda a tied grant of US$5.1 
million conditional on borrowing another US$1.26 million from a Norwegian 
commercial source68 [See Table 3.4, Row 4].  
 
Second, despite privatization of UEB government still pursued social objectives in the 
energy sector that included “continued intervention in socially desirable areas like 
rural electrification and extension of the transmission grid”. Government still footed 
fixed costs in the energy sector despite privatizing UETCL. Such scheme was the 
introduction of a rural electrification fund to facilitate a systematic increase of 
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electricity coverage in the countryside69, 70 itself arising out of environmental 
concerns.71 Third and last, the need to improve the country’s BOP position made 
subsidies stay on.  Government had the ambition of becoming a long-term electricity 
exporter in the region to exploit the extensive water resources, waterfalls and a very 
stable hydrological regime along the River Nile then. Due to the limited initial market 
for power, potential lenders, especially the World Bank advised the country to start 
with Bujagali (250 MW) and later Kalagala (350 MW) on the basis of alleged least 
costing in conformity with a hydropower development Master Plan.72 Consequently, 
the government embarked on negotiations with Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda73 to 
increase demand of Ugandan hydropower and agreed with Kenya and Tanzania to 
increase export sales of electricity to these countries in order to address Balance of 
Payments (BOP) problems (RoU, 1999: 3, 7, 9). But negotiation with Rwanda did not 
succeed due to bickering between the two countries. In addition, more hydro power 
was needed to solve the acute power shortages in the country arose out of 
mismanagement in the 1970s. Completion of the Owen Falls extension was not a 
solution to the power shortage and what was required was construction of new and 
large expensive hydropower stations. As a result of UEB leverage arising from the 
rehabilitation and extension of the Owen Falls, government opted for independent 
power providers (IPPs). Donors argued that IPPs would provide a fairer return on 
investment; attract new financial resources into the sector; assume the risks of 
construction, cost over-runs and operations; and efficiently operate the projects better 
than the state. Hence, the bigger guarantees originated from government’s promotion 
of these IPPs. Two companies Allied Energy Suppliers (AES) Nile Power and 
Arabian International Construction (AIC) indicated interest in hydropower 
development. AES was granted rights to investigate and develop Bujagali Falls 
(1995), AIC to develop the Kalagala Falls, and Norpak Power Limited74 to develop 
Karuma Falls in 1997 (RoU, 1999: 2-3). 
 
The very first HEP project by IPP was the US$500m AES Nile Power at Bujagali. 
This was the World Bank’s biggest funded single investment in Africa then75 and 
proposed to construct a hydroelectric station at Jinja with an initial four units 
generating 200 MW of power with a possibility of upgrading it to 250 MW. The 
project included construction of extensive transmission lines to transmit the power 
from site to the city and separately to the Owen Falls Power station and to add 
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flexibility and strength to the national grid. The estimated cost was US$515 million,76 
while completion was to be in 44 months. The donors included International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and Export Credit Agencies while AES Nile 
Power was to contribute 25 % of the project funding (RoU, 1999: 5). The AES project 
stalled due to allegations of corruption77 but was later given a go ahead in 2007 by 
World Bank. 
 
The informed public argued that there was no guarantee that power produced from 
Bujagali dam would be injected into the national grid in the hands of profit minded 
investors who had failed to eliminate power losses of over 33% and charged higher 
tariffs on the pretence that it was because of thermal fuel when neighbouring Kenya 
used more thermal and paid less. At the time, Uganda’s electricity was more 
expensive at over US$ 23 cents per unit compared to Kenya’s US $19 and Tanzania's 
US$9 and these two countries produced over 300 MW and 70 MW of their electricity 
from thermal respectively compared to Uganda’s 100 MW thermal. Unlike other 
countries, Uganda had left her power sector, the engine of economic growth, with 
private investors. There were many examples in and outside Africa to show that 
power sectors were best run by national governments and not private investors.  For 
instance, in Africa, Algeria produced 6,468MW, Morocco 4,687 MW, Ethiopia 1,200 
MW and South Africa 4, 0676 MW but their sectors were being run by the national 
governments. Outside Africa, Canada produced 104,371MW, China 116,287 MW, 
Japan 268,287 MW and South Korea 54,673 MW but these governments still run their 
power sectors.78  
 
Three lessons emerge from the AES project. First, private sector-led development can 
only occur in profit making sectors, as the UEB example shows. In sectors that are 
highly capital-intensive and require long-term infrastructures such as power gridlines 
or railway lines and harbours, government must step in. This also questions whether 
full privatization would ever take place in LDCs, since profitability of some SOEs 
conflicted with development. For instance, the telecommunication sub-sector that was 
left to the private sector in Uganda, the distribution of telephones was biased against 
the rural areas. Secondly, as shown by the negotiations between Uganda and Rwanda, 
Tanzania, and Kenya, both local and external markets can limit private sector 
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development (PSD) in LDCs. Uganda tried to help the firms in export markets, 
though they were privatized as shown in the Uganda negotiations with Rwanda, 
Kenya and Tanzania. Hence, markets were political constructions that thrived with 
good bilateral relations. While Uganda managed to export power to Kenya and 
Tanzania, she failed with Rwanda due to political differences between the two 
countries then. As such, instability in the Great Lakes region and other LDCs greatly 
influenced the growth of industries and regional trade. Third, inflating of budgets was 
not only a government phenomenon but also all other private institutions that 
interacted with government and this could result into siphoning off of scarce foreign 
exchange from LDCs as the AES example shows. IPP in Uganda represented a 
potential method of siphoning scarce foreign exchange out of the country. As such, 
privatization was not a complete solution to the budget-maximizing behaviour of 
government. One dilemma was that the state could not be completely eliminated.  
 
In summary, despite privatization and the government’s free enterprise rhetoric, it 
supported private firms as well as PSOEs through bailout operations and guarantees 
and state contracts. Such continued government support, however, is still challenged 
by scholars in search of possible alternative solutions that should have been used 
instead. Given the fact that PSOEs exhibited the same financial problems as before 
privatization, it prompts us to question whether other options, such as capital 
restructuring, could have been better than outright sale. 
 
Capital Restructuring  
 As an alternative, restructuring should have looked at changing the capital structure 
of enterprises away from interest paying to cheaper means of capital; and outside 
government support subsidies were indeed cheap means of capital, but not private 
source. In this way, cheap financing could have represented an alternative to 
privatization. While it was true that subsidies allocation was another term for cheap 
financing, what was required was something that left out the state and thus de-links 
SOEs from the Treasury. For instance, the textiles and energy sectors should have 
sought cheap financing such as the sale of preferential shares or company bonds to the 
public. Although outright sale of a SOE to a capital-strapped ‘core investor’, 
emphasized by the policy, changed ownership, it could not solve the capital problems 
of several enterprises. If a buyer of the PSOE did not have money of his own, the 
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result would be liquidation as it turned out in the textile sector with NYTIL and ATM; 
or continued government support, as was the case with UEB in the energy sector. 
Basing on the share of interest on total expenditure; cheaper financing could have 
solved 33.7-47 % (basing on UEB annual report and current study respectively) of 
UEB’s problems and 54.9 % of NYTIL’s. Thirty per cent of UEB financial costs 
could have been systematically replaced by cheaper non-interest finance like 
preference shares that actually did not require change of ownership.  
 
Privatization took a stranger turn in the sugar industries where government footed 
financial losses and bailed them out. The sugar industry had a whooping 456.2 % 
interest of total expenditure before privatization. After privatization, the interest 
expenditure increased to 482.6% overall.  The sugar industry-generated losses 
amounting to 588% that were footed by the government made privatisation 
questionable. In a normal private sector, poor managers bore the burden of the losses 
through bankruptcy. As it was, the two sugar factories of SCOUL and KSW were 
private, but government-funded and continued declaring losses after privatization. 
The analysis of the sugar sector, however, needs to be taken with some two cautions. 
 
First, SCOUL and KSW companies’ accounts were consolidated and also included 
several other subsidiaries outside the sugar sector. Second, the increase in interest 
expenditure from 456.2 % to 482.3 % in the sector could also be due to the increase in 
the number of firms in the sample that moved from two (SCOUL and KSW) to three 
(including KiSW) before and after privatization respectively. KiSW was ‘privatized’ 
under a management contract in 1992. Hence, interest expenditure might have been 
higher simply as a result of more enterprises in the sector than before privatization. To 
sum up, enterprises with financial costs as high as –456.2 % for sugar, 54.9 % for 
textiles, 19.1 % for beer, 33.7 % for energy and 28 .1 % for banks needed a review of 
their dear financing. With the exception of banks that usually keep high gearing 
ratios, most firms needed to reduce their gearing by moving away from loan capital to 
cheaper financing methods such as preferential shares. But as I show immediately, 
government did not only support PSOEs financially but also through state contracts. 
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3.1.1.3. Undervaluation of SOEs sold to State Employees 
During the privatization process at least seven (9 %) out of 74 SOEs were 
undervalued and sold to government employees79 costing government Shs. 4.3 billion 
(US$2.2) (over US$2,152,000 at US$=Shs.2, 000).80 Undervaluation (AV>SP) was 
calculated as the excess of asset value (AV) over the sales price (SP). The 
undervaluations were explained by politics and weak private sector.  
 
First, the ruling party supporters included cabinet ministers, presidential advisers, 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) supporters and Members of Parliament (MPs). 
In order to marshal political support, the ruling NRM either undervalued or condoned 
default. One hotel was both undervalued and the buyer also defaulted.  Valued at Shs. 
322 million (over US$162, 000), Lira Hotel was sold to Showa Trading enterprises 
after it was undervalued by Shs. 72 million (US$37,000). Despite the leverage, the 
buyer defaulted on the balance of Shs. 200 million (over US$100,000). With the 
exception of only Uganda Meat Packers (UMP) Soroti, all SOEs sold to political 
supporters were undervalued. 
 
ENHAS’s shareholding before privatization included UAC with 50 % majority stake, 
Efforte and Global Airlinks each with 20 %, Sabena 5 % and the workers of the UAC 
and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 2.5 % each. The first two highest bidders, 
Dairo Air Services and South African Alliance Air, had offered US$6.5 million and 
US$ 4.5 million respectively were ignored.81 Prior to the sale, the firm was valued at 
Shs. 5 billion (US$2.5 m) and Shs. 8 billion (US$4 m) by Ernest Young and DFCU 
respectively. Undervalued between US$812, 500-2, 312,500, the firm was sold to 
relatives of President Museveni who owned Global Airlinks and Efforte Corporation 
ignoring the two highest bidders.82 But this was not the first time the President’s 
brother, Salim Saleh, interfered in the privatization process. 
 
Earlier on, Salim Saleh was involved in UGMC sale that he bought and re-sold the 
next day in a speculative deal. Incorporated in 1955 as a private limited liability 
company with four subsidiaries,83 the SOE had a record of profit making 
approximating over Shs.500 million (US$250, 000) annually, dividend distribution 
and capacity utilization of 60%.84 Before privatization, UGMC shareholding included 
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government with 78.9%,85 DFCU 16.7% and other minority shareholders with 4.4%.86 
Caleb International bought 51% of the government’s 79.1% shares at Shs. 5.3 billion 
(US$26.5 m) ahead of the highest bidder (UNGA, a Kenya-based Food Company) in 
1997 citing ‘‘Ugandan ness” this time round. Interestingly, although “Ugandan ness” 
was the criteria used for awarding the company, the partners named by Caleb 
International in securing the UGMC bid were overseas firms -Tiger Oats and a South 
African company Number One Foods (PTY) Ltd.87, 88 As already explained, 
undervaluation did not only favour the first family but also several other NRM 
supporters.  
 
Other NRM supporters bought White Horse Inn and Soroti Hotel causing a financial  
loss of Shs. 290 million (US$145, 000) and Shs. 137 million (US$68, 500) 
respectively. While White Horse Inn went to Kabale Development Company owned 
by a Governor of the Central Bank, a transport and communication Minister and a 
former managing director of the Uganda Commercial Bank, the Soroti Hotel was sold 
to Speedbird Aviation, belonging to an MP and later to become Minister of State for 
Health (General Duties)89  while other party supporters were pacified through debt-
write off that received mixed results: succeeding over UMI Soroti but failing over 
Printpak Limited. 
 
Established in 1956, UMI Soroti used to slaughter and retail beef for both local and 
export markets till it closed in 1985 due to insurgency in Teso. The Soroti Meat 
Packers was sold to Teso Agro-Industries Company Limited (TAICO) belonging to a 
presidential advisor at US$300,000 (Shs. 300 million) with 50% paid immediately 
and the balance a year after.90,91,92,93 TAICO defaulted on the outstanding debt of Shs. 
150 million (US$150, 000) blaming it on the war in the Teso region. Later, the 
balances were written off as war loses in accordance with the deeds of assignment that 
were signed by the two companies in end of 2000. Besides Uganda Meat Packers 
Soroti, two other hotel buyers of Hill Top Hotel Kitgum and Acholi Inn Hotel 
benefited from the arrangement [RoU, 2000: 146].  
 
The Printpak buyers, however, were not so successful in having their debts cancelled. 
Sold for Shs. 900 million (US$450, 000) to New Printpak (U) Limited belonging to 
the then First Deputy Prime Minister; a Transport and Communications Minister; 
 79 
Presidential Media Adviser, in May 1996, the government sold only plant and 
machinery but retained the land and buildings that reverted to government.94 When 
government demanded payment, the buyers accused government of selling them 
encumbered assets that they could not use to access loan financing [RoU, 2000: 146].  
At least two Asians benefited from undervalued SOEs; although these had genuine, 
commercial reasons for the low prices. The first Bank of Baroda Uganda Limited and 
a paper company (PAPCO Industries)95 undervalued by Shs. 1 billion (US$500, 000) 
and Shs. 100 million (US$50, 000) respectively, citing market and capital problems.96  
 
Second, undervaluation was expected even before sale if the locals were to buy SOEs. 
What was not expected, however, was the preferred sale of the SOEs to NRM cadres 
and family members of President Museveni. Before sale, it was realized that the locals 
would not be able to buy all assets offered for privatization. Total SOE assets 
exceeded all the amount of money in the Ugandan Banks. While total SOEs assets 
were valued at Shs. US$ 1 m (Shs. 200 billion), the entire money supply was just shs. 
50 billion and bank deposits stood at shs. 46 billion end of January 1989.97   
 
3.1.1.4.  State Contracts 
In Uganda, like in Asian countries, private companies in the manufacturing sector 
depended on the state to create a market for them. After privatization, government 
created contracts where they should not have existed in the first instance, and in an 
inefficient manner that also maximized the budget, thus hurting the taxpayer. Two 
examples of TUMPECO and NYTIL, help illustrate the case of state contracts and 
firm survival.  
 
The TUMPECO case involved issue of new national motor vehicle number-plates 
immediately after the privatization of the firm. Government and TUMPECO hatched 
a plan to replace car number plates in the country citing depletion of the existing ones. 
The media argued that the reasons given by the government that existing ones were 
depleted or that the change was for security purposes were not convincing. First, 
although Uganda Revenue Authority clarified that the new number plates would run 
concurrently with the old ones and no deadlines were set, the racket was intended to 
force everyone to surrender his or her old number plate by August 1999 after paying 
US $76 to TUMPECO for motor vehicles and US $37 for motorcycles, which totalled 
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to US $10 million. In the end, no vehicle kept its old number plates. Second, the 
media argued that given the available technology, perforation was not difficult to 
forge, which defeated the purpose of the new, security waterproofed number plates.98  
 
The Nytil case involved President Museveni instructing the Defense Minister to 
contract Nytil Picfare based in Jinja to produce army uniforms in 1996. The Defense 
Ministry tendered the supply of army uniforms in two categories of plain and 
camouflage. While a pair of army uniform from China cost US$8, Nytil Picfare 
imported the same and sold it to government at a price nearly three times higher. 
Fourteen and sixteen companies tendered for the green and camouflage uniforms 
respectively. Nytil Picfare quoted US $19 for green while another Ugandan company, 
Eladam, quoted US $9.50. For the camouflage, NYTIL quoted US $20 while the 
lowest Karmang International quoted US $11.05 per pair.99 NYTIL, the dearest bidder, 
won the tender for both types, raising suspicions of ignorance, petty nationalism or 
corruption.  
 
Analysis of the granting of the tender seemed to suggest misinformation of alternative 
sources, petty nationalism or at worst corruption. It was either misinformation or petty 
nationalism to award the tender to a Ugandan firm and not to the internationally more 
competitive and cheaper Chinese firms whose prices were far lower compared to all 
the local quotations. By taking this option of awarding the tender to NYTIL, 
government squandered US $11 on each green and US $12 on camouflage uniforms 
respectively and squandered US $23 on both.  Hence, even with privatization, state 
contracts still exercised budget maximizing behaviour because of petty nationalism, 
corruption or simply ignorance. Like with expenditure, privatization’s impact on 
revenue-side was equally mixed, increasing tax revenue but failing to generate 
targeted SOE sales proceeds. 
3.2. Tax Revenue and Privatization Moneys 
Investigating the impact of privatization on tax revenue and sales proceeds gave 
mixed results with big leap in tax revenue but failure to hit the expected targets from 
SOE sales.  
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3.2.1. Tax Revenue 
After privatization, tax expenditure increased 4.4 times from Shs. 3.2428 billion to 
(US$1.6 m) to Shs. 17.6453 billion (US$8,822,650) with the increase in industry 
exceeding the trade and services sector in 31 SOEs studied (See Table 3.5, Row 10).  
The leap in tax revenue was explained by scrapping of tax incentives in 1997 
[although they bounced back in the 2003 budget], as well as increased production and 
efficiency.  
 
Finance state minister in charge of privatization, Peter Kasenene, explained increased 
taxation as due to overall efficiency that improved due to privatization, thus paving 
the way for management innovations and inventions. It also led to new and improved 
products and services and consequently increased profitability.56    
 
The number of PSOEs firms joining the big taxpayers’ category was on the increase 
from nine in 2003 to 20 three years later.  In 2003, the nine leading taxpayers in the 
country were PSOEs and they increased their tax payments by between 40% and 
100%. These included NBL, Crown Beverages, Shell Uganda, Total Uganda, Stanbic 
Bank and BATU.100 Three years later, more PSOEs joined the list of the first twenty 
biggest taxpayers.101 
Table 3. 5 Industrial Costs in 31 Surveyed SOEs/PSOEs in Billion Shs. 1986-2003 
Before Privatization After Privatization Costs 
Total 
Costs** 
Annual 
mean 
*** 
Annual 
mean for 
Industry 
Annual mean for 
TRSE 
Total 
Costs  
Annual 
mean  
Annual 
mean for 
Industry 
Annual 
mean for 
TRSE 
Interest 204.9 11. 7.4 3.9 174.4 90.7* 86.8 3.9 
Raw 
Materials 
80.3 4.6 4.6 0 436.9 24.3* 24.3 7.9 
Wages 268.9 14.9 9.3 5.6 164.6 9.1 5.7 3.5 
Utilities 29.5 1.6 0.9 0.7 4.8 0.3 0.3 0.04 
Transport 28.4 1.6 1.4 0.2 89.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 
Overheads 1.2 0.06 0 0.1 16.2 0.9* 0.5 0.4 
Taxation 58.4 3.2 1.5 1.8 317.6 17.6* 13.9 3.7 
Profit 164.4 9.1 -0.9 10.1 153.1 8.5 -1.7 10.2 
Total* 836.1    1276.6    
Notes: 1) *recorded increases after privatization; ** total cost is the sum of all the cost of enterprises 
either before or after. *** Annual mean is the result of dividing total cost is the sum of all the cost of 
enterprises either before or after by the number of years before/after under consideration. 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Financial Records, 1986-2003. 
 
The other interesting impact of privatization on taxation was the mixed sector effect.  
Tax burden shifted from trade and services to industry explained by increased 
business after privatization. While taxation increased 4.4 times overall, the increase 
for industry was 7 times while trade and services just doubled. Before privatization, 
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trade and services tax expenditure did not only exceed but also bore slightly more tax 
burden than industry; but this altered after privatization where industry bore the 
bigger weight (Refer to Table 3.4, row 9; Table 3.5  row 8).   
 
The Table 3.5 also shows that the profit in nominal terms has been constant from 
1986 to 1993 (almost constant), so in real terms profits decreased. High taxation was 
problematic because it did not only cause unemployment in tobacco sub-sector but 
also limited usage of modern communication equipment. First, BATU argued that the 
high incidence of taxes on cigarettes were out of line with the size of the economy 
whereby Uganda had the third highest tax rates on cigarettes in Africa behind Ghana 
and Kenya, but the per capita income of the latter two doubled Uganda’s.102 Second, 
mobile phone tariffs were also high due to taxes on the telecommunications sector 
especially excise duty. For every Shs100 charged, Shs. 28 went to government, 
divided into 18 VAT and 10 excise duty.103 In two years, tax on airtime doubled from 5 
% in 2002 to 10% 2004, reducing operators’ profits and re-investment because they 
strove to avoid transferring the tax to customers.104  Uganda had most of the highest 
mobile phone tax rates in East Africa. Kenya’s rate was at 10 %, Tanzania’s 7 %, 
while Rwanda was promising to introduce the duty. This meant that Ugandans paid 
between 25-30 % taxes more compared with Africa’s 17 % average. There were over 
three million mobile phone users with 9 % penetration.105 The high duties affected 
affordability of the services especially in rural areas. Although mobile phones were 
available countrywide, few people afforded them because of the high taxes payable by 
consumers.106 This in turn widened the rural-urban divide. Communications growth 
was only in the urban areas, with the majority of rural Ugandans lacking access to the 
services. Government had a rural communication policy developed in 2001 to address 
the urban-rural divide107 but both MTN108 and CELTE109 also had plans to improve the 
situation. 
 
Tax Review 
Given the tax problems of PSOEs, it was deemed necessary to reconsider reviewing 
tax policy in order to strike a balance between maximum tax revenue and investment 
promotion. Some enterprises like UCWL, UEB and Sugar industry could have 
benefited from lower taxation that could have increased their profitability by 43.2 %, 
.50.3 % and 20 % respectively [basing on Table  3.4]. Basing on UBL analysis, for 
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instance, reform of the enterprises pointed to tax policies review. The UBL (UBL, 
1998/1999:14) report revealed that taxes accounted for 50.3% of total costs in 1999. 
This meant that UBL did not require a change of ownership to solve the majority 
(73.6%) of its problems and privatization would be a total waste without tax policy 
change on beer.  Possible options to privatization could have included reduction in the 
tax rates on sugar and beer respectively. Comparing the effect of a tax reduction on 
tax revenue and compliance, maybe the measure could have had bad effects on tax 
revenue. The current corporation tax (CT) rate was 30 %. Success in tax revenue 
enhancement, however, did not spread to SOEs’ sales proceeds. 
 
3.2.2. Privatization Moneys  
As can be recalled, World Bank anticipated raising US$500 million sales proceeds 
from the 146 SOEs. The ambitions fell short of the targets generating only sh.303 
billion (about $172 million at US$1=1760), representing 35.6 % by end of June 2006 
[See Table 3.6]. 
Table 3.6 Accumulated Divestiture and Redundancy Accounts in Billion Shs. 1992-2006   
Sources & Utilization Accumulated 1-9-93 to 30-6-06 Percentage 
Revenue Divestiture Pre-Divestiture Total  
Sales proceeds   303 76.2 
Government contribution   40.5 10.2 
others   54.3 13.6 
Total   397.8 100 
Expenditure: Divestiture costs (DIV) and Pre-Divestiture Costs     
Provision for  Bad and Doubtful debts  0.1 - 0.1  
Bad & doubtful debts 29.2 - 29.2 7.3 
Caretaker costs (4) 2.4 45.1 47.6 11.9 
Creditors takeover (2) 70.9 10.5 81.4 20.5 
Professional fees (3) 45.1 26.4 71.5 17.9 
Arbitration Award 7.9 - 7.9 2 
Terminal benefits (1) 74.9 38.5 113.4 28.5 
UTL 4.2 - 4.2 1 
Warehouse 0.2 .0.1 0.3 .03 
Deficit   422 10.6 
Total 234.9 (59 %) 120.6 (41 %) 397.8 99.7 
Notes: (1)-(4) is importance in descending order 
Source: Computed from Privatization Unit data, 2006 
Cash proceeds from SOEs’ sales were deposited in three different accounts including 
fixed deposits, operational accounts and the dollar account (Ddumba-Ssentamu & 
Mugume, 2001:44). These accounts were operated by the Secretary to the Treasury 
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and the Under-secretary to the Finance Ministry. This one account was in deficit as at 
end of June 2006 (See table 3.6, row 17). 
 
The divesture proceeds by end of June 2006 amounted to Shs. 303 billion (US$172 
m) and 59 % went into divestiture costs, and 41 % in pre-divestiture costs. There was 
a deficit of Shs. 42.3 billion representing 10.6 %. Hence, over 89 per cent of the sales 
proceeds went into divestiture costs, the major ones of which included terminal 
benefits, creditors or assumed takeover of liabilities, professional fees and caretaker 
costs.  
 
Terminal benefits accumulated to Shs. 113.4 billion representing 37.3 percent of sales 
proceeds and 28.5 % of total revenue respectively. Most of this money arose due to 
payment of outstanding pension liabilities amounting to Shs. 14.6 billion taken over 
by PURSP for UP & TC former workers. The Uganda Communications Employee 
contributory Pension Scheme (UCECPSW) was finally regularized and could 
therefore legally administer the pension scheme on behalf of the beneficiaries as well 
as undertake investments that would yield returns. Another lump sum payment of 
pension of Shs. 7.2 billion was made to UEB former workers. Upon completion of the 
all residual issues, the two companies would be de-registered (MOFPED, 2006:13). 
 
Assumed takeover of liabilities totaled Shs.81 billion and comprised liabilities 
assumed from divestiture of SOEs in accordance with PERDS statute. These amounts 
were still subject to negotiation as part of the debt swap with the relevant parties 
including the Uganda government. The determination of the eventual amount payable 
and terms and conditions of payment were subject to the outcome of these 
negotiations (MOFPED, 2006:15). 
 
Arbitration awards totaled Shs. 8 billion representing 2 %. In 2006, some of these 
were paid to a Tunisian firm that had bought Nile International Hotel in Kampala. 
Upon evaluation of the management contract signed between the Uganda Government 
with M/S Tahar Fourati Hotels Limited in 1995, the Nile International Hotel Board 
concluded that the buyer had failed to run the hotel according to the business plan and 
annual budgets deposited on bidding, leading to cancellation of the first divestiture of 
the Hotel. The buyers sued government for wrongful termination of the contract. 
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Upon advice of the Solicitor General and Parliamentary approval, government settled 
for an out-of-court award of Shs. 7.9 billion as full and final settlement to the buyers’ 
and lawyers’ fees (MOFPED, 2006:12). 
3.3.  Summary  
The chapter set out to establish the fiscal impact of privatization by looking at 
subsidies as expenditure and taxes from PSOEs as well as sale proceeds from 
divestiture as revenue.  The findings reveal that the fiscal impact of privatization was 
mixed: leaving the subsidies more or less the same and increasing taxation from 
PSOEs but failing to achieve the expected sales proceeds. As already hinted, subsidies 
in nominal prices have been constant from the period 1992/1993 to 2004/2005. In 
today's Uganda, however, there was no link between subsidies and the central 
government budget deficit (very clear in Figure 3.1). In addition, tax from PSOEs 
increased four times as a result of increased business after privatization particularly in 
industry that increased 7 times while trade and services just doubled. Lastly, 
privatization failed to achieve the sales target of US $500 million target set by World 
Bank and just managed US$172 million by end of June 2006 due to asset 
undervaluation and stripping.  
 
The theoretical implication was that although popular belief had it that SOEs in red 
were the some of the major causes of budget deficits, de-linking of the subsidies from 
budget deficits in 1998/9 and subsequent steep rise in budget deficit seemed to 
suggested that in away SOEs partly financed the government activities in general and 
budget deficits in particular. In Uganda, after de-linking subsidies from budget 
deficits, the latter started rising steeply after 1998/9 seeming to support that although 
there might have been other causes such as import price swings, falling international 
prices for major exports such as coffee and inflation in donor countries; SOEs impact 
could not be completely ruled out as possible a possible cause. This tended to suggest 
that SOEs partly subsidized or financed budget deficits.  
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Chapter 4 
 
4. Privatization and Corporate Governance 
This chapter investigates whether public and private enterprises are managed 
differently by comparing how SOEs and PSOEs are managed. If public and private 
companies were managed differently then privatization would be expected to impact 
on firm performance. If, however, SOEs and PSOEs were managed in a similar 
manner, then privatization would not normally be expected to influence firm 
performance.  In addition, ther chapter attempts to link corporate governance to firm 
performance. I define corporate governance to include objective setting, board 
functions and transaction costs. The research questions I pose include: are SOEs 
objectives, board functions, and transaction costs different from PSOEs.  
 
I carried out this investigation because in chapter one, Galal (1994) theoretically 
argued that in monopoly conditions, the effect of privatization on firm performance 
was unpredictable and depended on how the private sector was managed. Frydman et 
al (1999) support the argument further that for privatization to be effective, 
management had to change. This would imply that privatization’s impact on firm 
performance was indirect, operating through corporate governance, and involved two 
steps: the first being privatization on corporate governance and the second corporate 
governance on firm performance. Bothe the former and the latter are focus of this 
chapter. 
 
Current preoccupation with corporate governance can be pinpointed at two events of 
the East Asian Crisis of 1997 and the American corporate crises of 2001-2002. The 
East Asian Crisis of 1997 saw the economies of Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Thailand and The Philippines severely affected by the exit of foreign capital after 
property assets collapsed. The absence of corporate governance mechanisms 
highlighted the weaknesses of the institutions in these economies. The second event 
was the American corporate crises of 2001-2002 which saw the collapse of two big 
corporations of Enron and WorldCom, and subsequent scandals and collapses in other 
corporations such as Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing and Tyco. 
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Corporate governance is a multi-faceted subject that has come to mean two things. 
First, it is the processes by which companies are directed and controlled. It is the set 
of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting the way corporation are 
managed broken into directing, administering and controlling. Management is the act 
of directing and controlling a large group of people for the purpose of coordinating 
and harmonizing the group towards accomplishing a goal beyond the scope of 
individual effort and includes the deployment and manipulation of human, financial, 
technological, and natural resources.110 In this section, I define corporate governance 
differently as objectives setting and board functions. The second meaning of the term 
refers to a field in economics, which studies the various issues arising from the 
separation of ownership and control.  This is a relationship among the stakeholders 
and the goals for which the corporation is governed, the principal players being the 
shareholders and board of directors.111 An important theme of corporate governance 
deals with issues of accountability and fiduciary duty, essentially advocating the 
implementation of guidelines and mechanisms to ensure good behaviour and 
protection of shareholders.112 Hence, I further define corporate governance as changes 
in transaction costs in addition to objective setting and board functions. 
 
The chapter argues that the impact of privatization on corporate governance defined 
differently as objective setting, board functions and transactions costs depended on 
how the term was conceptualized.  As objective setting, this study results revealed an 
improvement to the statutory bodies’ objective-setting due to corporatization that 
separated commercial from non-commercial activities of the SOEs in preparation for 
their sale. Among the other SOEs, however, namely J-Vs and 100% SOEs, there was 
no difference between SOEs and PSOEs largely due to the remaining unsold 38 out of 
a total of 146 slated for sale as well as the partial privatizations. As board operations, 
there was neither change in terms of strategy explained by capacity problems, colonial 
history and political appointments that recruited inferior staff nor in terms of 
monitoring particularly among the partially privatized SOEs. As transaction costs, the 
results were mixed for the overall performance and individual votes. While there was 
no overall net change, individual votes fell for communications, monitoring, and 
entertainment explained by reduction in waste, competition and reduction in over-
billing while auditing was explained by bankruptcy. On the contrary, advertising and 
legal costs increased after privatization due to increased competition in the oil trading 
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sub-sector that necessitated Shell to increase advertising. The increased legal charges 
were due to change from public to private provision of legal services in the banking 
sub-sector. 
 
 The chapter has three sections. The first deals with an investigation involving the 
manner in which the public and private enterprises were managed with respect 
objectives; and the board functions and their impact on firm performance. The second 
deals with transactions costs and their impact on SOEs and PSOEs performance while 
the third and last is the conclusion.  
4.1.  Corporate Governance as Management before and after privatization 
In Uganda, the law that governed public enterprises depended on the nature of the 
public enterprise under consideration. Essentially, however, there were three SOE 
types: statutory corporations, private companies entirely owned (100 %) by state and 
the J-Vs. The statutory corporations were established either by Act of Parliament or 
Decree. These laws laid out how the enterprises were established, governed and 
regulated. Being seventy-two (72) in number; they included UP &TC, UCB, BOU, 
UDC, NIC, URC, NSSF, marketing boards and Apollo Hotel Corporation, for 
example. The second type were private companies entirely owned (100 %) by the 
state and formed under the Companies Act. They included Nile Hotel, Foods and 
Beverages Limited, TUMPECO, and Transocean. These were established to carry out 
commercial business on behalf of the state. The need for commercial state enterprises 
was greatest especially after the expulsion of Asians in 1972. The Asians used to 
monopolise trade and other aspects of commerce. Normally, two ministries - Finance 
and the parent Ministry - jointly owned 100 % SOEs.   In the third group were joint 
ventures (J-Vs) where government owned shares as majority (at least 51 %) such as 
NYTIL, Bank of Baroda; and Oil companies like Shell, Caltex, Esso, Agip and Total. 
Obote established the J-Vs to attract expertise and foreign investment in the early 
1960s; although he later on targeted reducing foreign control that had caused a 
skewed income distribution in 1970s. The 1969 census had revealed that Asians who 
where not even 1% of the population controlled 75% of GDP. President Obote, 
reacting to this inequality nationalized over 68 private firms in May 1970.  The J-Vs 
were over 18 in number just before privatization. All the three types of SOEs were 
managed and regulated differently, although the Companies Act governed the last 
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two. Despite all being SOEs, they differed in purpose and objectives, and board 
functions. 
 
4.1.1. SOEs’ Objectives before and after Privatization 
As already seen in chapter one, the differences between public and private enterprises 
lies in their objectives. Whereas private enterprises pursue profit, SOEs may pursue 
whatever the government wants and is able to finance such as the promotion of social 
welfare by not exploiting monopoly position or by hiring a large number of redundant 
workers (Galal et al, 1995:10). Privatization materially affects management behaviour 
with important implications on efficiency. Ownership is, hence, important because it 
affects performance indirectly through management and the objectives of owners of 
the firms and the systems of monitoring managerial performance (Vickers and 
Yallow, 1988). So ownership is important, but observers have to look at objectives 
more than the mere ownership set-up. The problems of SOE management were not 
only limited to the non-commercial objectives of statutory bodies but also linked to 
failure to formulate objectives by more commercially oriented SOEs such as the J-Vs 
and 100 % SOEs. 
 
Unlike privatization literature that was awash with how SOEs non-commercial 
objectives led to failure,113 in Uganda the non-commercial objectives were limited 
mostly to statutory bodies that also served as regulatory bodies. These bodies mainly 
served a strategic purpose. For instance, the UP & TC controlled and regulated radio 
communications that was considered a security problem if left in private hands. 
Generally, the objectives of these bodies were non-commercial but were of a 
development focus and frequently carried words such as ‘regulate’, ‘promote’, 
‘finance’, ‘establish’, ‘market’, or ‘develop’ certain activities of the economy. 
Although they did not fully target profit, they were supposed to operate commercially 
according regulations reviewed (see Table 4.1). Unlike statutory bodies, both the J-Vs 
and 100 % SOEs generally had commercial objectives. 
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Table 4 . 1 Statutory SOEs’ Objectives/Functions before privatization  
Enterprise Objectives/Functions 
Uganda Commercial 
Bank (UCB)-
functions 
1) Accept deposits & keep customers’ accounts; 2) Lend against or without security; 3) Transfer. Remit money 
locally or internationally; 4) Discount bills; 5) Trade in foreign exchange; 6) Operate Agencies (project) Funds; 7) 
Act as correspondents of other banks; 8) Buy Stocks and other securities; Underwrite, guarantee, negotiate, and 
give indemnities. Act 22/1965, s.3 (1) a-w.  
NSSF Ensure a secure, profitable and effective financial management of the fund for the benefit of the workers and 
country Act 8/1985, s.3.(3) 
NIC To engage in business as any other insurer 
National Textiles 
Board (NTB)-
functions 
1) Produce, process, manufacture & distribution of textiles; 2) initiate, organize, assist, finance & research in 
textile industry; 3) manage and control textile industry; 4) Establish, promote, finance, acquire and manage related 
industries in textile; Decree 22/1974, s.3 (1) a-f 
Uganda Air Cargo 
Corporation 
(Objectives & 
functions) 
1) Establish and operate air transport services within and outside Uganda relating to air freight, air passengers, air 
passenger chartered flights and airmail services; 2) Give instructions and train flying of airplanes. Act 18/1994, 
s.6 (a & b) 
Uganda Railway 
Corporation (URC)-
objects & functions 
Construct, operate & maintenance of a railway, marine and road services both in Uganda and abroad for the 
carriage of passengers and goods as well as incidental activities towards attainment of objectives; 2) carry out 
storage; 3) clearing and forwarding services; 4) provide accommodation, refreshments and other amenities. 
Statute 13/1992, s.4 (a- b, s.5 (1(a-p 
UP & TC (objects) 1) Commercially provide postal and telecommunications services within and outside Uganda; and 2) regulate and 
control radio communications operated from or received in Uganda 
Coffee Marketing 
Board (CMB)-
objects & functions 
1) Purchase all the coffee produced by the licensed processing factories conforming to the established grades; 2) 
operate an incentive scheme through differential payments basing on grades; 3) regulate quality; 4) impose 
penalties and discounts for unclean coffee; 5) store and let stores for storage of the coffee; and 6) maintain and 
stabilize the price of coffee within and outside Uganda; Act 40/1969, s.2 (a); s. 3(5) b—m 
Uganda Tourist 
Development 
Corporation 
(UTDC) -objectives 
Promote and develop Tourism Industry 1) acquire, design, establish, construct and run hotels, restaurants, 
cafes, refreshment rooms, rest houses, camping sites, water skiing facilities, hunting, lodges, clubs, cinemas, 
casinos, amusement parks, aquariums, holiday resorts and places of interest and entertainment of all kinds of 
tourists; 2) establish, operate and manage all kinds of shops both duty free & otherwise; establish travel agencies 
& work as agents for all types of transport & organize tours locally & elsewhere; 3) own & manage road & water 
transport vehicles for tourist purposes; 4) form, promote, manage, control, finance tourist based firms; 5) Finance 
& guarantee loans for tourist development; 5) liaise with other related institutions. Decree 23/1974, s.2. (a-g) 
Uganda Tourist 
Board (UTB)-
functions 
1) Promote, market and popularize Uganda as a tourist destination; 2) Encourage investment in Tourism; 3) liaise 
with UIA & World Tourist Organization; 4) Promote and sponsor educational programmes in the industry; 5) 
provide or co-ordinate consultancy provision services; 6) carry out research and mobilization; 7) set, enforce and 
monitor standards. Act 15/1994, s.9 (a-g) 
UCC (functions) 1) Establish cement works or factories; 2) organize and control and staff of firms in cement industry; 3) distribute 
& market cement. Decree 26/1974, s.2 (2) a-b 
Bank of Uganda 
(BOU)  
(functions) 
Formulate  & implement monetary policy to achieve economic stability 1) perform all roles of central bank such 
as external assets reserve maintenance, issue currency notes & coins; banker to government, financial adviser to 
government and manager of the public debt, act as agent in financial matters of government, banker to financial 
institutions; 2) supervise, regulate, control an discipline financial institutions, insurance companies & pension 
schemes; 3) participate in economic growth & development; 4) maintenance of monetary stability. Statute 5/1993, 
s.5 (1 & 2) 
National Housing 
Corp. –NHC 
(Objects & 
functions) 
1) Undertake the development, building and management of estate houses; 2) Build, own, operate and transfers 
houses, and estates; 3) do the business of building houses. Cap 321, NHC Act 
National Planning 
Authority fn 
Plan and advise cabinet on 1) Economic and Social development 2) Effective and efficiency use of resources of 
Uganda in order to attain the maximum rate of growth of output.  
Uganda steel 
Corporation  
(Functions) 
1) Manufacture steel from iron & scrap; 2) make steel products e.g. plates, bars, screws, wire, nails etc; 3) 
organize & control management of firms in steel industry; 4) establish, promote, finance & acquire, manage other 
firms in the steel manufacture; 5) advise Minister on matters of steel and iron.  Decree 25/1974, s.2 (1) a-e) 
Uganda Tea 
Growers 
Corporation  
(UTGC)-functions 
& duties 
1) Encourage the formation of group of tea growers into co-operative societies with objective of acquiring tea 
processing factories; 2) prepare overall plans for tea industry development; 3) negotiate green leaf agreements on 
behalf of the tea growers or co-operative society; 4) organize inspection of green leaf & establishment & 
inspection of collection centre for transportation and storage; 5) organize transportation, sale and marketing of 
processed tea; 6) negotiate for financing and construction an d arrange for the management of the factories; set up 
and maintain training centre and experimental tea stations; negotiate with government for the construction, 
improvement and maintenance of roads and other  transport for collection of green leaf and distribution of 
processed tea;  7) control the processing of green leaf. Act 3/1966, s. 3(1) a-I 
Notes: UCC=Uganda Cement Corporation; UP & TC=Uganda Posts & Telecommunication corporation; NIC=National 
Insurance Corporation 
Source: Various Regulations  
Before privatization, most SOEs lacked objectives and, if they existed at all, they 
were poorly formulated, unachievable, supply-driven and generally non-commercial. 
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Most corporations failed to formulate clear objectives. Frequently, only a statement of 
functions sufficed explained by lack of capacity and partly government failure. First, 
the British colonialists made laws that hindered Africans from entering trade and 
Asians from owning land. The political economy that, therefore, emerged was African 
peasants; Asian traders; and European administrators, bankers and political elite.  
 
In turn, the colonialists allowed the Indians to trade because they where trading in 
British merchandise and also because they were outside the region and would not 
conspire with the colonized Africans.5 This colonial mentoring persisted whereby the 
African was ignorant of how business ran.6 Even after independence, the training of 
Ugandans in business administration was elitist and did not spread to wider private 
sector (employers) who were the policy makers in businesses. After privatization, 
changes in objective-setting were mixed: improving for statutory but recording no 
change for the J-Vs and 100 % state-owned. 
 
On privatization, in order to prepare SOEs for sale popularly known as 
corporatization, commercial functions were separated from non-commercial ones. 
While the commercial functions and objectives were left to SOEs for sale, the non-
commercial ones were left with regulatory bodies especially among the statutory 
bodies. Several statutory SOEs such as UP & TC, UEB, and UAC shelved their non-
commercial functions to regulatory bodies of UCC, ERA, and CAA respectively. The 
impact to governance was an improvement in objective setting for the PSOEs, 
especially those that emerged from former statutory bodies such as UEB, UP & TC, 
and UAC. But the improvement in objective-setting among statutory bodies did not 
spread to J-Vs and 100 % PSOEs. 
 
After privatisation, a questionnaire given to PSOEs to fill was returned blank. At 
least, the objectives were not written down on paper.  This implied that despite 
privatization, the objective setting did not change much in PSOEs, especially the 
former J-Vs and 100 % due to capacity problems since the majority owners were not 
trained in management science. As such, to dream of improved corporate governance 
after privatization was naive. In order to bring about such a change, there was need 
for less elitist courses tailored for employers or potential business owners. 
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It is interesting to note, however, that a project for promoting corporate governance in 
Uganda was instituted by the Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda (ICGU) 
and worked closely with PURSP. ICGU   delivers seminars and workshops initially 
with a bias of SOEs as preparation for private sector participation where divestiture 
was expected. The expectation was that corporate governance would be entrenched in 
the PSOEs to pave the way for private sector-led growth. During the year 2005/6 
alone, a total 138 senior managers and members of the boards of directors of key 
SOEs and private companies were trained (MOFPED, 2006:27). While both objective 
setting and board functions were equally bad before privatization, positive indicators 
in the former did not spread to the latter after privatization. 
4.1.2 Board function before and after Privatization 
It has been argued that the differences between public and private firms arise due to 
objectives of the two types. In a private enterprise, the owners, directors and managers 
perform distinct roles. The shareholders, as owners define the goals (G), set objectives (O), 
appoint directors (D) and dismiss them, approve the annual accounts (A) and dividends (D) 
(GODAD). Then the board provides strategic guidance, evaluates performance and appoints, 
motivates and fires the chief executive officer (SMEH). Lastly, the management develops the 
alternative plans, strategies and programmes; manages resources and daily decision-making 
and control of operations performance.7 SOEs boards in Uganda jumbled up roles, the 
worst scenario being J-Vs under UDC. I investigate strategic management and hiring and 
firing of managers before and after privatization and handle monitoring in the section 
on transactions costs. 
 
Before privatization, one interesting issue that cut across SOE management in Uganda 
was the fact that the top decision-making aspect of the SOEs was of two types and 
located either outside a particular enterprise and served a group of enterprises such as 
UDC subsidiaries (J-Vs) or within (inside) it as was the 100 % SOEs and the statutory 
bodies.8 Locating the board outside the SOEs was one of major causes of failure of 
some SOEs.  
 
SOE boards, particularly J-Vs, simply neither performed strategic planning nor 
monitoring and evaluation but instead degenerated to running day-to-day operations. 
First, UDC management, shareholders and directors failed to put in place alternative 
plans and strategies in a rapidly changing policy environment explained by the 
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monopoly position enjoyed by most UDC subsidiaries that did not force them to be 
either innovative or aggressive compared to the private sector. 
 
Worse still, Board meetings were not taken seriously as a forum for policy-making 
but just as a ritual to receive some money or partying. For instance, Gomba Motors 
Board held only two meetings in the 1986 both of which were in December. For the two 
meetings a total of Shs. 7.6 million (US$3790) was given and each director was paid between 
Shs. 450, 000= (US$225) and Shs. 850, 000= (US$425). In addition, there were also two 
board committee meetings, two of which lacked quorum being attended by two directors only. 
On the third occasion, and to show the lack of seriousness in SOE board functioning, a 
general purpose board committee meeting was called purposely for a luncheon that 
cost Shs. 680, 000= (US$340) and on yet another occasion, the Chairman simply paid 
each director Shs. 100, 000= (US$50) although no meeting took place.9 It was 
therefore, not surprising that UDC subsidiaries were inferior in performance to other 
SOEs.  
 
First, the accounts were simply not made while those that existed had errors and did 
not give a true picture of the state of affairs. For instance, UAC did not keep books for 
eight years from the time it was set up in 1976; the same was the case with UCB after 
1994. Second, even the few reports that were made were never acted upon. UDC 
received monthly reports of unstandardized nature of production, sales, trading profit 
and loss, cash flows and working capital position and personnel. Although monitoring 
exposed deviations from budgeted positions, the information was never processed to 
provide performance indicators. There were several gross abuses as well as late 
submissions.10 The failure to process the information from the subsidiaries meant that 
UDC and MOIT action was not based on facts. The mediocre performance of SOE 
boards was explained by organizational structure, political appointments, and 
absentee boards. 
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Table 4 . 2 Board Functions of 100 % SOEs and Joint Ventures (J-Vs) in Uganda before Privatization  
Board Functions/SOEs  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 jv1 jv 2 jv 3 jv 4 jv 5 jv 6 
Cause books of Accounts (OS) x x  x  x x x  x x x x 
Appoint CEO +officers            x  
Appoint P/A + official seal x x x x x x  x x x  x x 
Appoint Directors (OS) x             
Charge Company Assets x x x    x x      
Adjust number of Directors     x   x      
Authorize dividend (OS) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Appoint Company Secretary x  x  x x x x   x x  
Adjust borrowing Limits  x            
Cause Budgets preparation  x            
Appoint Managing Director  x x  x x x       
Appoint Chairman          x x  x 
Required Qualifying shares 0     0   5 0   0 
Number of Directors 3-10 7(4g, 3) 2-9 7 2-9 2-9 3-10 4-7 2-5 2-7 4-8 3-5 (2g) 4(a, b) 
 
Notes 1) : 1=Associated Paper Industry, 2=Nile Hotel international, 3=Lango Development Company, 4=Uganda Transport Company (UTC); 5= Uganda Meat Parkers-Kampala, 
6=Kulubya Property, 7=Associated Match Company (AMCO); JV1=Uganda Clay Limited (UCWL); JV2=Transocean U Limited; JV3=BATU; JV4=African Textile Mills; JV5=Bank 
of Baroda U Limited; and JV6=UFEL Note 2) : x represents Yes; Note 3: G directors appointed by government, Note 4 P/A=power of attorney; Note 5) JV=joint venture; A shares114; 
B shares = The second tier of classified stock.; G=government. 
Source: Articles and Memorandum of Association of Mentioned SOEs. 
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4.1.2.1. Organizational structure 
Before privatization, the organizational structure of SOEs, was not fully drawn or it 
was never implemented to show who was responsible to whom and for what among 
MOIT and UDC on one hand, and between UDC and subsidiaries (J-Vs) on the other 
hand. 
 
MOIT and UDC never synchronized their activities concerning J-Vs. Subsidiaries and 
associated companies complained of unnecessary interference either from MOIT or 
UDC. Often, the MOIT bypassed UDC on policy matters and dealt with subsidiaries, 
ignoring the need to inform UDC. Unaware of what MOIT had done, UDC would 
issue conflicting directives especially in the matters of appointment, negotiation with 
foreign institutions and salary reviews.12 As an example, appointments of the chief 
executives in the subsidiaries were at times made outside UDC. UDC as a majority 
shareholder in the subsidiaries did not always appoint the board. In at least five cases, 
the MOIT or the Prime Minister’s Office interfered in board appointment. Also, in 
some enterprises, the GMs/MDs were appointed politically either directly from 
President’s Office or the MOIT.13  
 
The relationship between  UDC and the subsidiaries extended beyond ownership 
role into co-ordination, supervision of resources and daily management of the 
enterprises’ operations.14 A UDC chief executive had two roles: one of UDC chief 
executive and the other as the Board Chairman of most of the UDC subsidiaries 
deemed to represent an extremely busy schedule. As Chief of the UDC, the Chairman 
had over ten officers reporting to him directly including five Executive Directors of 
finance, accounts, and audit. In addition to the UDC Chairman, many UDC Directors 
also sat on boards of subsidiaries (J-Vs). The subsidiaries themselves called at least 
two board meetings every month representing a minimum of 40 board meetings for 
the twenty SOEs deemed detrimental for efficient running of the J-Vs.15 The gravity 
of participation in meetings of subsidiaries implied that the UDC chief would be in at 
least a subsidiary daily throughout the month, or that he would not chair some 
meetings if they fell on the same day. 
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4.1.2.2. Political appointments 
In Ugandan SOEs, the representative of ‘ordinary shareholders’ or ‘taxpayers’ turned 
out to be the Finance Minister, the Parent Ministry, the President, or the UDC. In a 
few exceptions, the supervising Minister appointed the General Manager, Chief 
Executive Officer, Chairman or Managing Director,  as they used to be called, and the 
other directors. But in some cases such as UCB, the President appointed the 
Managing Director but this was changed later and fell in line with the usual procedure 
of the appointments by Minister. 
 
Unlike the private sector where directors are appointed by shareholders, SOE 
directors were appointed either by the politicians, Board, or by delegation. In some 
other instances, the Minister appointed the chief executive but in consultation with the 
Board as was in the URC. The Board, as opposed to the Minister, appointed the 
Company Secretary in NIC, NTB, UCC and Uganda Air Cargo Corporation. Unlike 
the statutory SOEs, directors in the 100 % SOEs could delegate to an ‘alternate 
director’ to act for them.16  
 
Although, the regulations emphasised board appointments based on quality and 
technical knowledge, the political machinery of all regimes fluffed this criterion.  
While regulations emphasised technical knowledge, politics always played a key role. 
According to law, in order to qualify as a director in an SOE normally required 
knowledge in business administration, finance, economics and commerce. Other 
specialized SOEs like banking also needed banking experience while URC needed 
industrialists, engineers, and knowledge in transport. Since SOEs were, however, 
owned and financed by government, politics played a part in recruitment of both 
directors and staff as was the case in NYTIL, Meat Parkers and Lira Spinning Mill; 
and Export and Import Corporation by President Obote and later by his successor 
Amin. President Amin, for instance, appointed an illiterate from the Secret Service 
Unit 17 to be Managing Director in Transocean in Mombasa, Kenya in 1974. Such 
political appointments resulted into inferior candidates.  
 
Such political appointments were a major source of failure in running the SOEs and, 
in most cases, were found wanting. For instance, most appointees considered it as a 
gift from the politicians and felt free to pursue personal goals. Hence, the Board 
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constituted no more than a collection of self-motivated individuals who lacked the 
expertise and experience to steer the SOEs to efficiency and maximum benefit for 
growth of the economy. In some instances, SOE Board members were ignorant of the 
procedures and tasks they were supposed to perform. In such cases, it was at one time 
thought necessary that a reference manual and letters of appointment spelling out 
certain issues to preserve the attainment of society as opposed to personal goals be put 
in place. 18 The failure to meet professional and academic eligibility criteria greatly 
weakened the board functions before privatization. 
 
While it was too early to estimate the degree of reduction in political appointments in 
PSOEs, it suffices to say that there remained 38 out of 146 SOEs to sell and another 
unknown number of mixed SOEs in order to completely solve the problem of political 
appointments. The latter problem of mixed enterprises was big and investors 
complained that government dictated terms even with a minority shareholding. 
 
4.1.2.3. Absentee boards 
In chapter 1, I theoretically argued that Board size and who appoints members were 
two major issues influencing differences between the public and private enterprises in 
the world. Whereas Board size in the private sector company is normally small and is 
appointed by shareholders who have a quantifiable stake in the enterprise, and the 
Board is responsible for seeing the business of the company is conducted in their best 
interests, this was not the case in SOEs. Important in Uganda, however, was not the 
size but rather the absence of board effectiveness. 
 
But while board size was blamed, the actual number of active board at any one time 
was at times less than legislated. For instance, while the UCB statute provided for a 
deputy director, this post was never filled for all the 37 years of the bank’s life from 
1965. In addition, in several other instances, directors whose terms lapsed were never 
retired, nor were new recruitments done on the death of some directors. For GCPC, a 
Board of Directors appointed in 1991 for a two-year term ending August 1993 was 
allowed to continue for seven years. Instead of retiring the old Board, the MoF 
allowed the existing Board to continue in office till a new one was appointed. Five 
years later, no new Board was appointed even when two of the members had died, an 
act that undermined the board’s independence and effectiveness.19 But a more telling 
example was UDC itself. For UDC, the changing political regimes made it impossible 
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for it to always have a Board. For instance, while UDC had a Board from 1952 to 
1970, it lacked one between 1971 and 1979. After the fall of Amin in 1979, the MOIT 
appointed a new board the following year.20  
 
Like with appointments, while it was too early to estimate the degree of improvement 
in board effectiveness in PSOEs, it suffices to say that there remained 38 SOEs to sell 
in order to completely solve the problem of big board sizes and composition. Another 
issue to consider in solving the problem of big board sizes and composition was that 
of mixed enterprises where government still retained some minority shares even after 
privatization and investors complained about government dictating terms even when it 
was a minority shareholder. 
 
4.1.2.4. Donor Interests 
UDC objectives were hardly met because it could not individually originate a 
feasibility study outside donor interest and receive funding. UDC reliance on foreign 
grants therefore tended to dictate implementation of the type of projects that foreign 
interests needed but not what management approved of (UDC, 1990: 6 -7). Hence, the 
government policy of foreign funding also determined the project types that in most 
cases satisfied donor (financer) interests than UDC or Ugandan interests of growth 
and development. Tied aid became a hindrance to development and created a negative 
relationship between foreign finance (FDI) and development especially after 1962. It 
was not surprising, therefore, that UDC subsidiaries were inferior in performance to 
other SOEs before privatization. 
 
Impact of SOE board functions on firm performance before privatization  
It should be recalled that UDC was established to finance, manage, and facilitate the 
industrial and economic development of Uganda through the starting of new projects 
[UDC s. 4 (a)]; application of modem and efficient methods of production in existing 
enterprises [UDC s.4 (b)]; and, to conduct research in the industrial and mineral 
potentialities of Uganda [UDC s.4 (c)].  In order to achieve its objectives UDC was 
empowered to: 
 
i. Promote and finance any undertaking in Uganda; 
ii. To advance money, or underwrite an enterprise proposing to establish, 
modernize, or expand business in Uganda; 
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iii. To manage, develop, let, hire or buy assets and securities of any of its 
subsidiaries as well as draw, make, endorse negotiable instruments; 
iv. Guarantee enterprises, raise money by issue of debentures or debenture 
stock, and borrow and lend money for the purposes of running the corporation; 
v. Conduct research in the agricultural and mineral wealth of the country 
and establish and administer research institutes and bodies; 
vi. To act as manager, agent, secretary of any undertaking and to appoint 
any person to act on behalf of the corporation as Director or any other 
capacity; and to act as an agent for any undertaking carrying on business in 
Uganda and overseas; and 
vii. To establish a pension and providence fund for the employees of the 
company in which UDC had an interest whether subsidiary, associate, 
or other statutory body [UDC s.5 (1) (a -k)]. 
 
The financial performance of UDC group of companies was dismal just prior to 
privatization between 1986 and 1988 returning an operating loss except in 1988 when 
a profit of 72 million was made. The profit in the year 1988 was exceptional because 
of the Shs. 222 million made by UGMC through sales of wheat from barter trade. The 
loss before tax and interest was Shs. 265 million in 1988 and profit-sales ratio of 
negative 9.7 % compared to 6.4 % of other manufacturing enterprises in the public 
sector. In addition, most UDC group of companies had solvency and liquidity 
problems and all the UDC companies were operating below 50 % capacity, with 
obsolete plants, raw material shortages, undercapitalization problems, low motivation 
and morale, poor maintenance, failure of management to prepare alternate plans and 
strategies in a rapidly changing policy environment. The monopoly situation of most 
of the UDC group of companies did not encourage aggressiveness and innovativeness 
(UDC, 1990:6-7).  While interference in the J-Vs day-to-day running by UDC 
resulted into poorer performance compared to purely SOEs; UDC closure during the 
initial stages of the privatization process resulted into not only insufficient investment 
levels but also led to neglected sectors by the private sector. 
 
Impact of SOE board functions on firm performance after privatization  
In the early 1990s, the government withdrew from doing business and put in place 
policies that gave the private sector wider roles. Such policies included privatization 
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that also included winding up UDC during the initial stages of the privatization 
process, due to corruption that rendered its operations unfeasible and inefficient. The 
closure led to ignoring certain sectors and also caused insufficient development.  
 
In 2003, government admitted that it erred in winding up UDC and planned to start a 
new agency to champion investment in strategic sectors. The revival of UDC would 
be a major policy reversal and an indication that the Government intended to play a 
major role in the economy again 21 explained by the insufficiency of private-sector-led 
growth and dislike by the private sector of certain sectors. First, Daudi Migereko, 
former minister for MOIT, argued the move was prompted by the need to have as 
many industries as possible to reduce unemployment. Migereko said there were 
several areas like mining and textile sectors, in which the Government would like to 
intervene because if the private sector was left on its own, it was not sufficient to 
foster industrialization. It was, therefore, important to have a combination of the 
private and public sectors. According to the Indian Ocean Newsletter, an official 
document on the national budget released in March, UDC revival was tentatively 
slated for beginning of July 2007. 22 Second, the government plans to revive the 
defunct UDC targeting investing in sectors that local and foreign investors 
had ignored after liberalization policy was established. Mukwaya, the Minister of 
Agriculture,  said the policies  had not entirely  been fruitful  because  the  private 
sector  had not  picked  interest in investing in the agro-processing  sector, a crucial 
sector to the country’s economic development. Given that agriculture was the 
backbone of the country interventions to industrialize it would yield enormous 
benefits to the economy. "There are priority sectors to the economy which private 
investors did not invest in despite the good policies.23  
 
The revival of the UDC, however, was prompted more by the AGOA markets. Mr 
Geoffrey Onegi Obel, Senior Presidential Advisor on the African Growth 
Opportunities Act (AGOA), exclusively told The Monitor, a local daily, that the 
immediate task of the planned new organization were to tackle challenges that had 
emerged in Uganda's quest to export to the huge American market under AGOA. 
Other sources clarified that in order for Uganda to reap maximum benefit from 
AGOA there was urgent need for investment in agro-processing and textile industries. 
Under AGOA, Uganda exported textiles to USA but newer markets had emerged 
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especially in the Middle East for fish, beef, mutton and other animal products that 
required heavy investment in processing facilities. 24 
 
SOEs normally intervened in causing investment in priority areas of the economy in 
which individuals did not invest despite the good policies or where government could 
venture directly. Almost all countries in the world had such bodies. For instance, 
Kenya had the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC); 
Tanzania has the National Development Corporation (TNDC) while even the 
wealthier United Kingdom- the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). 25 
While UDC closure caused more problems than solutions, retaining some SOEs did 
not improve corporate governance either. While closure of the UDC, a SOE-maker, 
caused economy-wide impacted negatively on performance; the other SOEs impact 
was less visible. 
Table 4 3 CG of Unsold SOEs & Gov’t Minority Shareholding 2003/04-4 
Compliance Indicator results Average FY  1999/0-4/5 2003/4 2004/5 2004/5 change 
Annual certificate of responsibility 24 % 21 % 16 % - 5 % 
Audited accounts 83  % 84 % 74 % -10 % 
Board of Directors 90 % 89 % 89 % 0 % 
Budget & Operating Plan 74 % 71 % 76 % 5 % 
Half Yearly reports 40 % 16 % 18 % 2 % 
Internal Audit Functions 21 % 53 % 53 % 0 % 
Average 55 % 56 % 54 % - 2 % 
Note: 1) on a five-year average; 2) Gov’t=Government; CG=Corporate Governance 
Source:  PURSP, 2006, page 26 
After privatization board functions gave mixed results for the partially privatized 
where government owned minority shares according to the PMU supervision report. 
The combined performance of SOEs with regard to six selected compliance indicators 
slightly declined from a score of 56 % in 2003/04 to 54 % in 2004/05 largely due to 
delays in the submission of audited accounts outlined in Table 4.3 (PURSP:200626). 
Despite the net decline, impact on individual votes was mixed. 
 
The results showed no change in the indicators for the ‘board of directors’ and 
‘internal audit functions’; a slight improvement for ‘budgets/operating plan’ and ‘half 
yearly reports’;  a decline in the indicator for ‘audited accounts’ and the ‘annual 
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certificate of responsibility; as a result of delays in SOEs submitting and publishing of 
their audited accounts (PURSP:200626). 
 
In order to estimate the degree of reduction in political decision-making in PSOEs, it 
suffices to say that these problems still existed due to the remaining 38 SOEs as well 
as the partial privatizations resulted into government minority shareholding but with 
capacity to dictate terms. In order to completely solve the problem of political 
decision-making, there was need to complete the selling of the remaining unsold 38 
out of a total of 146 SOEs.  That implied that political decisions in PSOEs still 
existed. The agency theory, however, states those management problems in firms are 
not unique to SOEs alone but also exist even in private firms that separate ownership 
from management. Like strategy, transactions costs also recorded not net change but, 
unlike the former, the latter individual votes recorded mixed results. 
4.2. Corporate Governance as Separation of Ownership from Management 
It has been argued that the difference in performance between SOEs and private firms 
was not ownership per se but rather the separation of management from ownership. 
Although economic analysis normally assumes that the main objective of private 
enterprise is to maximize profits, the separation of ownership from management can 
make this impossible. The existence of shareholders and managers brings about the 
problems of principal-agent relationships (Rees, 1985).26 An agency relationship is 
established when a principal delegates some rights over a resource to an agent who is 
bound by a contract to represent the principal’s interest in return for payment. The 
problems arise from the differing objectives and availability of information of the 
shareholders and managers (Eggertsson, 1990). While the principal tries to induce the 
agent to act in the principal’s interests, he lacks information about the circumstances 
and behaviour of the agent, which causes a monitoring problem (Vickers and Yallow, 
1988). Since the agent collects more information, he is in most cases more 
knowledgeable than the principal, causing “opportunistic behaviour,” agency costs 
and transaction costs. One solution to opportunistic behaviour was to carry out audits 
or sharing profits (Eggertsson, 1990). Empirically, I investigate the possibility of a 
difference in transaction costs between public and private sectors in Uganda.  
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Transaction costs refer to finding out what the relevant prices are, negotiating and 
concluding contracts and monitoring and enforcing these transactions. They are 
information, travel and communication, hospitality, default risks and contract 
enforcement costs. A common theory is that transaction costs decrease with 
privatization (Harriss et al, 1995; Harriss-White, 1995).27 Alternatively put, SOE 
transaction costs tended to exceed those of the private sector. Transaction costs can be 
measured using cost effectiveness analysis comparing market with government.  This 
is explained by the fact that the private sector is more cost-effective than SOEs or 
government. In case government operations turn out to be cheaper, this rare situation 
then requires explanation. The bigger transaction costs of government can be 
explained by the budget-maximizing behaviour of the bureaucrats already explained. 
 
4.2.1. Transaction Costs before and after privatization 
Evidence from 31 PSOEs studied revealed that on average annual transaction costs 
after privatization remained more or less the same after privatization in nominal terms 
at Shs. 1.4 billion (Refer to Table 4.4, column 3 & 7) attributed to privatization drive 
itself.  Despite the general lack of change in transaction costs, individual votes gave 
mixed results: falling in communication and monitoring but rising for advertisement 
and legal elaborated on next. 
Table 4 4 Privatization Impact on 31 SOEs Transaction Costs in Uganda in Billions Shs. 1986-03  
Before Privatization After Privatization Transactions 
Cost types Total 
TCs  
Annual 
average 
Annual 
mean for 
Industry 
Annual 
mean for 
TRSE 
Total 
TCs  
Annual 
average  
Annual 
mean for 
Industry 
Annual 
mean for 
TRSE 
Communication  17.5 0.9 0.4 0.6 1.02 0.06 0.01 0.05  (-) 
Advertising & 
Promotion 
4.1 0.2 0.1 0.08 15.5 0.8 0.2 0.6  (+) 
Monitoring & 
Audit 
2.03 0.1 0.07 0.05 1.4 0.08 0.03 0.05  (-) 
Legal Charges 2.07 0.1 0.07 0.05 6.3 0.3 0.01 0.3  (+) 
Entertainment 1.1 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.7 0.04 0.01 0.03  (-) 
Total 30.5 1.4 0.6 0.83 24.5 1.4 0.3 1.1   (0) 
Notes: 1) total cost is the sum of all the cost of enterprises either before or after; 2 Annual mean is the 
result of dividing total cost is or the sum of all the cost of enterprises either before or after by the 
number of years before/after privatisation.; 3) + means increased, - means reduced 
Source: Author’s Calculations based on Company Financial records 1986-03. 
 
While trade and services stepped up monitoring and auditing, industry reduced its 
expenditure and the two sectors exchanged positions before and after privatization. 
Before privatization, industry bore the heavier burden in auditing compared to the 
trade sector.  After privatization, however, the trade and services sector overshadowed 
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industry in monitoring attributed to stricter measures in the service and trade sector 
and collapse of industries. 
 
4.2.1.1.Communication transaction costs before and after privatization 
Communication costs fell from 0.9 bn to 0.06 bn representing 93.3 % explained by 
several factors such as unrealistic billings of the former UP & TC, reduced abuse of 
office telephones by parastatal staff that used to make unofficial calls on the expense of the 
SOEs, competition that saw four telephone providers CELTEL, MTN, UTL, and WARID and 
several other mail delivery providers compared to the monopoly UP &TC before 
privatization. Current telephone providers offered pre-paid services, reducing over-billing, 
while most workers in the few remaining SOEs used personal mobile phones for their 
personal calls. But it was difficult to tell exactly which of these factors contributed most to the 
reduction. Both before and after privatization TRSE costs exceeded those of industry 
explained by the existence of UP & TC in the TRSE.  
 
4.2.1.2. Auditing Transaction costs before and after privatization 
After privatization, auditing as measured by expenditure on this item changed 
drastically recording a net fall but exchanged positions between industry on one hand 
with trade and services on the other. Annual auditing costs fell by 54.8 % from Shs. 
112.5 million (US$56, 250) and 79.2 million (US$38, 600) before and after 
privatization respectively [Refer to Table 4.1] explained by the World Bank as a lack 
of public awareness of the importance of a sound financial management system.28 
Although this was aimed at public service, the private sector was not different.  
 
Reporting requirements 
The law clearly defined what reports were to be produced, by whom and where to 
lodge them. For both 100% SOEs and J-Vs, company law required budgeting as well 
as keeping books of accounts. The statutory bodies required annual budgets submitted 
to the supervising Minister for approval.29 Every company was required to prepare and 
present to the AGM a statement of profit and loss or income and expenditure not later 
than eighteen months after the incorporation and annually subsequently. The registrar 
could extend the period of eighteen months, and in case of a company extend the 
periods to either nine or twelve months. In addition, a balance sheet was to be made 
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yearly and presented to the AGM at the same time as the profit and loss accounts or 
income and expenditure statements.  
 
At the end of the financial year, holding companies had to present the accounts of the 
subsidiaries at the same time. Exemption from this rule included when the holding 
company was located abroad, or where the amounts involved were insignificant, or 
misleading or harmful to the business of the company or any of its subsidiaries, or the 
business of the subsidiary and holding company were different. 30   
 
In addition, it was a requirement to disclose detailed accounts of transactions and 
assets and liabilities at the registered office or any place and being open to inspection 
by the directors. Proper books of accounts were deemed not kept if they did not give a 
true and fair view of the state of the company’s affairs. Any director who failed to 
take adequate steps to secure good books or by his own wilful act was liable to 
imprisonment for a maximum of one year or fined ten thousand shillings (US$50) or 
both. To avoid conviction one had to prove that he believed that he employed a 
competent and reliable person.31 Penalty and the defence for the statutory were the 
same as the J-Vs. Unfortunately; the practice deviated greatly from the law because 
accounts were rarely made.  
 
The Ombudsmen 
Uganda company law also required every company to appoint at each AGM an 
auditor(s) to hold office for a year till the next AGM. At any AGM a retiring auditor 
was deemed to be re-appointed without any resolution being passed unless he/she did 
not qualify; the AGM appointed somebody else; or there was written notice of her 
unwillingness.32 In case no auditor was re-appointed, the registrar could appoint a 
person to fill the vacancy. In this case, the company was to be given one week to give 
notice of the fact and on failure, the company and every officer of the company who 
would be in default would be fined.33   In order to enforce the reporting, ministries, the 
AG, the UDC, and internal auditors were put in place. 
 
In the management of SOEs a common phenomenon was the supervision of the SOE 
by a government Ministry. For instance: 
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i) Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries controlled Dairy 
Corporation;  
ii) Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities controlled Uganda Hotels 
Limited, Sheraton Hotel and Nile Complex;  
iii) Ministry of Information controlled New Vision;  
iv) UTC and UPT were under the Ministry of Transport, Works and 
Communications;  
v) Ministry of natural resources supervised Kilembe Mines; and  
vi) Ministry of Trade and Industry controlled Foods and Beverages, Lake Victoria 
Bottling Co., Cable Corporation, Blenders U Limited, Uganda Meat Packers, 
Uganda General Merchandise Limited, Uganda Hardware Limited, Trans-
Ocean U Limited, African Ceramics, TUMPECO, ATM, ULATI, NYTIL, 
Uganda Bags and Hessian Mills, Hima Cement Factory, Printpak U Limited, 
AEL, UGIL, UGMA Engineering Corporation and Uganda Tea 
Corporation.34 In addition to the Ministry, J-Vs received further supervision 
from UDC.  
The Auditor-General, or an auditor appointed by him was required to audit the 
accounts of SOEs, deliver to the Supervising Minister and the Finance Minister, who 
in turn was required to present these accounts before Cabinet not later than six months 
from the end of the financial year.35  UDC subsidiaries received additional supervision. 
 
UDC offered additional supervision for its J-Vs. There was an industrial division 
responsible for monitoring and providing management and other operational support 
services to subsidiaries. The division had five EDs to the 23 companies in the areas of 
agriculture and livestock, foods and beverages, textiles and leather; paper and 
chemicals, metallic and non-metallic and financial and real estate.36 First, the 
responsibilities of the UDC executive directors gave them too much power to 
intervene in the daily management of subsidiaries. The overall monitoring of 
subsidiaries’ operations by UDC was ineffective with many of their accounts not up-
to-date, UDC’s own accounts not prepared beyond 1988 while the consolidated UDC 
and subsidiaries’ accounts had not been produced since 1973.37 Neither the statutory 
SOEs nor the J-Vs strictly followed these regulations as has been shown. Unlike the 
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other TCs that fell, advertising and enforcement costs increased instead after 
privatization. 
 
4.2.1.3.   Advertising and Legal transactions costs before and after privatization 
Unlike other transaction costs that reduced, advertising and legal average annual costs 
increased threefold from 0.2 b to 0.8 bn shillings explained by competition and high-legal 
costs in the private sector. In the trade and services sector, the bulk of the increase was 
attributed to Shell Oil Uganda Limited that accounted for over 63 % of post-privatization 
advertising and promotional costs. Three years after privatization, the MNC launched a three-
year, aggressive, advertising and promotional campaign averaging Shs. 2.6 billion (US$1.3 
m) annually. In total, Shell U Limited spent Shs.7.8 billion (US$3, 888, 035) between 1995 
and 1997. To crown up her expansion, the MNC opened up several outlet petrol 
stations and also purchased PSOE, Agip U Limited Oil.38 
 
The implication was that privatization was likely to increase advertising costs if 
competition was allowed in sectors that previously used to enjoy a monopoly 
situation.  This situation would suggest a possible relationship between structure and 
corporate governance. This assertion, however, has the limitation of a lone case - only 
one PSOE (Shell Limited) stepped up her advertising costs.  
  
Like advertisement, legal costs multiplied three times from 0.1 bn to 0.3 bn shillings 
after privatization due to bad loans created by SOEs and high, private legal costs. 
Before privatization, government contracted debt collectors to recover debts of 
statutory banks such as UCB and Co-operative Bank but not the J-V banks such as 
Barclays, Baroda or Stanchart that were left to handle their debts privately and hence 
the increased legal expenses. The move from public to private provision was partly 
responsible for higher legal costs. In addition, Ugandan lawyers charged ranging 
between US$ 150 to US$ 250 per hour that was considered high.39 
 
Transaction costs may not fall with privatization in certain sectors that also deal credit 
industry such as banks, particularly if legal services were government-provided 
before, but changed to private provision with privatization. In this case, corporate 
governance’s impact on privatization effects needs to consider the type of industry 
under consideration. This would suggest that high-legal costs for the banking sector 
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may not end immediately after sale but continue being big after changeover from 
government to the private sector. In case they do, this has the wide-ranging 
implications for the whole economy in terms of bank closures and also cost of capital 
and, consequently, investment. 
4.3. Summary 
Investigating differences in corporate governance between public and private firms 
gives mixed results. Defined differently as objective setting, board functions and 
transaction costs depended on how the term was conceptualized.  As objective setting, 
this study’s results revealed an improvement in the statutory bodies objective-setting 
due to corporatization that separated commercial from non-commercial activities of 
the SOEs in preparation for their sale. The SOEs that were, therefore, sold had 
commercial objectives while the non-commercial objectives were shelved with the 
regulatory bodies. Among the non-statutory SOEs, such as J-Vs and 100%, however, 
there was no observed difference in objective-setting before and after privatization 
largely due to the remaining unsold 38 out of a total of 146 slated for sale as well as 
the partial privatizations. Second and as board operation, there was no change in 
terms of strategy explained by capacity problems, colonial history and political 
appointments that recruited inferior staff. Third, and last, as transaction costs, the 
results were mixed for the overall performance and individual votes. While there was 
no overall net change, the individual votes fell for communications, auditing and 
entertainment. The reduction in communication was explained by reduction in waste, 
competition and reduction in over-billing by the UP & TC while bankruptcy 
explained auditing. On the contrary, advertising and legal costs increased after 
privatization. These were explained by increased competition in the oil trading sub-
sector that necessitated Shell to increase advertising but the increased legal charges 
were due to change from public to private provision of legal services in the banking 
sub-sector.  
 
Summarising the impact of corporate governance on firm performance, can be argued 
that it was either negative as expected operating through board functions but nil when 
operating through transactions costs. Regarding the former, the winding up of UDC 
with consequent abandoning of SOE-maker role in early 1990s caused both 
insufficient investments and neglected sectors such as agro-processing, textiles and 
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mining. On the other hand, despite individual changes recorded within transactions 
cost; there was no net change and therefore no change in firm performance. The 
implication was that with the exception of the rare case when SOE-maker (UDC) was 
also wound-up, the impact of corporate governance on firm performance was nil. 
Theoretical implications 
The theoretical implications are that while Galal et al (1995) argue that privatization’s 
effectiveness depends on corporate governance, the findings of this study point to at 
least three possible ways in which corporate governance may influence privatization’s 
effectiveness - which could be positive, with no effect at all or indeed negative as just 
elaborated on. First privatization may improve objective setting of some SOEs as well 
as reduce their transaction costs such as in communications and auditing leading to 
better firm performance. Privatization that follows corporatization may separate 
commercial from non-commercial activities of the SOEs in preparation for their sale 
can improve objective-setting. SOEs are therefore sold with commercial objectives 
while the non-commercial objectives were shelved with the regulatory bodies, 
suggesting that private sector was not necessarily better than public sector but just 
differed in objectives. Second, corporate governance may not record any change in 
firm performance due to a failure to strategize or monitor PSOEs especially where the 
state still maintained minority shareholding but still wielded controlling interest. This 
could be due to either general lack of capacity due to colonial past that might have 
discouraged training local businessmen in management sciences or just political 
appointments that could not sack their inferior kinsmen. In this scenario, there would 
be no difference between public and private sector but the solution would not be 
following a mixed economy but rather emphasizing private-sector discipline in 
recruitment and also training. Third and last, changes in corporate governance may 
impact on firm performance negatively after privatization due to a rise in advertising 
and legal costs depending on the nature of competition and industry under 
consideration.  This suggests a possible relationship between structure and the nature 
of business that is privatized on the one hand and corporate governance on the other. 
To begin with, privatization was likely to increase advertising costs if competition 
was allowed in sectors that previously used to enjoy a monopoly situation.  This 
assertion, however, has the limitation of depending on a lone case - only one PSOE 
(Shell Limited) stepped up its advertising costs. Transaction costs may not fall with 
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privatization in certain sectors that also deal in the credit industry such as banks, 
particularly if legal services were government provided before but changed to private 
provision with privatization. In this case, corporate governance’s impact on 
privatization effects needs to consider the type of industry under consideration. This 
would suggest that, for the banking sector, high legal costs may not end immediately 
after sale but continue being big after changeover from government to the private 
sector. In case, they do, this has wide-ranging implications for the whole economy in 
terms of bank closures, cost of capital and, consequently, investment.  
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Chapter 5 
 
5.   Regulation, Privatization and Firm Performance 
While two studies by Ddumba-Ssentamu (2001) and Uganda Manufacturers’ 
Association (2000) existed on privatization on Uganda, none focused on regulation as 
variable influencing privatization results. This chapter aims at filling that knowledge 
gap by bringing regulation back in. Regulation, one of the six ways a government can 
intervene in the economy, is defined as Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs) and Tariff 
Barriers (TBs); licensing, minimum financial requirements (MFRs) and price 
controls. Firm performance was defined not only as profitability represented by ROS 
and ROCE but also innovations, investments, and product variety. 
 
The theoretical basis is the Galal et al (1994) thesis that argued that in monopoly 
markets effectiveness of privatization on firm performance depends on how the 
private sector is regulated115 implying an indirect impact. Bearing in mind that the 
private sector targets profits, it would harm the public if it was not controlled. 
Regulation was vital to guard against the excesses of the private sector, such as 
promotion of competition, to avoid turning a public concern into a private monopoly; 
for transforming former SOEs into private entities before sale; for connectivity and 
conflict resolution among various competing firms; and protection of consumer and 
producers.  
 
The chapter has three parts. Section one is the post-privatization regulatory 
mechanism. It discusses the four regulatory mechanisms of NTB, licensing, minimum 
financial requirements (MFRs) and price control. The section also qualitatively 
attempts to investigate regulatory mechanism impact on firm performance; while 
three is the conclusion. 
5. Regulation of Business in Uganda 
In 1992 and at the prodding of the World Bank and IMF (IFIs), the Ugandan economy 
underwent a major policy change from extreme control to de-regulation.  De-
regulation dismantled price controls on consumer and producer goods; private 
exporters were licensed and existing marketing boards liquidated; SOEs were 
privatized; managed floatation of the shilling against the US dollar was introduced; 
exchange control regulations were removed; and, national development planning was 
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abandoned. Before 1992, the economy was characterised by consumer and producer 
price controls; both local and international trade was undertaken by state marketing 
boards; national development plans (NDPs) were the order of the day; there were 
strict exchange control regulations; and, the shilling was fixed to the US dollar.  
 
In Uganda of the period, business was mostly regulated through tariff and non tariff 
barriers (TB & NTB), licensing, financial sector minimum requirements, and price 
controls in the energy sector. Although singly listed, these regulatory tools were 
mutually exclusive with dependencies existing among several of them, except only 
between minimum financial requirements and price control. Dependencies existed 
between: 
• Licensing and tariff and non tariff barriers (TB & NTBs) for manufacturing  firms;  
• Licensing and minimum requirements for all financial institutions; 
• Licensing and price controls in the energy sector. But for purposes of a 
detailed discussion, I focus on four individually.  
 
5.1.1. Tariff (TBs) and Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs)  
NTBs to TBs regulation, after 1992, did not only create two groups of protected and 
unprotected but also generated contradicting international and regional tariffs on the 
one hand, and higher input than output tariffs on the other hand.   
 
In 1992, Uganda de-regularized due to IMF and World Bank loan conditionality as 
well as sharp shortage of essential commodities at that time.  Uganda Revenue 
Authority (URA) had been set up three months earlier by the URA Statute 6/1991 as a 
central body for the assessment and collection of specified tax revenue116, to 
administer and enforce the laws relating to such revenue and to account for all the 
revenue to which those laws applied, advise the Government on matters of policy 
relating to all revenue, whether or not the revenue was specified in the statute.117118 
 
5.1.1.1.2. From NTBs to TBs protection 
Despite de-regulation, some industrial groups such as BATU managed to lobby to 
maintain the cigarette imports ban justified by fact that BATU made significant 
contribution to national tax revenue, investment and employment. BATU, Uganda's 
second largest taxpayer after Shell, opposed government decision to lift the only 
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remaining import ban on cigarettes in 1999 saying that this would increase smuggling 
and loss of government tax revenue. BATU also deplored the high incidence of taxes 
on cigarettes that were out of line with the size of the economy whereby Uganda had 
the third highest tax rates on cigarettes in Africa behind Ghana and Kenya, but the per 
capita income of the latter two doubled Uganda’s.119  
 
Despite the pleas government thought that farmers would benefit from competition as 
was the case in Kenya where farmers had stagnated to 7,000 tones till Mastermind 
emerged on the scene and tonnage rose to 15, 000 because of competition120 creating 
more jobs, trade, and lower unit costs of production, prices and revenue for the 
treasury and showing that over-protection hurts efficiency.121 As a result, another firm 
Mastermind was licensed to produce tobacco.122 Cigarettes carried the only remaining 
import ban. All the other bans on car batteries, soda and beer were abolished in 1998 
in conformity with WTO terms to which Uganda became a signatory. 
 
With exception of BATU where the ban was maintained, government cunningly 
shifted from NTBs to TBs to protect firms in beer, soda and horticulture products.  
The conflicting objectives of World Bank for enhancing free trade conflicted with 
Uganda government for raising revenue and were best observed by the shift from 
NTBs to TBs. 
 
In 1997, World Bank and IMF forced government to the lift the ban on beer, car 
batteries and soda imports. When implemented in April 1998, the measure was 
effectively just a change in name because of the built-in tax mechanism. The excise 
tariff for soda and beers and all imported sodas and waters, including mineral water 
and other sweetened and non-alcoholic beverages carried a flat excise tax of Shs. 230 
per litre and with labels of production and expiry dates. The excise duty effectively 
brought 123 the cost of the beer bottle to above the price of the ordinary bottle of beer 
produced locally at Shs. 1, 200124  and locked out imports. 125 
 
Concluding NTBs and TBs regulation, the tool produced mixed results. In beer, soda 
and tobacco sub-sectors, protection from imports was guaranteed. BATU Limited was 
effectively protected by the only remaining import ban on tobacco. Beer, soda and 
other beverages were protected by an excise-duty of TBs nature.  Further, the shift 
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from NTBs to TBs created further problems. While a ban was easier to set, TBs 
created problems of not only setting the right rate to counterbalance international and 
regional tariffs but also the synchronization of input and output tariffs. The protection, 
however, ended on these few industries and chaos reigned in the rest of PSOEs as 
their products battled with cheaper imports the worst being NYTIL and ULATI.   
 
5.1.1.1.3. The Unprotected 
TBs rate setting did not only prove difficult to get the right rate to counterbalance 
international and regional tariffs on the one hand and the synchronization of input and 
output tariffs on the other, but also indicated that protection of industries needed to go 
beyond just raising tax revenue and consider helping firms secure market control for a 
particular period as the examples in textiles and leather show.  The contradicting 
regional vis-à-vis international tariffs on the one hand and higher input than output 
tariffs on the other hand caused smuggling and anti-export bias respectively.  
 
Contradicting international and regional tariffs 
There existed contradicting international and regional tariffs in the majority of 
industries, partly blamed for creating smuggling. With the exception of miscellaneous 
manufacturing whose regional tariffs exceeded international tariffs, the rest had 
higher international than regional tariffs. The commodities with contradicting tariff 
structures included fish processing, maize, sugar, leather, paints, plastic goods and 
tobacco with important impact on firm performance.126127 For instance, in 2004, KSW 
reported over 80,000 bags (4,000 tones) of unsold sugar after uncontrolled imports 
eroded the available small market after the authorities failed to curb smuggling.128 As 
already pointed out, NTB regulation was not only dogged by contradicting regional 
vis-à-vis international tariffs but also by higher input than output tariffs. 
 
Higher inputs than outputs tariffs 
The shift from NTBs to TBs did not only generate higher inputs than output tariffs but 
also discouraged exports because Uganda’s manufactured exports relied on imported 
spare parts and raw materials. The ultimate burden of import taxation fell largely on 
exporters who were price takers and could not shift their higher costs onwards.129 
Consequently, the country's industrial products were produced for the local market 
and exported only 8% of their output. Using 1997 figures, the effect of imposing an 
extra tax on average increased costs by 4% ranging from below 1% for paper products 
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and grain milling to as high as 26.7% for textiles.130 Hence, protective tariffs hurt 
industries instead.131  
 
Closed Textiles and Garments; limping Leather Industries 
Initially, there existed three firms in the textiles and garments including NYTIL, ATM 
and UGIL. NYTIL used to produce plain dyed cloth, printed cloth, thick drill fabrics 
(Khaki) Corduroy and honeycomb and NYTIL used to meet the demand for school 
and army uniforms, bedding, curtain materials, ladies’ garments and furniture making. 
There was negligible competition from local producers and the major competition was 
from imports especially synthetic and second-hand clothes. UGIL on the other hand 
used to command 70 % market share from the T-shirts, and new and used imported 
garments took the rest of the market.  UGIL had the potential to export to the USA, 
Canada and Germany.  
 
Uganda’s textiles industry was not only uncompetitive internationally but also 
regionally. Internationally, production costs almost tripled the border price 
(DRC=299.1%) of imported textile materials, despite having the highest protection in 
the country of ERP 220% internationally and 99% regionally. Regionally, the Kenyan 
industries, with DRC of 166 above border prices, were better off. Siggel and 
Ssemwogerere (2002:27) explained the inefficiency due to exchange rate distortion 
(39.8%), high cost of capital (31.9%), energy cost distortions (12.8%) and protective 
import tariffs that also penalized industries (26.7%). Things worsened when 
government cut the tariff protection for textiles in 1997. 
 
In 1997, import duties were cut from 30% to 20% in the budget while the surcharge 
dropped from 25% to 10%, depressing the effective rate of taxed (ETR) from 65% to 
32% for NYTIL Picfare.  NYTIL Picfare urged government to reverse the tax cuts 
and also introduce a minimum floor price concept similar to what was employed in 
other EAC countries to protect the textile industry. In addition, the Uganda Garments 
Association (UGA) also warned that the textile industry could be wiped out not only 
because of cheap, new, textiles from China, India and Pakistan but also stiff 
competition from cheap second-hand clothes from USA and Europe that cost between 
Shs. 2,000 (US$1) to Shs. 5,000 (US$2.5) per shirt or dress..132 Neither the tax neither 
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cut reversal nor was a minimum floor price put in place as suggested and NYTIL closed 
shop. 
 
NYTIL Picfare closed and in its place two companies, Nyanza Range and ‘NYTIL 
Picfare’, operated in the former giant’s premises. ATM followed and UGIL went into 
receivership but was salvaged by the Uganda government that formed a fresh joint 
venture with Yamato International, a Japanese company under the new name of 
Phenix International. Interestingly, other new textile companies emerged with 
government financing after the fall of the traditional and old ones. The new 
companies included Tri-Star and Eladam International. While textiles closed, the 
leather limped on offering some clues not only on how firms could survive in the de-
regulated environment but also issues to consider when setting the TBs rates. 
 
ULATI in particular and leather in general faced similar conditions like those in the 
textile industry of enjoying a monopoly of processing hides and skins. The similarity, 
however, ended there and differences emerged over control of markets. Although 
Uganda leather industry was inefficient, it was regionally competitive (DRC=133) 
and better than Kenya counterparts at DRC of 200 (Siggel and Ssemwogerere, 2002). 
The implication was that the ULATI example showed that protection was required 
only to acquire a market.  
 
ULATI, however, was less protected compared to the clothing and textiles industries. 
Leather ERP was 61% and 16% in the international and regional markets respectively. 
The sub-sector could do with more protection. For instance, ULATI’s response to the 
questionnaire argued thus: 
“The government needs to impose higher rate of duty say 60% on export of 
unprocessed leather as is being done in other countries such as Indian sub-continent, 
China and Ethiopia and also provide export rebate on exporting processed leather. 
This will create a level playing field for processed leather exporter vis-à-vis raw 
leather exporters. Extra benefits will encourage establishment of more leather 
processing units which will create employment and add value to local raw material of 
leather.” 
 
ULATI were threatened with being pushed out of the market not only through 
importation of second-hand shoes explained by low tariffs133 but also export of 
unprocessed leather. Only 20-25% of the products were consumed locally and 
majority exported in their low value unprocessed form. Although the leather industry 
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in Uganda had the potential of exporting upper shoe, finished shoes and leather 
garments, bags and other high quality leather goods with a projected employment of 
about 10, 000 people, no efforts were made to ban export of semi and unprocessed 
leather as was the case in other African countries of Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan and 
Togo (NEST) with negative impact on leather goods industry. Many countries of 
Africa including Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan and Togo banned export of unprocessed 
products where infant industries existed to process them, while countries such as 
Senegal, Cameroon, Mali and Togo that allowed exploitation of unprocessed hides 
and skins closed their tanneries. In India and Pakistan, raw material export was 
banned for many years together with export of semi-processed and processed leather 
to boost the leather goods industry. Today, these countries feature as the major 
exporters of footwear and a wide range of leather products.134  
 
Comparing textiles and leather that were not protected by NTBs offers interesting 
lessons for regulation. As already mentioned, while textiles closed when they were 
denied finance to acquire more modern technology to enable NYTIL compete, leather 
in general and ULATI in particular limped on. Surviving closure was explained by 
ability to export, comparative advantage of commodity that also implied efficiency 
and technology upgrading, and regional competitiveness. In short, TBs regulation 
needed to ensure that a firm managed to control a market although, in the long term, 
firms had to achieve international competitiveness through technology upgrading. 
 
In summary, tracing the impact TBs and NTBs on firm performance gave mixed 
results on firm performance. For the protected category, justified for purposes of job 
creation, to allow investment, and also tax revenue contribution to the government 
treasury; NTBs improved firm performance in tobacco, beer, soda and other 
beverages. On the other hand, impact of firm performance arising from removal of 
protective tariffs in the rest after 1992, depended on whether a firm controlled a 
market or not. Firms that controlled neither a local market nor regional markets closed 
shop. On the contrary, firms that were regionally competitive such as ULATI limped 
on.  In other words, the solution lay in ability to sell what a firm produced. In the next 
section, I discuss yet another regulatory tool - licensing. 
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5.1.2. Licensing: competition, connectivity and conflict resolution 
Post-privatization licensing did not only emphasize competition, quality products and 
development but also utilized licensing and registration as methods of control. In the 
pharmaceuticals, several other methods existed.  Licensing was an instrument of wide 
application in sectors such as FDI promotion, pharmaceuticals, transport, energy, 
banks and telecommunications.  Unlike the other regulatory mechanisms, one 
interesting issue with licensing was the self-regulation in the transport sector.  
 
The opportunity for self-regulation occurred when the assets of two government-
owned bus companies, the Uganda Peoples Transport Company (UPTC) and the 
Uganda Transport Company (UTC) were sold to the public in a privatization drive.  
Consequently, the operation and regulation of road transport was also transferred to 
the private sector.  At the time, the regulation of the taxi transport was in the hands of 
three rival bodies: the Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA), the 
Uganda National Association of Taxis and Taxi Operators (UNATTO), and the Taxi 
Owners Association (TOA), while the Uganda Bus Owners Association (UBOA) 
regulated the bus and lorry transport. These associations set the fares, general 
organization of the system, handled grievances between passengers and drivers and 
also ran the parks.135  
 
Competition 
While it is expected that privatization would usher in competition, with exception of 
only the Banking sub-sector that allowed entry and caused innovations such as ATMs,  
the rest of the sectors such as telecommunication and energy either continued with 
limited competition or monopoly positions respectively hurting efficiency.  
 
Unlike before privatization, licensing in the telecommunications sector targeted 
enforcing fair competition and equality of treatment. As such, practices that prevented 
entry, restricted or distorted competition in communications such as mergers, 
collusion and dominance of a sub-sector by one player were prohibited.136 Before 
privatization, the telecommunication sector was tightly controlled by the state for 
reasons of national security and UP&TC had a monopoly over the commercial postal 
and telecommunications services as well as regulation.137 
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Table 5 1 Structure of the Telecommunication Sub-Sector in Uganda in 2003  
Provider Range of Services Starting Year Subscriber base 
UTL (PSOE) Fixed land line 
Mobile telephone 
ISP (free access with UTL land line 
Data transmission 
1997/1998 50, 000 landlines 
100, 000 mobile 
(24.6 %) 
MTN (U) Fixed wireless 
Mobile wireless 
ISP 
Data transmission 
1998 400, 000 mobiles   
(65.6 %) 
Celtel Mobile wireless 1995 60, 000 mobile (9.8 %) 
 Source: UIA 2003:8, http://www.ugandainvest.com/callcent.pdf  
On privatization in 1997, however, the giant UP & TC was split into a commercial 
and a regulatory body - the Uganda Communications Commissions (UCC).138 The 
UCC was established to regulate and facilitate development of communication 
services in Uganda and license tele-communication services by issue of either a major 
or minor license. MTN and UTL were the only major licensed providers up to July 
2005. Major licenses authorized providers to local and long-distance communications 
networks.139140 
 
Both utility regulatory bodies in the telecommunication and energy pledged to 
promote fair competition through licensing.  For the former, owning, trading in and making 
communication apparatus or services required a license141 except systems capable of only 
reception of broadcasts; state security agencies in performance of their duties and which case 
communications devices complied with technical requirements specified by the 
commission.142 Similarly, conveyance, deliverance or distribution of postal articles 
needed a license except where the sender and receiver was the same person.143  
 
Contrary to what UCC promised, the telecommunication sector was dominated by 
MTN (65.6%), although other providers such as CELTEL (9.8%), UTL (24.6%), and 
WARID existed in the mobile phone sub-sector (PSF, 2002:5; See Table 5.2). 144 Before 
licensing of WARID, MTN had promised to make it impossible for a third national operator. 
Although the limited competition aimed at attracting credible investors and allowing them 
recoup some of their investments, it hindered cost reduction and technological 
innovation such as VOIP despite higher flow of investment in the sector.145 ,146 
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Table 5.2 Licensing Impact on service delivery of Businesses after Privatization  
Regulator Objectives of regulation Process Impact on firm  performance 
FDI/UIA 
1992 
Promoting FDI; Saving or generating 
new foreign exchange; Utilizing local 
materials; Creating employment 
opportunities for Ugandans; Contributing 
to locally or regionally balanced socio-
economic development; Introducing 
advanced or upgrading of indigenous 
technologies147.  
 Written application showing details of the business, investor, & 
expected incentives submitted to UIA ED. Technology or 
expertise transfer agreements and must be registered with the UIA 
by the beneficiary immediately. Agreements spell out the purpose, 
contract terms, and prices, language of contract, rights and 
competition.148 
FDI stagnated at US$150 m; between 2000/01 -2002/03 
FDI  barred from agricultural production except for provision of materials or 
other assistance to the farmer; leasing a piece of land for manufacturing and 
for ensuring a regular supply of raw materials with permission from the 
Finance Minister & UIA through a statutory instrument.149  
UIA did not provide geological data, mineral targets that could be used, as a 
basis for attracting serious investors nor extension services, training and 
mining equipment support that investors needed. 
UPL/UDA 
 
Ensure quality & safety of drugs Licensing of premises for pharmaceuticals and drug shops; 
inspection of operations and premises for manufacturers; drug 
assessment and registration; quality control and assurance; 
surveillance in the control of counterfeit or substandard or expired 
drugs; sensitization of the public and decentralization. 
 NDA officials mounted an operation and impounded several expired and 
fake drugs sold in drug in Eastern Uganda in 2004 
Energy/ERA ERA targeted promoting fair 
competition, efficiency, economy and 
safety on the part of the licensees and 
efficient use of the electricity 
Generation, transmission, or distribution of electricity for big 
stations exceeding 0.5 gegawatts, required a license150 unlike 
small stations that just paid a fee.151Further, the operating license 
for generation made another payment to the district local 
government of operational area a royalty agreed upon by the 
licensee and the local authority; but in case of disagreement, ERA 
sets the royalty.152 
UEB unbundling into a regulatory authority, and separate distribution, 
generation, and transmission companies had not altered the monopoly 
position and inefficiency that existed before privatization. Before 
privatization, UEB used incur 38% transmission and distribution losses, the 
second highest in Africa after Sierra Leone with 38.5%. 
Transport 
UTODA, 
UNATTO, 
TOA,  UBOA 
CAA 
CAA targeted the promotion safe, 
regular and efficient air transport 
services in and outside Uganda; provision 
of adequate, efficient and quality airport 
facilities and services to the users; and 
broadening the revenue base. 
The regulation of the taxi transport was in the hands of three rival 
bodies, namely, UTODA, UNATTO, and TOA, while the UBOA 
regulated the bus and lorry transport. These associations set the 
fares, general organization of the system, handled grievances 
between passengers and drivers and also ran the parks.153  
 
 
Telecoms 
& 
postage/UCC 
1997 
development; enforcing fair competition 
and equality of treatment after 
privatization 
Owning, trading in and making communication apparatus or 
services requires a license154 except systems capable of only 
reception of broadcasts; state security agencies in performance of 
their duties and which case communications devices comply with 
UCC specified technical requirements.155 Conveyance, 
deliverance or distribution of postal articles must be licensed 
except where the sender and receiver is the same person.156 
1) Mobile phones filled a market niche ignored by UP & TC due to lack of 
finance;  2) Limited competition blocked new cheaper modes of 
communications technologies like Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), a 
globally cheap form of telephone 
Banking/BOU Protect Depositors (Customers)  competition caused innovations & new commodities to customers mostly 
from FDI Banks such as Stanbic, Barclays and DFCU 
Note: 1) FDI/UIA=Foreign Direct Investment/Uganda Investment Authority; UPL/UDA=Uganda Pharmaceuticals Limited/Uganda Drug Authority; ERA=Electricity regulatory authority; 
UTODA=Uganda Tax Operators and Drivers Association, UNATTO=Uganda National Taxi Transporters Organization, TOA= Taxi Operators Associations, UBOA=Uganda Bus Operators Association; 
UCC=Uganda Communication Commission; UNBS=Uganda National Bureau of Standards 
Source: Various regulations 
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Liberalization of the telecommunication sector had attracted new financing 
and Investment by all players to provide essential services explained by 
underdevelopment157 and the love for prepaid services, demonstrating the 
potential for wireless systems in the country. Although liberalization hurt 
certain domestic industries, it benefited the economy in the services sector 
fostering the growth of modern telecommunications that were lacking. For 
instance, UTL got a bank loan of $38.5m for its countrywide rollout of GSM 
(Mango) and CDMA (TelesaverPlus) network.158 159CELTEL, a Dutch company 
operating mobile phones in thirteen African countries,  invested US$50 
million (Shs86.5b) in 2004 and US$400 million in both Uganda and the EAC 
region in general.160 Lastly, MTN Africa sank US$750 million in the thirteen 
countries in Africa. Despite the fresh investments, limited competition 
hindered cheaper innovations.  
 
But the limited competition in the telecommunication sector effectively made 
MTN and UTL stand in the way of new cheaper modes of communications 
technologies like Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), a globally cheap form 
of telephone. VoIP promised a stiff competition to the current expensive 
international phone call rates offered by MTN, UTL and CELTEL, since a 
VoIP call was as cheap as a local phone call.161162 Like UCC in 
telecommunications, ERA regulation in the energy sector was equally a 
failure.  
 
For the later, generation, transmission, or distribution of electricity for big 
stations (exceeding 0.5 gegawatts), required a license;163 small stations just 
required payment of a fee.164In addition to the operating license, the 
generation licensee paid to the district local government (DLG) in which the 
dam or reservoir was situated a royalty agreed upon by the licensee and the 
local authority; but in case of disagreement, ERA set the royalty.165166,  167A 
distribution license, on the other hand, had to define the area of operation. 
ERA could delegate to a local government authority its powers to license 
distribution systems with annual sales below four gegawatts and this could be 
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withdrawn if the bulk supplier failed.168 Generally, the promised fairness in 
treatment to ensure competition was more on paper than actual. 
 
 During the brief period of ERA, none of the legal targeted goals of fair 
competition; was visible. The unbundling of UEB into a regulatory authority, 
and separate distribution, generation, and transmission companies had not 
altered the monopoly position and inefficiency that existed before 
privatization. After privatization, companies split from UEB maintained their 
monopoly position as before. Each of the three new companies formed out of 
UEB enjoyed a monopoly in its area of operation of generation (UEGCL), 
distribution (UEDCL) and transmission (UETCL). In addition, before 
privatization, UEB used to incur 38% transmission and distribution losses, the 
second highest in Africa after Sierra Leone with 38.5%.169 These losses 
persisted although efforts existed to remedy the problem.170 But unlike in 
telecommunication and energy where licensing failed to create enough 
competition, it was more successful in banking. 
 
Licensing competition in banking sector 
For a person to transact banking, credit institution, or building societies 
business, he or she needed a valid license. Eligible entities included companies 
incorporated and registered under the Company Act as well as the SOEs; a 
building society incorporated under the Building Society Act and any 
institution classified as a Financial Institution (FI) by Bank of Uganda on the 
basis of statutory instrument.171  
 
The licensing of new banks, after privatization172 caused a shift from 
government owned and joint venture banks to privately owned, foreign 
commercial bank industry. There were 19 banks and Stanbic Limited was 
leader in branch coverage and deposits but not necessarily in lending. The new 
commercial banking structure brought in some improvement. Before 
privatization, six banks together controlled over 80% of the banking deposit 
market as at the end of December 2001173 (Bank of Baroda U Ltd. Prospectus, 
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2002:35). The sale of UCB to Stanbic caused Stanbic to take over leadership 
over both branch network and deposits in the sector. 
 
The entry of new commercial, foreign owned banks introduced some 
competition in financial markets. Several FDI Banks introduced innovations 
such as ATMs and new products such as credit cards. Meridian Cards, a joint 
venture between Ugandan and Kenyan investors introduced a charge card 
similar to a credit card and several foreign exchange bureaus began to trade in 
foreign currencies.174   
 
In summary, licensing to usher in competition was not only more successful in 
the service sector than industry but also attracted investments especially 
mobile phones that did not exist before in telecommunications although 
limiting entry here hindered cheaper innovations such as VOIP. Yet still, more 
success was scored in banking were ATM innovations were introduced. Next, 
I discuss yet another failed regulatory target-quality good. 175 
 
Quality products 
Although licensing promised to ensure a quality product in pharmaceutical and 
air transport, neither NDA nor CAA lived to their vows explained by 
understaffing and undercapitalisation of the regulatory bodies.  As explained 
before, most SOEs were both regulators and business operators. In the drug 
sector, the Uganda Pharmaceuticals Limited (UPhL) was not different and 
ensured drug quality through provision and financing of UPhL. With 
divestiture of UPhL, government pulled out of provision and remained in 
regulation forming a new body - NDA. By the time of the research, all drug 
providers were private dealers.176  
 
NDA ensured compliance through licensing of premises for pharmaceuticals 
and drug shops; inspection of operations and premises for manufacturers177; 
drug assessment and registration; quality control and assurance; surveillance 
in the control of counterfeit or substandard or expired drugs; sensitization of 
the public and decentralization.  Licensing of premises for pharmacies and 
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drug shops involves inspecting sites for suitability of location, size, structure, 
and fittings. A suitability certificate of premises preceded a license and was 
issued in the name of the registered pharmacist supervising the operations who 
had to be one of the directors if none of the other directors was a pharmacist. 
Import and export licenses for drugs were issued in the names of the 
pharmacists. The same procedure applied to “C” class drug shops that required 
just approved basic medical qualification and not necessarily a pharmacist.178 
Despite regulation and privatization, health was not effectively ensured and 
drug quality was problematic.  
 
For instance, in 2004, the NDA officials mounted an operation and impounded 
several expired and fake drugs sold in drug in Eastern Uganda. In reaction, the 
NDA gave drug dealers four months to register or close shop. Fresh 
applications were submitted to the NDA and interviews held in 2005.179   
 
Like in pharmaceutical, enforcement of a quality product air transport was 
equally problematic. After privatization, a separate body, the Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA), was set up to regulate the commercial and non-commercial 
activities of aircraft operating in Ugandan airspace in 1994.180 CAA targeted 
the promotion safe, regular and efficient air transport services in and outside 
Uganda; provision of adequate, efficient and quality airport facilities and 
services to the users; and broadening the revenue base by creating more 
revenue-generating activities.181   Like NDA, CAA regulation promises ended up 
on paper only as evidenced by ENHAS example. 
 
ENHAS monopoly resulted into overcharging of cargo at Entebbe Airport. 
Despite the need to make Uganda’s exports, especially perishables like fish 
and flowers competitive in the global market, ENHAS made this impossible 
through prohibitive pricing. The available figures showed that the shipping 
cost of flowers in Kenya was US$1.68 per kilogramme including 
documentation, local handling and refrigeration services but exporters at 
Entebbe had to pay US$1.90 per kilogramme without cold facilities and 
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ground handling services.182Hence, ENHAS charged a higher fee for an 
inferior service compared to Kenya. The failure of CAA to regulate air 
transport was explained by overloading it with activities whose objectives 
conflicted; an undefined debt burden and inadequate capitalization; large 
arrears owed by government and other SOEs; and negative impact of 
uneconomic and social projects that were never fully funded.183 
 
Before privatization, regulation of air transport was in the hands of the UAC 
that also operated air services.  Private regulation of road transport performed 
better than public regulation of air transport that air regulation could benefit 
substantially from self-regulation to create efficiency, and eliminate the 
financial and staffing problems that characterized public regulation.  There 
were strong beliefs among citizens and operators that self-regulation would 
succeed were public had failed. While it was expected that competition would 
take care of the problem, it could actually escalate it especially when shortage 
existed side by side with corrupt regulators as the cement example indicates. 
 
Two cement making factories existed in the Uganda - Tororo Cement Works 
and Hima Cement- both producing ordinary Portland cement based on British 
standard 12. Hima produced cement from local raw materials but Tororo 
imported 150, 000 tonnes of clinker annually, mixed it with gypsum and re-
bagged it. Clinker was 95% Portland cement184 making Tororo Pozzaland 
Cement cheaper but not suitable for permanent tall buildings.185  
 
In 2004, Police investigated Tororo Cement Limited (TCL) for alleged 
manufacture and supply of bogus cement. The investigation was sparked off 
by the collapse of several buildings under construction in and around Kampala 
and loss of lives. The accidents were simply dismissed as mere construction 
site incidents on one hand, but blamed on poor workmanship and the materials 
being used on the other by UNBS. In order to clear their image, the Uganda 
Institute of Professional Engineers (UIPE) sought to have a sample of the 
cement sent for testing in Kenya and South Africa. The Uganda National 
Bureau of Standards (UNBS) came up with two contradictory reports. The 
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first cleared the TCL in a November 2004 but the UIPE insisted on the truth 
and wanted people involved in the manufacture of the fake cement prosecuted. 
Ten days later, the second UNBS report acknowledged the substandard nature 
and unacceptability of the cement was of a 2-day186 compressive strength of 
value 8.5 MPa against a standard of 10 MPa, and did not conform to the 
standard of US310-1: 2001.187 Quality problems were also partly due to high 
demand for cement in Uganda arising out of a construction boom. 188   
 
Summarizing on licensing with view of ensuring a product quality revealed 
probably the worst failure ever experienced in ensuring quality caused by 
partly politics in case of ENHAS and corruption in case of UNBS concerning 
the sub-standard cement. 
 
Development 
For many years the World Bank and IMF sold the idea to third world 
governments that total privatization of parastatals and liberalization of the 
economy was the magical answer to under-development. Armed with this 
belief, governments chose to privatize public companies189  and also withdrew 
from doing business and put in place policies that gave the private 
sector wider roles.190 In Uganda, government wound up UDC in the early 
stages of the privatization process (1990s), citing corruption and inefficiency 
as the reasons.191 Established in 1952 by Governor Sir Andrew Cohen to 
oversee industrial development in sectors where government could not directly 
intervene prior to privatization, UDC was a special purpose vehicle supposed 
to cause investment in areas individuals or government could not. Almost all 
countries in the world have such development corporations.192,193, 194  
Government then embraced the much-touted `private sector-driven growth' 
policy by opening Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) to cause private sector 
development  as opposed from UDC that promoted state-led development.  
 
Established in 1992, UIA targeted to champion private sector-led development 
as opposed to state-led development that used to exist. In other words, UIA 
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replaced UDC with hope of a more successful private sector-led growth and 
had several objectives including but not limited to: 
• Promoting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); 
• Saving or generating new foreign exchange through ISI or exports; 
• Utilizing local materials, supplies, and services; 
• Creating employment opportunities for Ugandans; 
• Contributing to locally or regionally balanced socio-economic 
development; 
• Introducing advanced technology or upgrading of indigenous 
technologies.195 
These objectives, among others, were to be achieved through licensing of 
investors and registration of technology transfer. 
 
The Executive Director of the UIA was charged with the responsibility of 
receiving the applications for an investment license and the registration of 
foreign technology expertise in Uganda. A foreign investor needed an 
investment license before commencement of business. The was made in 
writing addressed to the UIA Executive Director showing details of the 
business and of the investor, as well as any expected incentives. Similarly, 
transfers of technology or expertise were regulated through agreements and 
must be registered with the UIA by the beneficiary immediately for validity. 
There were several conditions, all of which could be exempt, to accompany 
the agreements including the purpose, end of contract terms, prices following 
changes in agreement, language of contract, rights and competition.196 Despite 
the regulation, the Investment Code failed in most of its objectives such as 
FDI promotion and government wanted policy reversal for active state 
intervention again.  
 
Compared to other LDCs like Angola and Sudan, Uganda received less FDI 
and stagnated at US$150m before the oil-investments started flowing in after 
2007.197 This poor performance was explained by poor policy formulation, 
insufficient investment, export bottlenecks and ignored sectors by the private 
sector-led growth.  
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The careless policy-making was visible in the agricultural and mining sub-
sectors. Despite agriculture contributing 40% to GDP in 2003, the Code 
discouraged FDI investing in the sector. Foreign investors were refused to 
engage in agricultural production except for provision of materials or other 
assistance to the farmer; leasing a piece of land for manufacturing and for 
ensuring a regular supply of raw materials with permission from the Finance 
Minister with recommendation from the UIA through a statutory 
instrument.198 In the mining sector, despite a big mineral potential, UIA 
neither provided investors important investments information like geological 
data and mineral targets that could be used, as a basis for attracting serious 
investors nor extension services, training and mining equipment. Impact was 
that although 206 companies were licensed to carry out prospecting, acquire 
mining lease and mineral dealers’ license, there was little on the ground and 
the sector recorded zero cumulative investment up to 1998/9199  Interestingly, 
however, government blamed private ownership policy and not her 
weaknesses for the aborted of private sector-led growth. 
 
In 2006, government admitted that it erred in winding up UDC and a new 
agency was planned to champion investment in strategic sectors. Government 
intended to play a major role in the economy again explained by the need to 
have as many industries as possible to reduce unemployment.  There were 
several areas like the mining and textile sectors where if the private sector 
was left on its own, it would not create enough investments to foster 
industrialization- a combination of the private and public sector was 
necessary.200  
 
The weaknesses came to the fore especially when implementing AGOA, 
whose benefits were negligible.  It had been realized that for Uganda to reap 
maximum benefit from the access to the American market there was urgent 
need for investment in agro-processing and textile industries. Under AGOA, 
Uganda exported textiles to America but new markets had also emerged 
especially in the Middle East for fish, beef, mutton and other animal products 
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which called for heavy investment in processing facilities.  Uganda enjoyed 
negligible benefits under AGOA blamed on absence of structures to mobilize 
farmers and yet FDI was barred from agriculture.  Ugandan agriculture sector 
was fraught with subsistence farming methods that could not produce in 
quantities of export viability. If the co-operative movement existed, it would 
have been much easier to communicate to the farmers about the available 
opportunities and production would have been instigated.201 
 
Second, the policies  had not entirely  been fruitful  because  the  private 
sector  had not  picked  interest in investing in the agro-processing  sector, a 
crucial sector to  development.   Both local and FDIs had ignored certain 
sectors after liberalization policy were established. There were priority sectors 
to the economy which private investors ignored despite the good policies. 
Given that agriculture was the backbone of the country, interventions to 
industrialize it promised to yield enormous benefits to the economy."202  
 
In summarizing, licensing to usher in private-sector led development revealed 
that the policy failed not only to master enough to cause growth but also 
ignored vital sectors such as agro-processing, textiles and mining critical for 
development. As such a policy reversal was planned. For the private sector to 
bring about development there was need not only to allow FDI in agriculture 
through amending the investment code but also provide geological data and 
mineral targets, extension services, training and mining equipment. 
 
Missing regulatory targets: Connectivity and conflict resolution 
One omission after de-regulation licensing was the absence of mechanisms for 
inter-connectivity  as well as conflict resolution mechanisms evidenced by 
accusations of CELTEL of charging MTN for uncompleted calls in the 
telecommunication sub-sector on the one hand, and conflict resolution 
mechanisms that characterised private sector competition as shown by quarrels 
in the soda sub-sector. While the former connectivity issues were known by 
UTL management and auditors and the latter’s by police, there were no 
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industrial organisation avenues to address these issues, as I elaborate 
immediately. 
 
Interconnectivity 
In 1995, MTN accused CELTEL of charging MTN for uncompleted calls and 
abetting mobile phones thefts because CELTEL had not installed the 
Equipment Identity Register (EIR). CELTEL counter-reacted with a press 
conference and denied the MTN accusations arguing that it charged MTN for 
calls going to its network just as MTN charged her and that the public did not 
know the complex interconnections and agreements.203 
 
UTL management, however, confirmed that CELTEL lacked the EIR machine 
and maintained that the tariff rates of local traffic between UTL and CELTEL 
were neither registered nor recorded. This included calls originating or 
terminating in UTL’s network as well as the international traffic originating 
from abroad and terminating in CELTEL’s network through the UTL switch. 
This meant that with exception of international traffic originating from 
CELTEL network, UTL could only rely on CELTEL’s traffic declarations in 
determining the balance to be invoiced. UTL’s view was supported by other 
authorities. An independent group of auditors supported UTL’s view that they 
could not confirm the accuracy of the entire CELTEL traffic declaration 
because of the inability of UTL’s system to capture or record part of the 
traffic. In summary, UCC needed to put in place not only connectivity issues 
such as installing an EIR machine before licensing any major provider but also 
conflict resolution avenues such as those between UTL/CELTEL, 
MTN/CELTEL, and UTL/Starcom. 
 
Conflict resolution 
Conflicts did not only exist in the telecommunication but also in the soda sub-
sector. First, the auditors revealed that UTL had a money dispute of Shs. 141 
m (over US$75, 000) with STARCOM that was licensed in 1995 to offer e-
mail and pay phone services in Uganda. STARCOM disputed the balance and 
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accused UTL of allowing the public to misuse their pay-phone booths with the 
full knowledge of UTL officials.204 
 
Second, in order to survive in this competitive industry, Pepsi-Cola launched 
an advertising campaign in the press and by setting up a minimum of 30 soda 
kiosks in strategic places of population concentration in the City near the 
Nakivubo Stadium, Main Taxi Parks, City Square and in other major towns of 
Jinja, Masaka and Mbarara.205 The rival soft drink producer reacted cunningly. 
A series of accusations and counter-accusations were exchanged between 
Century Bottling and Lake Victoria Bottling Company (LVBC). Century 
Bottlers for over a month had been accusing their rival Pepsi-Cola for 
sabotaging their business by hoarding Coke bottles and shells. The verbal war 
climaxed when Police stormed the Nakawa Pepsi plant and found the 250 
crates of Coca-Cola empties from a rival company Century Bottlers and three 
of Schweppes from Kampala Bottlers hidden in a huge store although more 
Coke bottles might have been deliberately destroyed before mounting the 
surprise search.206 207 
 
The situation of conflict resolution was in a state whereby regulators such as 
UCC just ignored or when some response existed was handled by the wrong 
entity, such as police in the Century/LVBC on one hand; and the TCL/Hima 
Cement conflicts on the other hand. As such, there was need for UCC to 
incorporate conflict resolution agenda in their objectives.  
 
In summarizing, licensing impact on firm performance did not only display 
negligible gains but also revealed several weaknesses in the tool. The marginal 
gains included innovations in the banking sector such as installation of ATMs 
and computer-networked branches as well as introduction of mobile phones 
that were lacking and new investments in the telecommunication sector - 
although the limited control in the latter hindered cost cutting innovations such 
as VOIP. The rest of the licensing failed to deliver competition, product 
quality, and development explained by monopoly position in former UEB 
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companies, politics in ENHAS, corruption in UNBS and ignored sectors and 
insufficient investments in development. Most regulatory bodies lacked 
connectivity and conflict resolution mechanism on their agenda.   All this 
failure at regulation was explained by inadequate financing and staffing of the 
regulatory bodies. Before separation of commercial from non-commercial 
activities, the former used to finance and supply experienced staff to the latter, 
but after privatization, this was no longer possible.208 
 
5.1.3. Minimum Financial Requirements (MFRs) 
Analysis of regulation in financial sector does not only indicate the relative 
better success of licensing over MFRs but also show that intra-MFR 
comparisons gave mixed results.  Comparing licensing and MFR impact on 
firm performance in banking sector showed the former more successful than 
MFRs due to increased competition that caused innovations such as ATMs 
and credit cards. On the other hand, intra-MFRs comparisons showed that 
while MCR strictly improved bank performance as a result of limited entry, 
CRR impact depended on whether a bank was a price maker or taker.  
Table 5. 3 MFRs in Financial Sector in Uganda after Privatization 
Regulation Tool Policy 
Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) 10% of all demand deposits & 9% of time deposits to be 
placed with Bank of Uganda. 
Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR) Minimum capital requirement is Shs. 2 billion from 1st January 
2001 & 4 billion from 1st January 2003. 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) Core Capital=8% of Risk Adjusted Assets plus Risk Adjusted 
Off Balance Sheet items; and 
Total Capital= 12% of Risk Adjusted Assets plus Risk 
Adjusted Off Balance Sheet items. 
Lending Limits Maximum amount of credit exposure to any one borrower and 
maximum amount of aggregate credit exposure to insiders 
limited to 25% of core capital. 
Maximum Liquidity Requirements 
(MLR) 
Liquid assets must be at least 20% of demand deposits plus 
15% of time deposits. 
Foreign Exchange Exposure Limit 
(FEEL) 
25% of core capital 
Note: MFRs=minimum financial requirements 
Source: Bank of Baroda (U) Limited Prospectus, 2002:35 
 
Although licensing played a major role as already explained, the main tool of 
regulation in the financial sub-sector was MFRs.  Specifically, FIs were 
required to maintain 10% cash reserve ratio (CRR), Shs.2 billion (over US$ 1 
m) minimum capital requirement (MCR), 8% capital adequacy ratios (CAR), 
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lending limit to any single borrower was 25 %, 20% demand and 15% time 
deposits of minimum liquidity (MLR), 25% each to lending and foreign 
exchange exposure limits (FEEL) according to the Financial Institutions 
Statute 1993 (See Table 5.3). 
 
Regulation was needed in either the utility or other sectors that had strong 
externalities to other sectors, including but not limited to railway, banks and 
energy to promote development. Regulation hence was particularly important 
because the financial sub-sector was a vital source of finance for development 
and greatly influenced the real sector. Hence, the sector products were 
important input in production of other goods. Unfortunately, however, the 
MFR measures were put in place to ensure depositors’ security as opposed to 
the much-needed competition and lower rates of interest. 
 
5.1.3.1.  MFRs Effectiveness 
MFRs had three effects of running down banks, limiting entry particularly in 
micro finance, and maintaining high lending rates. Although the law was 
meant to ensure bank solvency and safeguard customers’ deposits, it actually 
set in instability and reduced the number of banks.209  For instance, Trust 
Africa closed September 1998; Co-operative Bank in May 1999; Greenland 
Bank April 1999; International Credit Bank (ICB) in September 1999; and 
Trust Bank went in November 1999.  
 
The MCR requirements complicated things for new entrants, partly 
contributing to the high interest rates. The media expressed the effect of 
minimum requirements on competition thus: 
“Members of the Parliamentary Committee on Finance expressed dismay at the high 
minimum capital in order for micro-finance institution to do business. The 
Parliamentarians argued that the Shs.700 million (US$350, 000) was too high for 
most local micro-finance institutions whose members were mostly from the rural 
areas. It was argued that there were interest groups in the micro-finance sector that 
were interested in maintaining that high entry capital requirement to shut out 
competition from the new ventures into the sector. It was agreed that a clarification 
be made on the basis of arriving at this figure on which recommendations would be 
made to encourage competition in the sector.210” 
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The high CRR affected the rate of interest charged by commercial banks 
because a big portion of their assets did not earn income at the Central Bank. 
In order to compensate for that loss, they were forced to increase lending 
margins. Modern countries were moving from CRR to LRR that included 
interest-earning Treasury Bills and listed Government bonds.  Low CRR 
countries included Botswana at 3.25% and South Africa at 2.5% that also had 
fair interest rates. Businessmen complained that CRR of 10% of total deposits 
was very high and inconsistent with modern trends and suggested lowering it 
to levels consistent with low-interest countries such as 3.5% in a bid to lower 
lending rates. Interest rates were quite high and very few private sector 
companies realized a rate of return of 25 % to justify borrowing from 
Uganda’s commercial sector.211 Ugandan banks charged higher interest rates 
than banks in several developed countries and needed to copy their 
counterparts in the developed world that charged low interest rates.  In the US, 
interest rates were at 3%, in UK 4%, India and China 5%. These were far less 
than African rates of between 25% and 30%.212 High CRR did not only 
negatively impact on bank profitability but also economy-wide spreading to 
other sectors through high interest rates discouraging investments and growth. 
 
Uganda stood alone in the EAC region with the staggering interest rate 
ranging between 21 and 25 per cent compared to Kenya’s between 12 and 16 
per cent and Rwanda at 16 and 18 per cent respectively. In response and to 
display poor policy analysis, instead of reducing CRR or replacing CRR with 
LRR, the Central Bank Governor said the solution to the astounding interest 
rates lay in allowing more players into the financial sector and installing of 
Credit Reference Bureau (CRB) to improve risk management and enforce the 
repayment culture.213 Despite being the world’s most entrepreneurial country, it 
lacked a cheap credit, thus dampening growth rates. Without easy credit, most 
entrepreneurs started with savings and built their businesses with retained 
earnings till they got to 50 or 100 employees when they needed the bank 
support. Comparatively, Kenya performed better in providing financing to the 
small and growing businesses.214,215 
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In summarizing on MFRs, although initial reactions were bank closures in 
1999, later impact depended more on MCR and CRR among other factors.  
While MCR limited entry ensured, maintained or improved bank performance; 
CRR impact depended more on structure: whether a bank was a price-taker or 
maker. While price-takers deteriorated in performance, price-makers improved 
explained by passing on the higher interest rates to borrowers. Poor 
performance was explained by poor policy analysis. Like for MFRs, regulation 
was needed in either the utility or other sectors that had strong externalities to 
other economic sectors, such as infrastructure, railway, banks and energy 
through price control. 
 
5.1.4. Price Control: Consumer Protection & Development 
Theory on whether prices and profits of utility companies as well as 
intermediate industries should be controlled or not contradicted. On one hand, 
and basing on export and competitiveness purposes, it was seen as prudent to 
control utility prices. On the other hand, however, and basing on investment 
argument, it was seen as wrong to control these prices.  First, it was argued 
that cheap utility and other intermediate industrial prices such as transport was 
important for movement of materials from one country to another. But cheap 
transport also means good roads, preferably paid for by the state, and cheap 
fuel to create enthusiasm for profit in international trade. For the majority of 
businesses in the world, the state paid much of the costs to enable lucrative 
trans-national trade. Cheap transport was necessary because it was more 
profitable to manufacture goods in LDCs where wages were low than in DCs 
where workers enjoy higher wages and standards of living.  In return, the 
people in LDCs did not afford to buy expensive manufactured goods and so 
the finished goods had to be transported back to markets in high-income 
countries.216  Second and in the contrast, it was argued that political pressure 
for low prices could have different consequences depending on what type of 
public enterprise that was privatized. Some public (utilities), for instance water 
and sanitation in cities, tend to suffer from under-investment because there is 
strong political pressure to keep prices low with serious consequences for 
public health. This could be seen as a justification to privatize, provided that it 
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was easier to raise prices in a privatized enterprise, thus generating higher 
profits and larger investment funds. This was the case with UP & TC 
companies such as UTL. Privatization was welcome in an attempt to solve 
lack of investment in UP & TC. As such, the criterion of success should not be 
low prices or profits after privatization, but also the level of investment after 
privatization. It is interesting to note that ERA position on regulation shifted 
from export to investment positions since privatization as I show immediately. 
 
As indicated before, ERA promised to enforce compliance with the conditions 
set in the license and was supposed to protect the interest of the consumers in 
terms of the prices, charges and other terms of supply of electricity.217 What 
transpired later was that ERA ignored protecting the consumer and 
concentrated on electricity producers’ protection as shown by price increases 
since privatization. 
 
Before privatization, domestic tariffs were charged in phases whereby the first 
30 kWh were charged at Shs.20 per kWh; the next 170kWh at Shs. 70 per 
kWh; and all units over 200kWh were at Shs.100 per kWh. Immediately, after 
unbundling of UEB, power rates increased to Shs.50 for the first 30 kWh and 
to Shs.186.8 per kWh for all units above 30 kWh.218 But this was not all. The 
UEDCL applied to ERA seeking authority to hike the power rate by 15% for 
domestic consumers which Parliament resisted. In 2002, Parliament, in vain, 
passed a resolution to reduce power rates from Shs. 170 to Shs. 150 per unit 
that UEDCL ignored. UEDCL argued that during 2003, it spent Shs. 114 m 
(over US$57, 000) on additional works under the urban power project at 
Masindi Port that required recovery from 2004 rates.219 Battles were fought 
between the Minister for Energy, ERA, Parliament, and the Presidency. The 
Energy Minister ordered ERA to cancel the power hikes; Parliament also 
passed a resolution to stop the hikes that was ignored. Lastly, Parliament 
threatened to censure the Energy Minister, Syda Bbumba, for failing to control 
ERA and UEDCL. In spite of the battles, power rates were hiked through 
removal of domestic consumer subsidy not only enhancing UEDCL 
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performance but also hurting regional competitiveness since energy in other 
EAC countries was cheaper.220 221 
 
The current rates for power increased for domestic consumers ranged from 
Shs 170.1 to 171.4 per unit but reduced for industrial users, from Shs 170.1 to 
Shs 164.8 for small enterprises to Shs. 37.7 a unit for extra large industrial 
firms after privatization222 shifting power costs burden from the industrial users 
to the domestic consumers. One reaction against power tariff hikes was 
formation of a consumers’ association to monitor the power on behalf of 
consumers in Kampala in 2007.223 
 
Rates of energy in Uganda at over US$ 23 cents per unit exceeded her EAC 
member countries such as Kenya’s US $19 and Tanzania's US$9. Although 
Uganda explained the high rates as due to thermal, this was not plausible since 
Kenya produced over 300 MW and Tanzania 70 MW of their electricity from 
thermal respectively compared to Uganda’s current 100 MW thermal yet their 
rates were lower.224 Rates were not only high in energy but also in 
telecommunications and air transport. 
 
Missing price controls: telephone tariffs rates and Airport Handling 
Analysis of telecommunication tariffs also presented in Table 5.4 did not only 
indicate that mobile phones were higher than landline rates but also that with 
the exception of international calls, UTL was cheaper than the new entrants - 
MTN and CELTEL. As expected, rates were higher at peak than super-
economy periods.  
 
Comparatively, telephone costs in Uganda were higher than Kenya, Mauritius 
and South Africa, making Uganda a high-cost country. Part of the effort was 
therefore to bring the costs in line with at least that of South Africa - the best 
on the continent - initially and with the rest of the World in the long run 
(USAID, 1995).  
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Table 5.  4 Telephone Rates in Uganda in Shs. per minute in 2004   
Provider/Direction Super Economy  Economy Peak 
UTL Landline 180 250 280 
Mango (Telecel) 180 280 340 
MTN 360 360 420 
Celtel 360 360 430 
Calls to EAC 1000 1000 1000 
       Source: http://www.utl.co.ug/mobile/prepaid_tariffs.htm 
 
Higher mobile tariffs were explained by taxation in the telecommunications 
sector, especially excise duty. For every Shs100 charged, Shs. 28 went to 
government, divided into 18 VAT and 10-excise duty.225 In two years, tax on 
airtime doubled from 5 % in 2002 to 10% 2004, reducing operators’ profits 
and re-investment because they strive to avoid transferring the tax to 
customers.226  Comparatively, Uganda had the highest mobile phone tax rates 
in East Africa. Kenya’s rate was at 10 %, Tanzania’s 7 %, while Rwanda was 
promising to introduce the duty. This meant that Ugandans paid between 25-
30 % taxes more compared with Africa’s 17 % average limiting mobile phone 
use to 9 % penetration227 and widening the rural-urban divide since most users 
were urban.228   
  
In the air transport sector, the ENHAS example already cited helps illustrate 
overcharging that required some form of policing. 229 ENHAS charged a higher 
fee for an inferior service compared to Kenya.  
5.2. Summary 
The chapter aimed at investigating the impact of regulation on firm 
performance. The chapter did not only reviewed the post-privatization 
regulation defined as NTBs and TBs, licensing, minimum financial 
requirements (MFRs) and price controls but also tested these tools impact on 
firm performance defined  as profitability (ROS and ROCE). 
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The results revealed that the various regulatory tools impact on firm 
performance was mixed. First, impact TBs and NTBs on firm performance 
gave mixed results. For the protected category, justified for purposes of job 
creation, to allow investment, and also tax revenue contribution to the 
government treasury; NTBs improved firm performance explained by 
protected local markets. On the other hand, impact of firm performance arising 
from removal of protective tariffs in the rest after 1992, depended on whether 
a firm could control a market or not. Firms that controlled neither a local 
market nor regional markets closed shop. While the firms that were regionally 
competitive such as ULATI limped on.  Second, licensing impact on firm 
performance did not only display negligible gains but also revealed several 
weaknesses in the tool. The marginal gains included innovations in the 
banking sector such as installation of ATMs and computer- networked 
branches, introduction of mobile phones that were lacking and new 
investments in the telecommunication sector although the limited control in 
the latter hindered cost-cutting innovations such as VOIP. The rest of the 
licensing failed to deliver competition, product quality, and development 
explained by monopoly position in former UEB companies, politics in 
ENHAS, corruption in UNBS and ignored sectors and insufficient investments 
in development. Generally, regulators lacked an agenda for connectivity and 
conflict resolution mechanism and needed to install such objectives.   Third, 
while MCR-limited entry ensured improved bank performance; CRR impact 
depended more on structure: whether a bank was a price-taker or maker. 
While price-takers deteriorated in performance, price-makers improved 
explained by passing on the higher interest rates to borrowers. Lastly, price 
control policy ignored the consumer and protected the producer tended to 
improve firm performance in the energy sector but economy-wide impact was 
less clear since tariff increases favoured industries than domestic consumers. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
While Galal et al (1994) argue that in order for privatization to be effective it 
depends on how the private sector is regulated; Ugandan evidence seemed to 
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suggest that this is true only for manufacturing industry and not all enterprises. 
While regulation was important in influencing firm performance in 
manufacturing as a result of opening up, it was not the case for service sector 
whereby, in order to come with better performance, competition was allowed.  
 
In manufacturing industry, selective protection in names of NTBs/TBs 
effectively influenced firms in a mixed manner. Firms in tobacco, beer and 
other beverage industries that were protected by NTBs/TBs in order to 
encourage new investments, employment and because of their tax contribution 
to the government treasury managed to improve their performance to the 
extent of even breaking into exporting to regional markets.  In the rest of 
industries where selective protection did not take place, however, the 
performance of these firms depended more or less whether a firm controlled a 
market or not. This was because opening up also meant surrendering the local 
market to cheaper imports. Firms that used to thrive on local markets such as 
NYTIL closed shop while those that managed to break into   regional markets 
limped on. Hence NTB/TBs regulation effectively influenced firm 
performance in manufacturing. This was not the case in services. 
 
In the service sector, it took up opening up (more than just regulation) to bring 
results in both banking and telecommunications.  In these sectors, allowing in 
new players did not only lead to innovations such as introduction of ATMs 
and computer-networked branches in banking but also caused a variety of 
products to be produced such as mobile phones that were lacking in the 
country and also brought fresh investments in the telecommunication sector 
that was under-funded.  This also meant that for meaningful results in the 
services sectors that were under-funded, effectiveness after privatization was 
more successful if competition was allowed than mere regulation as opposed 
to manufacturing.  
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Chapter 6 
 
6. Privatization and Motivation  
In chapter one, Galal et al (1994) argued that the effectiveness of privatization 
depends on how the public sector is motivated. If motivation in SOEs was 
same as in PSOEs, privatization would be expected to have no effect; while if 
they differed some results whether positive or negative would be expected. 
This was because Madsen (1988) argues that work conditions are worse in 
PSOEs than SOEs because the latter used trade unions to fix unrealistic work 
conditions before privatization. In this chapter, I measured motivation by 
wages, fringe benefits and job security. The chapter has three sections. Part 
one is on wages and salaries; part two covers fringe benefits and part three the 
job security all before and after privatization. This was because work 
conditions were likely to be worse in PSOEs than SOEs. 
 
Motivation is having the desire and willingness to do something. It can be 
temporal or dynamic A motivated person can have a short-term goal like 
learning how to spell a particular word or reaching for a long-term career goal 
such as becoming a computer specialist. The subject has been better discussed 
by Hertzberg’s Motivator Hygiene Theory which explains satisfaction and 
motivation in the workplace arguing that satisfaction or dissatisfaction are 
driven by different factors – motivation and hygiene factors respectively.  
 
Hertzberg (1968) argues that motivators include challenging work, 
recognition, responsibility which gives positive satisfaction, while hygiene 
factors include salary, fringe benefits and job security which do not motivate 
if present, but if absent will result in de-motivation.  The term hygiene factor 
is used because, like hygiene, the presence will not make you healthier, but 
absence can cause health deterioration. Steve Bicknell’s230 empirical evidence 
supports the motivator-hygiene theory. Research into employee engagement 
data analysis of over 50 companies found a relationship between low hygiene 
and low employee engagement. Employees consistently recorded low scores 
against management/leadership but happy to complain about leadership since 
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their hygiene factors were bad. This study defines motivation being of the 
hygiene nature and ignores the motivator type. 
 
Most employee surveys always give a fair reflection regarding what motivates 
them, or what provides job satisfaction, pay, or salary: salary is always down 
on the list, with people being much more concerned about work conditions, 
challenges, and other soft factors. If salary were denied, however, most people 
would not go to work just because of the challenges - suggesting that, money, 
pay, or salary was important. If this was not the case, people would all work 
for the fun of it. The relationship of pay to performance and work motivation 
was complex and varied depending on: the financial situation of the individual 
employee; the individual employee’s values; the employee's perception of 
whether pay (or pay increases) is (are) fair; other working conditions in the 
company; and the perceptions of people in the industry sector. The conclusion 
was that salary and pay are important in the motivational mix, and thus should 
not be ignored but an increase in salary does not necessarily increase 
productivity of an employee, although a reduction of salary may result in bad 
feelings and lower effort (Bacal Robert, 2000 – 2006)231. 
6.1. Salary and Wages in the Public (SOEs) and Privatized Sectors (PSOEs) 
Before privatization, SOEs, unlike their FDI counterparts, were lavish in 
dishing out salaries. Determination of workers’ salaries and wages and other 
conditions, particularly for the fully SOEs, was based on factors other than 
production or profitability. On the contrary, the workers’ conditions in 
enterprises that had some degree of FDIs or where government held minority 
shares tended to be free of labour restrictions generally.  During this era, wage 
determination was political but also depended on whether the SOE was FDI or 
purely government. 
 
FDI 
On the contrary, the workers’ conditions in enterprises that had some degree 
of FDIs or where government held minority shares tended to be free of labour 
restrictions generally. The sugar and the tea factories suffice to illustrate the 
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differences in motivation in FDI firms and the purely SOEs. Firms with some 
element of foreign ownership tended to ignore the idea of collective agreement 
and fluffed the trade unions and their restrictive working practices. Bad 
conditions in FDI firms always resulted into strikes with varying intensities. In 
the big enterprises, the workers used to react through strikes and other violent 
actions that also differed in industry type. In the Tea and the Sugar plantations, 
the workers destroyed the crop, while in the textiles industry, they harassed the 
management and the strikes were less violent.  
 
Determination of workers’ salaries and wages and other conditions, 
particularly for the fully SOEs, was based on factors other than production or 
profitability. For instance, a UCB regulation stated that ‘the salary, wages, 
fees, or other remuneration or allowances paid by the Bank were in no way to 
be computed with reference to the net or other profits of the Bank’ [22/1965, 
s.11 (3)]. This implied that even if losses were made, salaries and benefits 
would continue rising but in case of profits there would be no bonus for the 
workers, thereby de-linking pay from productivity explained by state 
ownership and TU influence. Unlike fully government SOEs, FDI firms’ 
salaries and conditions of work were based on production and profitability. 
 
6.1.1. Unionization in Public Sector 
In 1990 just before privatization, SOEs exceeded the non-SOEs trade union 
membership; but this was reversed after privatization. Trade union 
membership was 67,000 and 34,500 for SOEs and non-SOEs respectively 
before privatization in 1990. After privatization, the corresponding figures 
were 75,359 and 92,135 respectively (see Table 6.1).  Being a union member 
meant to have a membership card, being up-to-date with the monthly 
contributions232 and having an ideology. A member was baptized and initiated. 
While the former turned a member into either ‘a brother’ or ‘sister’; the latter, 
took a worker through training in ideology and work values. Employment was 
not taken as a favour but a right or an entitlement.233  Before privatization, SOE 
trade unions comprised a small majority of total union membership. 
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Specifically, there were 67,000 employees in 1990 accounting for 66 per cent 
of total union membership and 0.6 per cent of the 1992 national census 
respectively. Unions covering SOE staff accounted for more than half of all 
unions in the country. Specifically, there were eight unions catering for SOE 
staff out of a total of 17 unions in the country.  This unionization was possible 
due to the government employment policy and socialist tendencies. The 
government encouraged unionization for purposes of satisfying a social 
obligation of providing employment to people. In addition, the socialist 
tendencies of Obote regime gave clout to unions. For instance, President 
Obote used to say that he loved three people - the students, peasants, and 
workers.234 
Table 6 . 1 Trade Union Membership Trends of SOEs/PSOEs 1990-2004 
 No Union 1990 1995 1998 1999 2001 2002 2004 % ∆ 
1* UBTAWU c 3500 1486 2388 1352 1432 4781 4781 +36.6 
2* UBCCAWU c 5500 3457 3500 3612 10150 10011 1293 -76.4 
4* UCEU 3500 1500 1400 1359 2650 859 630 -82 
7* UEAWU g 3500 2735 1700 1800 1637 1322 1322 -62.2 
8* UFAWU     1550 3202 3202 - 
10* UHFAWU  4500 1953 1400 1400 3400 4507 4507 +0.2 
13* UMMAWU i 4500 1415 1193 1299 2767 2503 2610 -42 
14* NUPAWU b 22000 32838 42000 47000 50000 47213 47213 +114.6 
17* URWU 5000 1200 1273 800 1600 1020 1250 -75 
18* UTGLAWU e) 9500 1580 2500 200 1520 3034 3034 -68.1 
19* ATGWU f 5500 1301 4000 3833 4633 5407 5407 -0.12 
 SOEs Only 67000      75359 +12.5 
 Non-SOEs 34500      92135  
∑ All 101500 62646 100682 102014 165079 146427 167494 +65 
Note: i) * unions with SOEs firms, ii) ∆ =change a)Commercial, clerical and technical employees in the 
marketing boards,235 research institutes, insurance companies, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), Bata Shoe 
Company and banks., b) tea estates and sugar plantations, c) building, construction, housing, cement, and roofing 
industries, d) soft drinks, beer, and tobacco, e) garments, leather and textiles industries, f) bus and air transport, oil 
companies, petrol stations, and private security organizations, g) electricity and cable, h) UP&TC and the new mobile 
telephone companies, i) mines and steel works; iii) SOEs=state owned enterprises/PSOEs privatized state owned 
enterprises 
Source: Department of Research and Economics, NOTU 2006. 
 
The sources of TU powers originated from SOEs’ authority to hire and fire. 
SOEs’ power to recruit and lay-off staff automatically gave unions the right to 
protect workers’ interests.  The terms of hiring and firing of an employee in 
SOEs were determined by Trade Unions. SOEs that were not given powers to 
hire and fire did not form unions in which case the parent ministry employed 
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staff and also determined their working conditions, as was the case in UFEL.236  
SOEs’ power to hire and fire was given by statutory instrument to either the 
board or management, and this automatically gave unions the right to protect 
the workers’ interests. The existence of a union, however, did not always grant 
every worker the right to be unionized. The unionized levels were negotiable 
between the employer and the union. Hence, the lowest level of unionization 
depended on employer-employee agreement237,238,239 usually stipulated in the 
recognition agreements (Barya, 2001:13).  
 
Later, and when privatization had set in, in 1993, legislation allowed more 
association limiting the area of non-unionized employees in the private sector 
to only a very small section of personnel and industrial relations officers. Only 
officers and employees of the rank of personnel, labour, industrial relations 
officer, Chief Judge, Magistrate of the Court of Judicature and personal 
secretary were excluded 240 (Barya, 2001:15). In addition to the legislation, 
officers or employees could be excluded from membership of a trade union or 
employees’ association by mutual agreements between an employer and the 
trade union to which such officers or employees belonged.241 One impact of 
TU and SOE ownership was the share of wages in SOE expenditure. 
 
In firms such as those in agro-processing and textiles, wages formed a big 
percentage in SOEs’ total expenditure. For instance, textiles had wages 
accounting for 47.2%, tiles 24.1%, and energy 51.4% of total expenditure 
before privatization. This implied that restructuring some of these SOEs 
through retrenchment and automation in textiles and the energy sectors 
respectively could have paid dividend. Taking the example of energy and 
banks, automation in such ventures as pre-paid electricity service could have 
released meter readers, staff in bill distribution, amount of paper used, and 
those people who disconnect and reconnect power. In banking, introduction of 
ATMs could have eased staff costs after privatization. Government, however, 
both before and after privatization refused to lay off workers citing political 
reasons. 
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Wages were, however, not the only reason for a big-wage bill although it is 
difficult to know which of the two: wages or overstaffing was more 
responsible. Before privatization, SOEs were generally overstaffed especially 
the fully SOEs. A firm was considered overstaffed if the ratio of line to 
support staff differed from the straight forward rule-of-the-thumb of two-to-
one. UDC and Hima Cement Industries help illustrate the problem. While 
UDC had both line and support sections, the support staff rose faster than the 
line staff numbers. By 1990, it had 22 line and 28 support staff giving a ratio 
of 1: 1.25 that was considered higher compared to the mentioned rule.  In the 
case of the Uganda Cement Industries Limited (UCIL), although it hardly 
produced cement it employed about 1,400 workers on full-time pay roll in the 
1990s (UDC, 1990:6-7, 13). Overstaffing in SOEs was caused by the 
government’s policy to employ as many people as possible.   
 
It was, therefore, not surprising that SOEs contributed greatly to employment, 
accounting for 20 per cent of total employment in the manufacturing industry 
in Uganda in 1963 and 1964. Stoutsdijk (1967:37-8) argued that in 1963, the 
five manufacturing firms of UDC employed total of 3,905 persons that 
increased to 4,019 in 1964. Comparing UDC with the country’s employment 
surveys for the same period of 19,220 and 20,838 accounted for 20 per cent of 
total employment in the manufacturing industry in both years.  A further 
comparison of Uganda’s employment with the rest of the third world for the 
1978-1985 period shows that Uganda’s SOE employment was near Africa’s 
19.9 per cent, although it superseded Asia’s of 2.9 per cent, and Latin 
America’s 2.8 per cent.  Uganda’s SOEs doubled the LDC average of 10.2 per 
cent implying that Uganda was one of those countries that over-recruited in 
the SOE sector during the period, although Stoutsdijk (1976) refuted this. 
These lavish conditions and union powers took a stranger turn after 
privatization.  
6.1.2. Salaries and Wages after Privatization 
This situation changed after privatization, the new buyers cunningly increased 
salaries for managerial, technical and clerical staff in agreements only. 
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Practically, however, they recruited the staff to high positions as group 
employees who did not enjoy negotiated terms. In addition, PSOEs laid off 
more highly paid group employees earning shs. 300, 000= and replaced them 
with those willing to work for shs. 100, 000= per month. This resulted into 
falling wage-bill as well as product quality in the tea sector. After 
privatization, while working conditions improved on paper for the majority of 
sectors, increasingly few staff enjoyed them. These terms were for permanent 
staff, yet majority were recruited on temporary and contract terms set by the 
PSOEs’ new owners. According to the Table 6.2, salaries increased by 97.1 % 
to 15.7 times the original figure in the lowest; and 89.2 % to 23.1 times in the 
highest paid categories respectively after privatization.  The rise in salaries 
was due to growth, union pressure and competition. Hotels and beverages had 
some of the highest growth rates and therefore absorbed more workers after 
privatization. A second reason for increase in salaries was trade union 
pressure. As already stated, some trade unions also still played some role in 
improving workers’ conditions as the Coca-Cola example shows. The 
company had some of the worst working conditions in the country whereby 
payment was fortnightly. The miserable hourly rates ranged between Shs 598 
and 1,559 and were recorded on clock-cards.242 Union intervention, however, 
caused monthly payments and better wages and a retirement package that did 
not exist before.243 Third and last conditions improved due to competition such 
as in sugar and telecommunications.  
 
In the sugar industry rivalry among KiSW, KSW, and SCOUL ensured that 
workers conditions improved since they determined product quality. In the 
telecommunication, conditions improved immediately in UP&TC after 
privatization, due to competition created by new entrants, MTN and CELTEL. 
The two companies were involved in poaching skilled workers of UP&TC by 
paying the workers better salaries than they enjoyed in their previous jobs.  
However, these terms were declining.244 
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Table 6.2 shows salary scales of TU member firms before and after 
privatization. The figures show a general increase in salaries for all firms.  
Table 6.2 Privatization Impact on Wages of 11 SOEs/PSOEs in Shs 1986-3 
 Firm/Union Before Privatization After Privatization % Change  
  Lowest  Highest Lowest  Highest L-H 
1 UEB/Eskom-(1996/2006)-UEAWU 251591 496000 532200 1167950 112-.135.5 
2 LVBC 1993/2005245 -UHBAWU 173447 263719 259134 353516 49.4-34.1 
3 Coca-Cola/Century1998246/2005247- UHBAWU 598-1hr  
- 05248 
1559-1hr -
274384 
317619 519120 201.7-89.2  
 Coca-Cola/Century-Mbarara - UHBAWU   290702 443870 - 
4 Nile Breweries Limited 1988248- UHBAWU 1500 3135 371184 475677 246.5-150.7 
5 Uganda Breweries Limited - UHBAWU 150654 210000 334265 583910 121.9-178.1 
6 BATU 1987249/2005250- UHBAWU 15858 33429 265028 803988 1571-2305 
7 BOBU Clerical (NUCCPTE)   793693 1527267  
 BOBU/2005251(support) NUCCPTE)   563293 1103996  
8 UCWL 2005 (UBCCAWU)   166900 371800  
9 Hima Cement (lunch, rent) (UBCCAWU)   347928 753299  
10 ENHAS (APGWU) 160000  327000  104.4 
Notes: 1) L= lowest, H=highest categories; 2) SOEs=state owned 
enterprises/PSOEs=privatized state owned enterprises; 3) UEB=Uganda Electricity Board, 
LVBC=Lake Victoria Bottling company, BATU=British American Tobacco of Uganda, 
BOBU=Bank of Baroda Uganda, UCWL=Uganda Clay Works Limited, ENHAS=Entebbe 
Handling Services 
Source: Fieldwork Results, 2006.  
The best salaries were in banks, where the lowest clerical and support staff 
earned Shs. 793,693 (US$400 and Shs 563,293 (US$300) respectively. 
Practically, however, few enjoyed these new terms. The worst salaries were in 
plantation where basic salaries were below survival. 
 
After privatization, wages increased in total expenditure for some firms such 
as garments and energy accounting for 54.8% for UEB, 46 % for metal, and 
tobacco 40.2%, soda for 27.7%, and sugar for 178.6%.  Some of the causes of 
this big wage bill were overstaffing. Most of the PSOEs were overstaffed as 
already explained and a policy of laying off some workers would have 
increased profitability and efficiency.  
 
Group employees earning between Shs. 100, 000 (US$50) and Shs. 300, 000= 
(US$150) formed the majority of workers after privatization. The group 
employees who earned Shs. 300, 000= were laid off and replaced with those 
who earned less than Shs. 100, 000= per month. Top managers earned Shs. 2 
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million (US$1,000), middle managers about Shs. 1.2 million (US$600), 
technical workers between Shs. 300, 000= (US$150) and Shs. 500, 000= 
(US$250) while clerical staff earned between half a million shilling (US$250-
500) a month (UMA, 2000). The figures were consolidated with all the 
benefits leaving no room for adjustment especially during inflation.   
 
The reasons for the group employees’ growth emanate from the privatization 
process itself since businessmen target profits unlike government that may 
pursue social welfare objectives. Hence, with privatization, the new owners 
preferred to evade terminal benefits by employing workers with temporary 
tenure that did not attract improved pay and benefits. Interestingly, the term 
group employees originally referred to a low cadre, temporary, non-pensioned, 
staff including cleaners, messengers, security guards, tea-girls or boys, 
shamba boys and to some extent drivers. By the time of privatization, most 
workers were group employees regardless of calibre. 
 
In the energy and plantation, salary reviews were either slow or very marginal 
respectively. In the energy sub-sector, despite the recognition agreements, 
salary reviews were slow. Eskom went a step further over salary negotiation 
and set its own salary structure that was later agreed upon with the union - 
UEAWU. While the union submitted a proposal to UEDCL (Umeme Ltd), the 
UETCL salary structure was renewed annually.252  In the plantation,253 the 
changes in salary after privatization was small and below the survival level - 
causing child labour. In order to generate meaningful income from a day’s 
work, one needed to take the entire family to help to harvest enough tea leaves 
to enable workers survive. NUPAWU wrongly attributed this to absence of a 
minimum wage.254  
 
Economic theory, however, points out that a policy of minimum wage 
legislation can succeed not only when the minimum wage is fixed above the 
market clearing wage but also when the government is able to withdraw the 
excess labour caused by the policy.  These conditions did not only sound 
tricky but also impossible respectively. To begin with, nobody knew exactly 
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the market clearing wage. In addition, Uganda government lacked capacity to 
withdraw excess labour because it lacked resources with half of its national 
budget footed by donors. Although government had promised to give the 
unemployed benefit of shs. 18, 000= (US$10) per month in the 2007/8 
financial year, this was even below the ‘minimum wage’ of shs. 53, 385=. 
 
There was no minimum wage law in Uganda. Instead, some agreement was 
reached between the Federation of Uganda Employers (FUE) and NOTU on 
wages. The minimum wage in Uganda was set at Shs. 53, 385 (US$27) after 
several consultations. In 1995, a Minimum Wage Board made 
recommendations to government but the latter foot-dragged. Two years later, 
the Board, comprising of FUE, Ministry of Labour (MoL) and NOTU 
recommended Shs. 75, 000 (US$37.5) but Cabinet rejected this proposal and 
instead reviewed it downwards to Shs. 65, 000 (US$32.5). FUE, then, 
conducted a parallel study and recommended Shs. 20,000 (US$10). 
Eventually, the Prime Minister, Apollo Nsibambi chaired a meeting in 1999 
and the parties agreed on Shs. 53, 385 (US$27) as minimum wage (Barya, 
2002:18). Against this background, initial privatizations dished out some of 
the worst work conditions ever experienced. 
 
Salaries did not display only the usual worker levels but also industrial 
differences. For instance, the salary differed among industries, the smallest 
being recorded in the textile, followed by the plantation-based industries, and 
utilities came last (Okuku, 1995:14).  
 
Impact of privatization on salary is best expressed in total wage bill of PSOEs. 
Total wage bill for 31 PSOEs surveyed fell from 14.9 to 9.1 billion shillings, 
representing 38.9 percentage points, explained by several factors including 
lay-offs, lower salaries for temporary workers and bankruptcy although it was 
difficult to exactly say how much of the wages and redundancy were 
responsible for the fall in the total wage bill. The fall in industry exceeded 
trade and services. Industrial establishments reduced their share of wages in 
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total expenditure by 3.6; while trade and services decreased theirs by 2.1 
percentage points after privatization. Interestingly, the fall in wages was not 
uniform. While the industrial sector recorded overall fall, some individual 
firms such as Tobacco, Soda, Metal and Energy increased their share of wages 
in total expenditure by 35.2 %, 26.2 %, 42.4 % and 3.4 % points respectively, 
explained by better salaries and wages and growth in these sectors. On the 
contrary, transport, telecommunications and banking cut their wages in total 
expenditure by 22.8 and 6.2 percentage points respectively, explained by 
layoffs or redundancies and lower wages.   
 
Concluding behaviour of wages in SOEs and PSOEs show a sharp contrast 
particularly for the fully SOEs than the FDI firms. Before privatization, wage 
determination depended not only whether the enterprise was either fully 
government-owned or FDI, but also the industry type. Determination of 
workers’ salaries and wages, particularly for the fully SOEs, was based on 
factors other than production or profitability explained by state ownership and 
trade union pressures. On the contrary FDI firms tended to ignore the idea of 
collective agreement and fluffed the trade unions and their restrictive working 
practices consequently igniting strikes and other violent actions that also 
differed in industry type with varying intensities. In the Tea and the Sugar 
plantations, the workers destroyed the crop, while in the textiles industry, they 
harassed the management and the strikes were less violent. After privatization, 
this situation changed, the new buyers cunningly increased salaries for 
managerial, technical and clerical staff in agreements (read paper) only. 
Practically, however, they recruited the staff to high positions as group 
employees who did not enjoy negotiated terms. In addition, PSOEs laid off 
more highly paid group employees earning shs. 300, 000= and replaced them 
with those willing to work for shs. 100, 000= per month consequently causing 
falling total wage-bill although the fall in wages was not uniform. While the 
industrial sector recorded overall fall, some individual firms such as Tobacco, 
Soda, Metal and Energy increased their share of wages in total expenditure by 
35.2 %, 26.2 %, 42.4 % and 3.4 % points respectively, explained by better 
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salaries and wages and growth in these sectors. On the contrary, transport, 
telecommunications and banking cut their wages in total expenditure by 22.8 
and 6.2 percentage points respectively, explained by layoffs or redundancies 
and lower wages. In the next sub-section, I show yet another similar 
transformation in working conditions of SOEs and PSOEs. 
 
6.2. Fringe Benefits in Public and Private firms 
In this sub-section I represent fringe benefits by allowances and other 
conditions such as lunch, medical, transport, and hours of work.  Before 
privatization, purely government-owned SOEs were lavish in granting benefits 
unlike the FDI firms. UP & TC and UCB suffice to illustrate these worker 
conditions. In the UP & TC, the Minister regularly appointed officers and 
employees when necessary for the proper and efficient discharge of its 
functions.255 The Board could also grant pensions, gratuities or retirement 
allowances to the staff and employees pension, provident fund or super-
annuation scheme.256 In addition, it was always possible for officers in the civil 
service to access SOE posts through secondment.257  Hence, SOEs became 
extensions of the traditional civil service with all the ills of the latter although 
salaries and benefits in civil service were poorer compared to SOEs. In the 
UCB, the Managing Director258 appointed most employees on terms and 
conditions laid down by Board259 as already explained under salaries. Second, 
most staff on falling sick were treated in the company clinics and not a public 
hospital (Asowa Okwe, 1999:12).  Third, the average working day of eight 
hours was mostly observed, particularly in the fully SOEs firms (Asowa 
Okwe, 1999:16-7), but this was not the case in FDI s. Staff in firms with some 
element of foreign ownership worked longer hours between 10-12 hours. 
Hence, in FDIs, working hours and employee numbers changed depending on 
the volume of work available.  For instance, workers laboured for 8.1 hours, 
12.2 hours, 13.4 hours, and 8.5 hours in BATU 1984 Limited (BATU), Kakira 
Sugar Works (KSW), African Steel Mills (ASM) and Nile Breweries Limited 
(NBL) respectively. Particularly, in BATU, the duration of work tended to 
vary with the volume of work or amount of tobacco available for processing at 
a particular time (Asowa Okwe, 1999:16-7). In Kakira Sugar Works (KSW) 
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and African Steel Mills the combined total of casual and contract workers 
were as big as the permanent employees. Thus FDI firms were, however, more 
geared to productivity than in the entirely government-owned SOEs. In pure 
SOEs, unlike FDI, government allowed lavish benefits before privatization but 
this situation changed after privatization whereby determination of benefits 
was based on industry-type and profitability. 
6.2.1. Fringe Benefits after Privatization 
After privatization, changes in fringe benefits were mixed: being determined 
by trade unions, contests, competition, industry type and market share on one 
hand and profitability on the other hand before pre-1996 and post-1996 
privatizations.  
6.2.1.1.Pre-1996 Privatization: Industry Type, Market Share,  
After privatization, fringe benefits such as lunch, transport, and safety 
standard in PSOEs depended on trade unions, contests, competition, and 
industry type and market share. In early privatization, the government neither 
prepared for retraining, redeployment of demobilised staff, nor ensured the 
installation of legal and contractual obligations before reform. Instead, 
government condoned mistreatment of both the old and new workers in the 
PSOEs by just signing ‘’no obligation guarantees’’ to the buyers (Barya, 
2001:33). 
 
The only statutory provisions for the employees in the PSOEs was in the 
PERDS that simply stated that the Finance Minister would ensure the payment 
to the demobilized employees arising out of restructuring or liquidations 
through the establishment of a redundancy account.260 Government through a 
responsible Minister and the Board of Directors and management of the SOEs 
could use the sale proceeds in the divestiture account to compensate or provide 
for demobilized staff arising from divestiture.261  
 
While PSOEs particularly those covered by ATGWU or NUPAWU had taken 
over tasks that used to be for unions and thereby improving some working 
conditions with intention of being well rated, industry type and market share 
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were the overriding issue determining work conditions.  In the oil companies, 
all staff including upper management and lower cadres lunched together 
unlike in the past where senior and junior staff sat separately. In addition, 
unlike before, all staff were collected in the morning and dropped in the 
evening using the same transport for both categories of workers. This helped 
to reduce discrimination. In the plantation industry, issues like protective gear 
were part of work discipline and ethics and not a safety standard requirement 
to be enforced by unions such as ATGWU or NUPAWU any more. In 
addition, occupational health and safety and training were part of company 
policy. In the plantations, an officer was employed to take care of such issues, 
which was not the case before. With respect to safety, all employees had 
general things like an overall and gum-boots but always lacked specific 
section protective gears such as nose-masks for sprayers or heat-repellent 
uniform for those working in hot sections like chimneys. The employers 
defaulted to provide specific gears because they were imported and expensive. 
First, despite the improving conditions, ATGWU still required the members 
for solidarity and pooling or good practice purposes that meant that despite the 
general improvement, some oil companies such as GAPCO paid lower rates 
than others, due to differences in market shares. GAPCO, the Indian-owned 
firm that bought Esso Uganda Limited, was responsible for failing to sign the 
new agreement and for four years paid the lowest terms.262  
 
Second, the introduction of ‘Employer of the Year Award’ played a major role 
in continuous review of working conditions particularly in the plantation sub-
sector. The gold, silver and bronze medal awards were given to the three 
employers who treated workers fairly. Employees and trade union officials 
were the respondents who chose the good employers. Employers valued the 
award because of the publicity it gave to the company and numerous benefits 
associated with it. Third, competition in the sugar industry among KiSW, 
KSW, and SCOUL also ensured that workers’ conditions improved since they 
determined product quality. Fourth and last, trade unions also still played 
some role in improving workers’ conditions as the Coca-Cola example shows. 
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Coca-Cola had some of the worst working conditions in the country whereby 
payment was fortnightly. The miserable hourly rates ranged between Shs 598 
and 1,559 and were recorded on clock-cards.263 Union intervention, however, 
caused monthly payments and better wages and a retirement package that did 
not exist before.264 Unlike poor conditions in FDIs and unprofitable PSOEs, 
terms were better in more profitable PSOEs. 
6.2.1.2. Post-1996 Privatization or Profitable SOEs 
On the contrary, privatization of the relatively more profitable Uganda 
Airlines and utility sector after 1996 brought in more protection of the 
workers’ rights than before privatization. Barya wrongly explains the better 
terms by the presence of three workers’ MPs who sensitised and lobbied 
fellow MPs on workers’ interests. Barya wrongly argues that the MPs 
struggled on their own to bring on board such issues for debate and attention 
by Parliament. Barya maintains that they articulated and presented workers’ 
demands directly instead of relying on third parties as used to be the case in 
the past. He does not explain whether the existence of workers’ MPs alone 
significantly altered the motivation in the post-1996 period when the ideal 
conditions for motivation indicated otherwise. Hence Barya tends to ignore 
neo-classical determinants of motivation such as market structure and 
profitability of enterprises in the utility and airlines sub-sectors.  
 
In addition, Barya fails to point out the differences between pre-1996 and the 
post-1996 firms.265 During sale, it was agreed that small enterprises (loss-
making) would be sold first and bigger ones (profit-making) last. Hence, the 
bigger ones that were sold later, like the UP & TC, UEB and UAC/ENHAS 
were more profitable than the pre-1996 ones.  
 
In the utility sector, on privatization, UEB and UCC Acts provided that all 
employees who transferred services to the new bodies266 would do so on 
similar or better terms as compared to those enjoyed by employees before 
transfer.267 The new bodies would assume the terms and conditions of service 
applied to the UP & TC and UEB respectively at the commencement of the 
 156 
two acts.268 The two acts spelled terms of former employees of the UP & TC 
and UEB who, at the commencement of the statutes 8/1997, were receiving 
retirement benefits and pensions from the two SOEs would continue to be paid 
by the government.269 The staffs of both corporations made redundant as a 
result of the reforms would be paid the calculated and ascertained retirement 
benefits and pensions from the SOEs before the repealing of UP & TC and 
UEB.270 A contributory pension fund initially government-financed would be 
established for the permanent employees of the UP & TC and UEB before any 
reforms for any staff who transferred to the new bodies.271 In addition, all employees 
of UP&TC and UEB who transferred to the Uganda Posts Limited  (UPL), Uganda 
Telecom Limited (UTL), the Post Bank Uganda Limited or the Uganda 
Communications Commission (UCC); and the Uganda Electricity Distribution 
(UEDCL), Uganda Electricity Generation Company (UEGCL) or the Uganda 
Electricity Company (UETCL) in case of the power sub-sector would have their 
terminal benefits calculated, ascertained and transferred to the Contributory Pension 
Fund (CPF) before commencement of the acts, and any employee who retired, 
dismissed or terminated for any reasons after transfer would be paid.272 The 
reality was not as expected fading immediately after privatization in the UP & 
TC on one hand; while adjusting work conditions in the UEB was slow.  
 
Conditions improved immediately in UP&TC after privatization, in the postal 
and telecommunications due to competition and union pressure created by new 
entrants, MTN and CELTEL. MTN and CELTEL were involved in poaching 
skilled workers of UP&TC by paying the workers better salaries than they 
enjoyed in their previous jobs.  However, these terms were declining.273 
Current conditions in the MTN and CELTEL were more of window-dressing 
than handling the problem. Instead of offering favourable terms, the new 
entrants invested in high-sounding projects but of a temporary nature under 
the so-called ‘social corporate policy’ such as in education donations, 
philanthropic activities for society, supporting the aged and HIV/AIDS, 
orphanages, and cultural institutions.274  
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In the energy sub-sector, despite the recognition agreements, review of salary 
and terms and conditions of work were slow. The three firms of UEGCL 
(ESKOM), UETCL, UEDCL were still upholding the old (UEB) terms and 
conditions of service.275  In the next section, I look at the last measure of 
hygiene factors-job security. 
 
Summarizing work conditions in the public display a similar picture like that 
obtained before privatization when considering wages. Like for wages, 
working conditions in SOEs was partly dictated not only by whether firms 
considered were fully government owned or FDI but also by nature of industry 
under discussion. Before privatization, purely government-owned SOEs were 
lavish in granting benefits such as medical, housing, transport, and pensions 
and gratuities or retirement allowances not linked to production or profitability 
unlike FDIs. In FDIs, however, staff tended to work according to the situation. 
For instance, while the working day was 8-hours in SOEs, staff in FDI firms 
worked longer hours between 10-12 hours and employee numbers changed 
depending on the volume of work. After privatization, changes in fringe 
benefits were mixed: being determined by trade union pressures, contests, 
competition, industry type and market share on the one hand and profitability 
on the other hand before pre-1996 and post-1996 privatizations respectively. 
Pre-1996 privatization, the government did not ensure the installation of legal 
and contractual obligations before reform and instead condoned mistreatment 
of both the old and new workers in the PSOEs by just signing ‘’no obligation 
guarantees’’ to the buyers. On the contrary, post-1996 privatization of the 
relatively more profitable Uganda Airlines and utility sector after 1996 
brought in more protection of the workers’ rights than the pre-1996 
privatization. The lower changes in wages and benefits favoured industrial 
performance. 
6.3. Job Security in the Public and Private Sectors 
Just with salary and benefits, in SOEs especially the wholly government-
owned firms, job security was equally guaranteed once employed before. The 
SOEs’ offered lavish terms of permanent and pensionable (PP) but this 
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drastically changed to temporary and re-trenchable (TT) after privatization.  
Before privatization, particularly in the SOEs that were purely government-
owned, the terms and conditions of hiring and firing were permanent and 
pensionable (PP) (Asowa Okwe, 1999:12).  
 
The Board did hiring and firing but the firing of senior staff such as Company 
Secretary, Chief Accountant and Heads of Department, divisions or projects 
required approval by the Minister [Decree 24/1974, s.6&7; Decree 23/1974] 
explained by government policy of job creation as well as TU involvement 
already explained. 
Table 6. 3 Job Security in 14 SOEs before Privatization 
Work place No answer Casual Contract Permanent Others Total 
UCI   8 27  35 (6.3%) 
Casements    26 1 27 (4.9%) 
Luwala 15  5 33  53 (9.6%) 
Kasaku  2 5 30  37 (6.7%) 
UGMA    22  22(4.0%) 
SCOUL   5 30  35 (6.3%) 
Jute   2  23  25(4.5 %) 
Tororo Steel Works 1 5  15  21(3.8%) 
Uganda Blanket  13 1 27  41(7.4%) 
BAT 1   21  22(4.0%) 
Nile Breweries   1   47(8.5%) 
Uganda Breweries 1   46  22(4.0%) 
Kakira KSW  3 25 21  73(13.2% 
African Steel Mills  24 13 45 1 70(12.75% 
Total 17 (3.1%) 50 (9%) 63 (11.4%) 32 (75.9%) 2 (0.4) 553 (100) 
Note: i) UCI=Uganda Cement Industries, UGMA=Uganda General Machinery, 
SCOUL=Sugar corporation of Uganda, BAT=British American Tobacco, KSW=Kakira 
Sugar Works; ii) SOEs=State owned enterprises 
Source: Asowa Okwe 1999, pages 12-5, Table 1. 
 
Table 6.3 gives some examples of the nature of job security before 
privatization in both FDIs and fully SOEs. Generally, 75.9% of the employees were 
recruited on permanent basis (column 5, Table 6.3) against 11.4% contract (column 4, 
Table 6.3) and 9% casual (column 3, Table 6.3). These SOEs’ lavish conditions of 
service changed drastically after privatization from permanent and pensionable 
(PP) to casual workers regardless of rank.  
6.3.1. Job Security after Privatization 
After privatization, job tenure became more temporary than before. The casualness 
is best described by postal union officials. Temporary employment, for instance, in 
the telecommunication sub-sector, was on temporary and contract terms for most 
crucial jobs that required skills. In PSOEs, the terms casual, temporary, and contract 
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were characterized and meant ‘daily but continuous,’ ‘six months to one year,’ and 
‘one to three years’ in the private sector respectively.276  
 
Despite the fall in group employment, the share of group employment 
compared to total employment increased.  Privatization mostly favoured group 
employees whose number grew from 52.3 to 69.5 per cent on sale and the 
sixth year after sale (See Table 6.4, Row 17). The latter category (earning less 
than Shs 100, 000 = US$50) replaced the more highly paid counterpart - the 
upper group employees category (earning Shs 100-300, 000=US$50-US$150). 
The upper group employees’ category (earning Shs 100-300, 000=US$50-
US$150) were retrenched and replaced by the relatively less paid counterparts 
(earning Shs 100-300, 000 =US$50-US$150) explained by a need to cut costs 
but with negative effects on product quality.  
Table 6.4 Employment by Sector in 21 PSOEs on and after Privatization 
Sector/ Years after Sale    on Sale (0) 1 2 3 4 5 6
Manufacturing 
3835 4336 4252 2737 2447 1654 653
Transport 218 207 342 412 91 102 103
Trade 28 20 15 14 15 0 0
Finance 266 260 100 111 0 0 0
Tourism** 295 297 302 305 322 0 0
Agro-processing 40 200 49 46 46 0 0
Total 4682 5320 5060 3625 2921 1756 756
Full-time 3509 3267 3535 2823 2221 1288 727
Contract 77 650 155 175 226 183 5
Casual 1096 1403 1370 627 474 285 24
Total 4682 5320 5060 3625 2921 1756 756
Top 92 97 87 83 59 31 6
Medium 200 202 200 206 139 69 33
Technical 601 662 752 763 523 436 24
Clerical 756 741 614 684 372 228 76
Group 1807 1706 2347 2293 1199 915 318
Total 3456 3408 4000 4029 2292 1679 457
Note: i) PSOEs =privatized State Owned enterprises; ii) **= High growth sector;  
iii) At sale (0) =number of years at the time of privatization; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc 
Source:  Computed from UMA (2000), Table A1. 
 
The driving force behind casualness was competition, which required cutting 
down on production costs. At first, employers turned both permanent 
employees into casual workers who did not enjoy negotiated terms and 
conditions since they were not unionized. The reason for turning permanent 
workers into casual ones was to evade paying negotiated terms such as leave, 
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housing and medical. In the plantation union (NUPAWU), the only fairly 
permanent employees were the low cadre contract workers including cane 
cutters, weeders in sugarcane plantations; and sprayers and tea pickers in the 
tea sub-sector. The contracts were normally for a one-year period but 
renewable. The high unemployment rate in the countryside made it possible 
for terms to be changed to a situation whereby formerly permanent workers 
were recruited as temporary ones. 
 
The impact of job insecurity on product quality is best seen in plantations of 
tea and sugar. In the tea sub-sector, quality was poor due to the casualness and 
consequent poor terms of service, among others, that also impacted negatively on 
tea quality. In comparison, the quality of Kenya tea was better than that of Uganda’s 
because the former carried out training at Kericho Training Institute.277  Initially, 
casualization resulted into a drop in the product quality of both the sugar and tea 
sectors forcing the management, on recommendation of management and the 
plantation union (NUPAWU), to change policy. In order to avert the situation, the 
causal were turned into contract and permanent staff in the sugar industry.   
 
According to the General Secretary, of the plantations workers (NUPAWU), 
lowering the job tenure impacted on product quality in tea and sugar cane sub-
sector in Uganda. While picking tea leaves, it was the youngest bud that was 
harvested and not all leaves, after privatization; untrained workers harvested 
everything causing a fall in the tea quality. The selecting of leaves and failure 
to process sugar on the same day could be signs of general fall in quality, but 
this needed to be confirmed for all other sectors. In the sugar cane industry, 
before privatization, sugarcane cutters were permanently employed working 8-
hours a day after which they embarked on their overtime to generate more 
money. In the sugar industry, canes were processed on the day of harvest to 
produce fine white sugar otherwise molasses would be the product instead of 
fine white sugar. If sugar were processed on the same day, 11 tones of cut 
sugar-cane would produce one tone of fine sugar. If, however, the canes were 
not processed on the same day; the same 11 tones of cut sugarcanes would 
produce less than a tone of fine sugar. After privatization, it was discovered 
 161 
that the casual workers always left unfinished work. The new buyers of 
PSOEs disbanded the permanent employees and recruited casual ones. Under 
this arrangement, the daily job was per task which was 3 tones which proved 
impossible and one had to do a day’s work in two days. The failure to process 
the canes on the same day caused most of the would-be sugar to become 
molasses causing a fall in sugar quality.  
. 
Summarizing job security defined as the length of contract tenure, changed 
from permanent to temporary before and after privatization. After 
privatization, the terms casual, temporary, and contract characterized and 
meant ‘daily but continuous,’ ‘six months to one year,’ and ‘one to three 
years’ employment respectively. The impact of reducing job tenure, however, 
caused falling product quality in the tea and sugar sub-sectors pre-empting 
employers on the advice of trade union management to improve the job tenure 
length since sugar-cane and tea harvesting required training that was not 
favoured by the temporary nature of tenure that these new owners offered.  
 
In comparison, the three motivation types offer interesting lessons in manual 
jobs that also required some skills. In the lowest paid tea and sugar cane 
plantations sector, while wages and fringe benefits fell due to retrenchment of more 
highly paid and replaced them with relatively lesser paid consequently boosting firm 
profitability; the bottom line to this labour exploitation was job security. On the 
contrary, attempts to lower job tenure to lesser permanent levels threatened 
and indeed affected product quality, sales revenues and firm performance 
negatively forcing management to reach some agreements with the trade 
unions. These opposing results had explanations in the fact that while for lay-
offs people left and were replaced by new ones who accepted lower wages and 
fringe benefits and thereby not affecting worker satisfaction, more temporary 
terms attracted and  favoured untrained staff that led to sub-standard work 
hurting product quality and the revenue base of the firm. This would tend to 
suggest that in the lowest paid industries that also used manual skills, cutting 
wages and fringe benefits through layoffs and fresh recruitment could boost 
profitability; but increasing temporariness (reducing tenure) in jobs that 
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required training would harm sales revenues and profitability and thereby put 
a limit to how motivation would be manipulated to improve firm performance. 
6.4.  Summary 
The chapter set out to investigate the nature of motivation in public and 
privatized sectors in Uganda. I defined motivation using three variables of 
wages, fringe benefits and job-security. The results indicate that the behaviour 
of wages in SOEs and PSOEs show a sharp contrast particularly for the fully 
SOEs than the FDI firms. Before privatization, wage determination depended 
not only whether the enterprises was either fully government owned or FDI, 
but also the industry type. Determination of workers’ salaries and wages, 
particularly for the fully SOEs, was based on factors other than production or 
profitability explained by state ownership and trade union pressures. On the 
contrary, FDI firms tended to ignore the idea of collective agreement and 
fluffed the trade unions and their restrictive working practices, consequently 
igniting strikes and other violent actions that also differed in industry type 
with varying intensities. In the Tea and the Sugar plantations, the workers 
destroyed the crop, while in the textiles industry, they harassed the 
management and the strikes were less violent. After privatization, this 
situation changed, the new buyers cunningly increased salaries for managerial, 
technical and clerical staff in agreements (read paper) only. Practically, 
however, they recruited the staff to high positions as group employees who did 
not enjoy negotiated terms. In addition, PSOEs laid off more highly paid 
group employees earning shs. 300, 000= and replaced them with those willing 
to work for shs. 100, 000= per month, consequently causing falling total wage-
bill - although the fall in wages was not uniform. While the industrial sector 
recorded overall fall, some individual firms such as Tobacco, Soda, Metal and 
Energy increased their share of wages in total expenditure by 35.2 %, 26.2 %, 
42.4 % and 3.4 % points respectively, explained by better salaries and wages 
and growth in these sectors. On the contrary, transport, telecommunications 
and banking cut their wages in total expenditure by 22.8 and 6.2 percentage 
points respectively, explained by layoffs or redundancies and lower wages. 
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Work conditions in the public enterprises display a similar picture like that 
obtained before privatization when considering wages. Like for wages, 
working conditions in SOEs was partly dictated not only by whether firms 
considered were fully government owned or FDI but also by nature of industry 
under discussion. Before privatization, purely government-owned SOEs were 
lavish in granting benefits such as medical, housing, transport, and pensions 
and gratuities or retirement allowances not linked to production or profitability 
unlike FDIs. In FDIs, however, staff tended to work according to the situation. For 
instance, while the working day was 8-hours in SOEs, staff in FDI firms worked 
longer hours between 10-12 hours and employee numbers changed depending on the 
volume of work. After privatization, changes in fringe benefits were mixed: being 
determined by trade union pressures, contests, competition, industry type and market 
share on one hand and profitability on the other hand before pre-1996 and post-1996 
privatizations respectively. Prior to the 1996 privatization, the government did 
not ensure the installation of legal and contractual obligations before reform 
and instead condoned mistreatment of both the old and new workers in the 
PSOEs by just signing ‘’no obligation guarantees’’ to the buyers. On the 
contrary, post-1996 privatization of the relatively more profitable Uganda 
Airlines and utility sector after 1996 brought in more protection of the 
workers’ rights than the pre-1996 privatization. The lower changes in wages 
and benefits, made possible by high unemployment levels in the country, 
resulted into falling wage-bill favouring industrial performance. 
 
Job security, defined as the length of contract tenure, changed from permanent 
to temporary before and after privatization. After privatization, the terms 
casual, temporary, and contract characterized and meant ‘daily but 
continuous,’ ‘six months to one year,’ and ‘one to three years’ employment 
respectively. The impact of reducing job tenure, however, caused falling 
product quality in the sugar and tea sub-sectors pre-empting employers on the 
advice of trade union management to improve the job tenure length since tea 
and sugar-cane harvesting required training that was not favoured by the 
temporary nature of tenure that these new owners offered.  
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Theoretical implications 
While Galal et al (1994) theoretically argues that in monopoly situations, 
privatization impact depends on whether the privatized sector remunerated 
workers better than the public sector, Uganda evidence seem to suggest that 
laying off workers enjoying higher wages and benefits and replacing them 
with those who accepted lower terms could improve firm performance in over-
staffed firms. However, reducing job security could also worsen industrial 
performance if it affected product quality if new workers lacked skills. The 
combination of these two events could have self-cancelling effect limiting the extent 
to which motivation could impact on privatization effectiveness in the lowest paid 
agricultural sub-sector that used manual, skilled labour that required training.   In the 
third-mentioned scenario, in the lowest paid tea and sugar cane plantations sector, 
while wages and fringe benefits fell due to retrenchment of more highly paid and 
replaced them with relatively lesser paid consequently boosting firm profitability; the 
bottom line to this labour exploitation was job security. On the contrary, attempts to 
make jobs more temporary threatened and indeed affected product quality, sales 
revenues and firm performance negatively forcing management to reach some 
agreements with the trade unions. These opposing forces of improving firm 
performance arising out of replacing well-paid, old with poorer paid workers on one 
hand; and worsening product quality and therefore sales arising out of employing 
inexperienced staff on the other hand had explanations in the fact that while for lay-
offs workers left and were replaced by new ones who accepted lower wages and 
fringe benefits and thereby not affecting worker satisfaction, more temporary terms 
attracted and  favoured untrained staff that led to sub-standard work hurting 
product quality and the revenue base of the firm. This would tend to suggest 
that in the lowest paid industries that also used manual skilled (trained) 
personnel, cutting wages and fringe benefits through layoffs and fresh 
recruitment could boost profitability; but increasing temporariness in jobs that 
required training would harm sales revenues and profitability and thereby 
putting a limit to how motivation would be manipulated to improve firm 
performance. In the next chapter, I discuss the effect of privatization on firm 
profitability and efficiency.   
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Chapter 7 
 
7. Privatization, Ownership and Firm Performance 
In chapter one, I theoretically argued that the effect of privatization on firm 
performance can be positive, negative or none at all. In this chapter, I 
empirically investigate this relationship. I used SAS package to compute 
Whitney Man U tests on firm-level data of 15 companies. The firm-level data 
covered the years from 1986 to 2003. The 15 companies were broken up into 
two state (S=2), two mixed (M=2) and eleven private (P=11) firms. I also 
investigate whether FDI or local ownership on the one hand; and sector 
(industry-TRSE) on the other hand were associated with any observed change 
in performance after privatization.   
 
The chapter has three parts. Part one is the methodology. The second part is 
the presentation of absolute figures and test results including: 1) effect of 
privatization on firm performance, 2) effect of FDI or local ownership on firm 
performance, and 3) effect of sector (industry- TRSE) on firm performance. The 
third and last is the conclusion and discussion of findings. 
7.1   Methodology: normality tests  
In order to know the nature and type of distribution of the data, I did an initial 
visual normality assessment of histograms. This helped not only in deciding 
scope for transforming (cleaning) average firm performance (See Appendix 3 
& 4) but also determining the type of analysis to apply on the data. The visual 
assessment indicated that the first and third histograms of the mean TFP and 
ROCE variables for both “before” and “after” privatization portrayed two 
extreme values in both ends of the spectre showing quite large departures from 
normality. Furthermore, it seemed unlikely that a transformation would give a 
more normal distribution. In contrast, the two ROS mean variables “before” 
and “after” were more centrally distributed, with large peaks in the centre but 
visual normality assessment was less straightforward in this case. Lastly, the 
visual normality assessment for the median measures (TFP, ROS and ROCE), 
with the exception of ROS median before, was less straightforward and 
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required further calculations. Considering that TFP and ROCE were not clear 
diagrammatically further calculations using the K-S and S-W tests were 
required to establish the nature of the distribution. 
 
As already indicated, normality tested the data to determine the type of 
analysis to apply. If the variables were normally distributed, then parametric 
tests were possible. If, on the other hand, the variable was non-normal, then 
non-parametric testing was necessary. In comparative studies, both variables 
of ‘before’ and ‘after’ had to be normally distributed in order to use parametric 
tests. But if one was not, then remedy was the non-parametric analysis. The 
test revealed that most of the data was generally non-normal as I report in 
Table 7.1.  
 
7.1.1. Normality Tests for TFP, ROS and ROCE Means 
I used the Shapiro-Wilks (S-W) and Lilliefors significance corrected 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests to ascertain the statistical normality 
assumption. The null hypothesis was a normal distribution while the 
alternative hypothesis was non-normality. A significant test meant that the 
tested variable was not normally distributed while an insignificant result meant 
that the tested variable was. The variables before and after had to be normally 
distributed in order to allow parametric tests. While the TFP and ROCE results 
were clearly non-normal, ROS displayed elements of normality.  
 
While the rest of the means displayed non-normality, ROS was normal. The 
performed S-W and the K-S tests reported significant departures from the 
normal distribution for the mean TFP and ROCE before and after privatization 
with p-values of 0.02 and p=0.001 leading to strong rejection of the normality 
hypothesis and taking up the alternative hypothesis of non-normality. With the 
exception of ROS means and medians, all other variables were non-normal. 
 
In contrast, the mean ROS “before” was more centrally distributed, with one 
large peak in the centre. Running the K-S and S-W tests for ROS before gave 
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p-values of 0.200 and 0.910 respectively, confirming the suspicion of normal 
distribution. This result indicated significant departure from normality (Table 
7.1, row 5). More tests were performed using the same K-S and S-W tests for 
medians TFP, ROS and ROCE before and after privatization. The combined 
mean and median K-S and S-W results for TFP, ROS and ROCE before and 
after privatization are summarized in Table 7.1. 
 
7.1.2. Normality Tests of TFP, ROS and ROCE Medians 
Just like the means, the K-S and S-W tests showed mixed results for the TFP 
and ROCE on the one hand and the ROS measures on the other hand, with the 
former non-normal but the latter normal also shown in Table 7.1. 
Table 7 1 Whitney-Man U Normality test results for firm performance 
(TFP, ROS, ROCE) of 31 SOEs before and after privatization 1986-2003 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (a) Shapiro-Wilk Measure 
Statistic d.f Sign Statistic d.f Sign 
TFP mean before 0.441 16 0.000* 0.449 16 0.000* 
TFP mean after 0.318 10 0.005* 0.725 10 0.002* 
ROS mean before 0.129 22 0.200# 0.980 28 0.910# 
ROS mean after 0.291 21 0.000* 0.737 21 0.000* 
ROCE mean before 0.284 24 0.000* 0. 630 24 0.000* 
ROCE mean after 0.217 17 0.032** 0.800 17 0.002* 
TFP median before 0.451 16 0.000* 0.376 16 0.000* 
TFP mean after 0.333 11 0.001* 0.714 11 0.001* 
ROS median before 0.111 22 0.200# 0.972 22 0.759# 
ROS median after 0.286 23 0.000* 0.707 23 0.000* 
ROCEmedian before 0.308 24 0.000* 0.499 24 0.000* 
ROCE median after 0.244 18 0.006* 0.730 18 0.000* 
Note: 1) # insignificant means normality; 2*=99 % confidence level, **=95 % 
confidence level3) TFP=total factor productivity; ROS= return on sales; ROCE= return of capital 
employed; 4) d.f. =degrees of freedom 
    Source:  Author’s Calculations, 2004 
 
While both the medians of TFP and ROCE variables showed significant 
departures from the normal distribution (p-values < 0.01), K-S and S-W test 
results for ROS medians showed normality before privatization. Hence, while 
the median ROS variable before privatization was normally distributed (K-S 
p-value=0.200; S-W p-value=0.759), the ROS medians after privatization 
were clearly non-normal (K-S and S-W p-values less than 0.001). The effect 
of ‘ROS before’ being normally distributed while ‘ROS after’ was non-normal 
needed taking any of the two options available: 1) either cleaning the non-
normal ROS in order to perform a parametric test; (2) or performing non-
parametric tests with available data since it was difficult to clean it any further. 
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The latter option, however, had to contend with the weaknesses of using non-
parametric tests on a normally distributed ‘ROS before’ privatization. I opted 
for the latter non-parametric tests for the statistical assessment of difference 
privatization and firm performance (Table 7.1, row 11). 
 
7.1.3. Normality Tests for APC and RPC Means and Medians 
Further tests were carried out on APC and RPC of TFP, ROS and RPC for 
normality.  As already stated in chapter 2 on methodology, it was necessary to 
compute a single measure to represent firm performance either average (APC) 
or relative (RPC). Just like for the means and medians of TFP, ROCE, and 
ROS variables, I tested the means and medians of APC and RPC for 
normality. Like the other entire previous tests, a significant test meant that the 
variable was non-normal. The results revealed that most of the variables were 
not normally distributed. With the exception of APC TFP mean, RPC TFP 
mean and median, the K-S test showed that the rest of the APC and RPC 
variables were non-normal. For the S-W test, only APC of the TFP mean was 
normally distributed (Table 7.2). 
Table 7 2 Whitney-Man U Normality Tests results for firm performance 
(APC, RPC) for 31 SOEs before and after privatization 1986-2003 
 K-S (a) S-W 
 Statistic d.f. Sig Statistic d.f. Sig 
APCTFPm 0.238 7 0.200* 0.899 7 0.328 
RPC TFPm 0.251 7 0.200* 0.779 7 0.025 
APCROSm 0.263 15 0.006 0.707 15 0.000 
RPCROSm 0.416 15 0.000 0.566 15 0.000 
APCROCEm 0.258 15 0.008 676 15 0.000 
RPCROCEm 0.489 15 0.000 0.333 15 0.000 
APCTFPd 0.306 7 0.046 0.745 7 0.011 
RPC TFPd 0.281 7 0.102* 0.735 7 0.009 
APCROSd 0.309 15 0.000 0.677 15 0.000 
RPCROSd 0.531 15 0.000 0.291 15 0.000 
APCROCEd 0.373 15 0.000 0.490 15 0.000 
RPCROCEd 0.380 15 0.000 0.621 15 0.000 
Notes: 1) m=mean, d= median; 2); 3) APC=Average performance change, RPC=relative performance 
change; 4) d.f. =degrees of freedom; 5) K-S a= Kolmogorov-Smirnov lilliefors significance correction,  
 S-W= Shapiro-Wilk 
Source: Author’s Calculations, 2004 
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In summary, the test sample was not normally distributed. As such, non-
parametric tests were necessary and the results I report were generally based 
on non-normal data. 
7.2  Test Results of Privatization on Firm Performance 
In this section, I carry out three tests. First, I test whether privatization, 
measured either as differences in performance before and after or as a 
superiority of private over state, affected firm performance. Second, I also test 
whether local or foreign (FDI) ownership is responsible for any detected 
difference in performance after privatization. Third and last, I also test 
whether sector (TRSE/Industry) are responsible for better performance after 
privatization.  I present the observed and test results of Mann-Whitney non-
parametric immediately.  
 
7.2.1 Effect of Privatization on Firm Performance 
In chapter one, I theoretically argued that the effect of privatization on firm 
performance gave mixed results. At times it had no effect at all (Omran 2002; 
Yallow, 1993), was positive (Boardman and Vining, 1989; Boycko, Schleifer 
and Vishny, 1993), and at times negative (Aharoni, 1986; Caves and 
Christensen, 1980). In this section, I investigate the nature of privatization’s 
impact on firm performance in Uganda. 
 
Using observed data is displayed in Table 7.3; I test whether privatization 
influences firm performance. The data set included a total of 15 firms all of 
which were SOEs before privatization, but at the time of test included two 
(S=2) state, two mixed (M=2) and eleven (P=11) privatized companies. In 
Table 7.3, the observed average (mean and median) firm performance of state, 
mixed and private firms are presented. I carry out two tests: the first involves 
comparing state, mixed and private firms individually thus state against mixed, 
state against private, and mixed against private. Second, I also compare the 
combined state and mixed firms (S+M) against the private firms. 
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The test results were mixed depending on how state firms were defined. When 
state and mixed firms were separated and each compared with private firms, 
all the results were insignificant (See Appendix T.1); but when state were 
combined with mixed and then compared with private firms, the results 
became significant (See Appendix T.2). 
 
7.2.1.1  Privatization Effect: State, mixed, private firms compared individually 
Taking a total of fifteen firms (n=15) including two state (S=2), two mixed 
(M=2), and eleven private (P=11), I compared if any of the mentioned 
categories had an edge over the other in firm performance. In the Table 7.3 are 
observed values obtained by comparing situations before and after 
privatization. For instance, the figure -0.6 showed that a percentage reduction 
of profits by 60 per cent for state firms.  
Table 7 3 Ownership & Observed Average Firm Performance of 15 firms before and after Privatization 
1986-03 
  Firm Performance 
ownership  statistic 
APC of  
ROS 
median 
RPC of  
ROS 
median 
APC of 
ROCE 
median 
RPC of  
ROCE 
median 
RPC 
of  
ROS 
mean 
APC 
of  
 ROS 
mean 
APC  
of  
ROCE  
mean 
RPC of  
ROCE   
mean 
S Mean -19.7 -0.59 -8.1 -0.71 -0.62 -20,1 -7,70 -0.71 
  N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
  Std. 
Dev 
1.41 0.04 1.97 0.17 0.02 0.70 2,26 0.21 
M Mean -115.8 240.4 -13.4 -8.35  -112.4 -6,60 -29,7 
  N 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 
  Std. 
Dev 
174.1 336.5 10.3 9.75 
 
174.3 17,5 39,9 
P Mean -5.0 -0.06 -39.0 0.41 0.53 -0.79. -50,7 -0,24 
  N 11 11 11 11 4 11 11 11 
  Std. 
Dev 
31.4 0.81 124.9 1.84 0.66 32.6 100,4 0.88 
Total Mean -21.7 31.9 -31.4 0.,88 0.14 -18.2 -39,1 -4,.4 
  N 15 15 15 15 6 15 15 15 
  Std. Dev 66.0 123.1 106.1 4.11 0.78 66.6 87.3 14.8 
 
Notes: 1) S=state; M = mixed; P = private; 2) TFP are ratios while ROCE and ROS are 
percentages; 3) Std Dev=standard deviation, N=number of firms, APC=Average performance 
change, RPC=relative performance change; 4) -0.60/+0.60 means that firms’ profitability 
fell/increased by 60 % before and after privatisation 
Source:  Author’s Calculations, 2004  
 
The null hypothesis (Ho) was that there was no difference in performance 
between state, mixed or private firms (S=M=P). This implied that state, mixed 
and private firms did equally well. The alternative hypothesis (Ha) was that 
there was a difference in firm performance between states, mixed or private 
firms (S≠M≠P). While a significant result would lead to rejection of the null 
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hypothesis of no difference and take up the alternative hypothesis of a 
difference between state, mixed and private firms’ performances; a significant 
result would uphold the null hypothesis of no difference in performance of 
mentioned ownership parties.   
 
All the results are shown in Appendix T.1 and no indicators was significant 
leading to non-rejection of the null hypothesis of no difference in firm 
performance interpreted to mean that privatization did not bear results or that 
PSOEs’ performance was as poor as SOEs’ explained by regulation impact, 
exclusion of non-PSOEs from sample studied as well as failure to secure 
capital after privatisation elaborated later on.  
 
7.2.1.2 Privatization Impact: state and mixed against private firms 
Once again, I took a total of 15 (n=15) firms including, two state (S=2), two 
mixed (M=2), and eleven private (P=11); but this time combined state and 
mixed firms and compared them against private ones (see Table 7.4). There 
was reason for comparison since mean performance for the eleven private 
firms of 0.45 was higher than -4.53 for the combined state and mixed firms. 
Once again, the null hypothesis (Ho) was that there was no difference in firm 
performance before and after privatization arising out of ownership pattern. 
The alternative hypothesis (Ha) was that there was a difference in firm 
performance between state/mixed (S/M ≠ P) and private firms. The 
interpretation of results here was as in the first test.  
Table 7 4  Ownership effect on firm performance of 15 SOEs/PSOEs before 
and after privatization 1986-2003 
 Mean of RPC of ROCE statistics 
Ownership Mean Number of Firms  (N) Standard Deviation 
State & Mixed  -4.53 4 7.15 
Private 0.45 11 1.84 
Total -0.88 15 4.31 
Notes: 1) RPC=relative performance change; 2) ROCE = retun on capital eomployed; 3) N= 
number of firms; 4) -0.45/+0.45 means that state firms’ profitability fell/increased by 60 % 
before and after privatization; SOEs= state owned enterprises, PSOEs=privatized state owned 
enterprises 
Source: Author’s Calculations, 2004  
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When state were combined with mixed firms and compared against private 
firms, the test, detected significant difference in firm performance  for only 
one lone indicator (RPC of ROCE of median) out of the twelve  with p=0.026 
and Z=-2.219 (see Appendix T.1).  This led to rejection of the null hypothesis 
of no difference in firm performance among combined state and mixed firms 
against private ones in this cohort. Instead, the alternative hypothesis of a 
difference was taken up. The result was interpreted to mean better 
performance after privatization or that private firms performed better than the 
combined state and mixed firms as a special case (P >S/M) and therefore 
supported privatization policy.  The lone significant result could have arisen 
due to either a fall in wage bill or reduced waste after privatisation or both. 
 
First, total wage bill for surveyed 31 PSOEs fell from 14.9 to 9.1 billion 
shillings, representing 38.9 percentage points, due to several factors including 
lay-offs, lower salaries for temporary workers and bankruptcy although it was 
difficult to exactly say how much of these were more responsible for the 
reduction. Particularly, transport and telecommunications and banking cut 
their wages in total expenditure by 22.8 and 6.2 percentage points 
respectively, through layoffs or redundancies and lower wages farvouring 
improved performance particularly for FDI.  Second, the detected improved 
firm performance could have been due to reduced waste in transport costs that 
experienced 64.3 % fall from 1.4 to 0.5 billion due to reduced waste usually 
associated with state ownership as the UBL case shows. Before privatization, Uganda 
Breweries was losing up to Shs. 60 million (US$30, 000) monthly in transport costs 
and commissions to big shots in the Breweries itself and influential people in 
government fraudulently conniving and being among the lorry owners who hired their 
trucks to the company. For a trip to the city, a Tata lorry owner earned Shs. 81, 000= 
(US$40) compared to Shs.40, 000= (US$20) for a whole day charged by the 
Soda company, Pepsi-Cola.278  While lone significant result arose from fall in 
wage bill and reduced waste after privatization; the more noted privatization 
impotency might have been influenced by regulation, exclusion of non-PSOEs 
particularly in the service sector from the study, and failure to secure capital 
after privatization. 
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7.2.1.2.1 Explaining Privatization Impotency: NTBs/TBs and MFRs 
The nil impact on industrial performance can be attributed to mixed impact of 
TBs/NTBs regulation on firm performance. The TBs/NTBs impact on firm 
performance for the protected industrial category of tobacco, beer and 
beverages, justified for job creation, to enhance investment, and tax revenue 
contribution to the government treasury; improved firm performance as a 
result of a protected local market. On the other hand, removal of protective 
tariffs in the rest of industries after 1992, generally caused industrial decline 
although this also depended on whether firms controlled a market or not. 
While firms that controlled a regional market such as ULATI limped on, those 
that did not closed shop. While NTBs/TBs contradictory policies were 
responsible for zero impact in the industrial establishment; MFRs caused 
similar effect in banking. 
 
In service sector, particularly banks cash reserve ratio (CRR) requirement of 
10% affected the rate of interest charged by commercial banks because a big 
portion of their assets did not earn income at the Central Bank. In order to 
compensate for that loss, they were forced to increase lending margins. 
Uganda stood alone in the EAC region with the staggering interest rate 
ranging between 21 and 25 per cent compared to Kenya’s between 12 and 16 
per cent and Rwanda at 16 and 18 per cent respectively. Businessmen 
complained that CRR of 10% of total deposits was very high and inconsistent 
with modern trends and suggested lowering it to levels consistent with low-
interest countries such as 3.5% in a bid to lower lending rates. Interest rates 
were quite high and very few private sector companies realized a rate of return 
of 25 % to justify borrowing from Uganda’s commercial sector. The impact on 
bank performance was a positive ROS (ROS >0) but negative ROCE 
(ROCE<0) for most banks implying that while profitability from operations 
looked healthy (ROS >0), taking additional deposits after privatization turned 
out loss-making in view of the capital employed (ROCE<0) explained by high 
CRR that kept most of the deposits redundant at the Central Bank. 
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Second, despite lack of change by former PSOEs displayed by the profit 
indicators, the non-profit measures of firm performance such as new volume 
of investments, product variety, and innovations undertaken particularly in 
service industry outside the PSOEs showed more successful results arising 
from privatization and liberalization of the economy implying that poor 
performance was a problem of PSOEs and not fresh entrants particularly in 
telecommunications and banking. The contradicting difference in firm 
performance was not only due to different measures applied but also the fact 
that the latter included new firms as a result of liberalization such as MTN and 
CELTEL in telecommunication. Liberalization of the telecommunication 
sector had attracted new investment by all players to provide essential telecom 
services explained by underdevelopment279 and the love for prepaid services, 
demonstrating the potential for wireless systems in the country. For instance, 
UTL got a bank loan of $38.5m for its countrywide rollout of GSM (Mango) 
and CDMA (TelesaverPlus) network.280 281CELTEL, a Dutch company 
operating mobile phones in thirteen African countries,  invested US$50 
million (Shs86.5b) in 2004 and US$400 million in both Uganda and the EAC 
region in general.282 Lastly, MTN Africa sank US$750 million in thirteen 
countries in Africa. In addition, there was product variety in 
telecommunications by fresh entrants MTN and CELTEL, pioneered mobile 
phones in the country that were lacking. In the banking industry, licensing of 
new FDI banks introduced the ATM machines as well computer networked 
branches enabling a customer of a bank to transact business from any branch 
that was lacking before privatization.   
 
Third and last, failure to access finance jeopardized improved performance 
after privatization. With exception of firms such as BATU that accessed bank 
loans, UCWL that secured share capital from the stock exchange market, and 
KSW, SCOUL and UEB split companies that survived on government 
guarantees and bailout operations; the majority of PSOEs found themselves 
into capital difficulties and some closed. 
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In summary, this sub-section set out to investigate the effect of privatization 
on firm performance. The results indicated that with the exception of when 
state firms were combined with mixed firms and then compared with private 
ones, there was no difference in firm performance between state and private 
firms. While the lone success was attributed to oppression of workers and 
reduced waste after privatization; the failure for privatization to deliver was 
possibly due to regulation that caused conflicting results in the industrial 
establishment as a result of selective NTBs/TBs protection, exclusion of non-
PSOEs particularly in the service sector from the study, and failure to secure 
capital after privatization.  
 
7.2.2 Effect of FDI-Local Ownership on firm performance  
It should be recalled that in chapter one (1), Graham (2000:88) suggested that 
foreign firms (FDI) may perform better than local ones particularly due to the 
former’s out-sourcing foreign markets, superior goods, processing 
technologies, superior management skills, and access to markets not possessed 
by the local firms. In this chapter, I investigate the effect of FDI on firm 
performance change before and after privatization. In this sub-section, I 
attempt to investigate whether the observed better performance after 
privatization could be attributed to either FDI or local ownership. The 
observed average firm performance is presented in Table 7.5. 
 
7.2.2.1  Effect of FDI Ownership on Firm Performance  
Here, I test whether FDI was associated with the better performance detected 
after privatization using a total of ten firms (10) divided into two (M+S=2) 
combined state and mixed and eight (P=8) private firms. While from the table 
7.5 it is clear that private firms on average performed better than mixed and 
state firms, for both indicators, I needed to know whether the difference was 
statistically significant and hence associated with FDI. 
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Table 7 5 FDI Effect on firm performance of 10 firms before and after Privatization 
1986-2003 
Firm performance in % 
Ownership  statistics RPC of ROCE mean RPC of ROCE median 
S + M Mean -29.7 -8.35 
  N 2 2 
  Std. Deviation 39.9 9.75 
P Mean -0.03 0.83 
  N 8 8 
  Std. Deviation 0.91 2.01 
Total Mean -5.97 -1.01 
  N 10 10 
  Std. Deviation 18.3 5.35 
      Notes: 1) S + M =combined state and mixed firms; P = private firms; N=number of firms  
  Source: Author’s Calculations, 2004 
 
The null hypothesis (Ho) was that FDI was not associated with the observed 
better performance.  The alternative hypothesis (Ha) was that FDI was 
associated with observed better performance after privatization.    
 
The test results  indicated in Appendix T.3 reveal a significant difference in 
firm performance change as measured by RPCs of ROCE mean and median as 
well as RPCs of ROCE median,  all three being z = -2.089 and p=0.044.  This 
led to rejection of the null hypothesis of FDI not being associated with better 
performance after privatization. Instead, the alternative hypothesis of 
association was taken up. The result was interpreted to mean that private firms 
performed better than mixed firms, explained by the FDI. The reasons for 
superior FDI performance might have included government financial support 
to FDI after privatisation, underpayment of workers, and superior goods. 
 
Despite privatization and government attempts to pull out of business, the state 
operated bailout operations to PSOEs, particularly those belonging to three 
Asian businessmen explained as “strategic intervention in vital sectors 
generating employment and fighting poverty through helping businesses that 
generated wealth’’.283 Second, FDI superiority was partly due to 
underpayment of workers both before and after privatisation. Before 
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privatisation, the workers’ conditions in enterprises that had some degree of 
FDIs or where government held minority shares tended to be free of labour 
restrictions generally and tended to ignore the idea of collective agreement, 
fluffing the trade unions and their restrictive working practices.  For instance, 
staff tended to work according to the situation: while the working day was 8-
hours in SOEs, staff in FDI firms worked longer hours between 10-12 hours 
and employee numbers changed depending on the volume of work. After 
privatization, the new buyers cunningly increased salaries for managerial, 
technical and clerical staff in agreements (read paper) only but they recruited 
the staff to high positions as group employees who did not enjoy negotiated 
terms. This was achieved through laying off more highly paid group 
employees earning shs. 300, 000= and replaced them with those willing to 
work for shs. 100, 000= per month, consequently causing falling total wage-
bill - although the fall in wages was not uniform. Third, FDI had superior 
goods as displayed by telecommunications before and after privatisation of UP 
& TC. While UP & TC provided only landline telephones before, the new 
entrants introduced mobile phones. In the Banking sector, privatisation of 
SOEs and licensing of FDI banks caused innovations in terms of introduction 
of non only ATMs but also computer-networked branches that did not exist 
before. 
 
The policy implication would, therefore, be to promote FDI. Unfortunately, 
however, this was not the case during privatization as evidenced by UGMC 
and ENHAS examples. During privatization, few SOEs were sold to 
foreigners because of political interference. Government preferred Ugandans 
to FDI, a situation that tended to contradict FDI promotion efforts as shown in 
the sale of UGMC and ENHAS. MC’s, highest bidder UNGA, a Kenya-based 
food company, was denied chance to purchase UGMC and instead the SOE 
was sold to President Museveni’s brother on consideration of “Uganda ness” 
as the awarding criteria. Interestingly, however, Caleb International, the 
buying company, had used foreign companies, Tiger Oats and a South African 
company Number One Foods (PTY) Ltd as partners in securing the UGMC 
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purchase.284 For ENHAS, the firm was285 sold neither to the highest (Dairo Air 
Services) at an offer price of US$6.5 million nor to the second highest bidders, 
South African Alliance Air who bid US$ 4.5 million, citing pre-emptive 
rights.286287Saleh refuted allegations that he and Kutesa used their political 
influence to buy the airlines’ shares at the give-away price of Shs. 3.375 
billion (US$1, 687, 500) when the company had been valued at Shs. 5 billion 
(US$2.5 m) and Shs. 8 billion (US$4m) by Ernest Young and DFCU 
respectively.288 Interestingly, in both cases, when Ugandan nationalism was 
cited, the first family of President Museveni was involved. Secondly, this 
nationalism rotated around very profitable SOEs such as ENHAS, UGMC and 
UCB. In the case of UGMC, that Ugandan Nationalism turned out to be 
speculation since re-sale took place on the very first day it was transferred. In 
both cases, the decisions also turned out to be inferior because the new owners 
lacked capital. While UGMC went into receivership, ENHAS offered an 
inferior service at Entebbe Airport charging a higher price compared to that 
offered in Kenya. While FDI managed to influence firm performance after 
privatization, local ownership did not. 
 
7.2.2.2  Effect of Local Ownership on firm performance 
I tested whether local ownership was associated with the better performance 
detected after privatization using a total of 5 firms divided into two (P=2) 
private and three mixed and state (S+M=3) and the test results are displayed in 
Appendix T.4. All the Mann-Whitney tests results were insignificant for the 
local cohort leading to upholding the null hypothesis of no association 
between local ownership - with the earlier observed better performance after 
privatization. The lack of change in local firms was attributed to failure to 
acquire finance and poor management. 
 
With the exception of only a local exporter of hides and skins, government 
refused to bail out other PSOEs sold to local investors such as UAC, UMI 
Kampala, NYTIL and PAPCO that cried out for help. For instance, UAC 
needed Shs. 2 billion (US$500, 000) to fund her operations. On three 
occasions, it was bailed out to a tune of US$3 million (Shs. 3 billion). The 
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fourth time, however, there was no alternative but to sell shares to ENHAS in 
order to raise the money.289 Several other PSOEs such as NYTIL, PAPCO and 
a private local Bank (ICB) solicited for support in vain. While government did 
not give a reason for ignoring the local investors, the media and opposition 
politicians had their explanations of the FDI preference to local investor as a 
political strategy by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government to 
entrench herself in power because in a crisis, the FDI were likely to support 
the government in power in order to protect their investments unlike the local 
investors that could ally with the opposition to change government. In 
addition, the opposition politicians argued that the government policy, besides 
being strategic, was also selfish because President Museveni wanted to 
impoverish Ugandans so that they could respect him and also be easily 
governed.  
 
Poor performance of local PSOEs was due to poor management style 
displayed by lack of change in either objective-setting or sstrategy or both. For 
instance, there was no observed difference in objective-setting before and after 
privatization largely due to the remaining unsold 38 out of a total of 146 slated 
for sale as well as the partial privatizations. In addition, there was no change in 
terms of strategy explained by capacity problems, colonial history and 
political appointments that recruited inferior staff, particularly among the 
partially privatized SOEs already explained. But literature also indicates that 
besides property rights, sector also influenced privatization outcomes. It is this 
latter fact that led me to investigate effects of sector (industry/TRSE) on firm 
performance after privatization.  
 
7.2.3 Effect of Sector on Firm Performance 
In chapter one (1), I theoretically argued that Hoj et al (1995:2) explain the 
superiority of services to industry as due to lack of exposure to international 
competition, strategic advantage, and specific market outlets. Hoj et al argued 
that first, while trade was effective in shaping competition for manufactured 
goods, many services were not exposed to a high degree of competition. 
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Therefore, de-regulation and privatization remained key to shaping 
competition for services and the main elements in structural reform. Second, 
even if services were exposed to international competition, domestic producers 
tended to have a strategic advantage over foreign investors such as closeness 
to market or dominant market position. Third, since services were produced at 
the same place as they were consumed; international competition might 
depend on the number of outlets in the specific market. Empirically in this 
section, I test whether sector (any of industry or TRSE) was associated with 
the observed better performance after privatization. The observed values for 
the two sectors of industry and TRSE appear in Table 7.6 and 7.7 respectively.  
 
7.2.3.1   Privatization and Industry  
I performed Mann-Whitney tests over industries stratum (2 mixed (M=2) 
against 7 private enterprises (P=7)).  There was reason to perform the tests 
because while two measures of RPC of ROCE mean and RPC of ROCE 
median indicated that private firms performed better than mixed, RPC of ROS 
median measure showed the reverse.  
Table 7 6   Industry Effect on Firm performance of 9 firms before and after 
Privatization 1986-03  
Firm performance in % 
Ownership  Statistics 
RPC of ROCE 
mean 
RPC of ROS 
median 
RPC of ROCE 
median 
M Mean -29.7 240.4 -8.38 
  N 2 2 2 
  Std. Deviation 39.9 336.5 9.79 
P Mean -0.31 -0.27 -0.02 
  N 6 7 6 
  Std. Deviation 0.79 0.89 1.22 
Notes:  1) M =Mixed firms; P = private firms 
 Source: Author’s Calculations, 2004 
 
The null hypothesis (Ho) was that industry was not associated with better 
performance earlier observed.   The alternative hypothesis (Ha) was that 
industry was associated with better performance observed after privatization.    
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Here the Mann-Whitney test has detected borderline differences in 
performance change between mixed and private companies in the parameters 
“RPC of ROCE mean”, “RPC of ROS median” and “RPC of ROCE median.”  
 
The test results were borderline significant in the industrial sector [see 
Appendix T.5] and, like the observed figures in Table 7.6, displayed 
conflicting (positive and negative) results. The RPC of ROS medians were 
definitely an error. It can be seen that the RPC of ROS median had p=0.056 
with a Z-value of –2.049, while RPC of ROCE mean and median were 
p=0.071 with Z=-2.0. The results were interpreted to mean that on the margin, 
industry was not associated with the better performance after privatization. 
This was interpreted to mean that although figures in cost analysis displayed 
industrial decline after privatization, this was not statistically significant. 
 
The results did not only contradict the theory but also with earlier cost analysis 
carried out that had revealed that industrial percentage profitability seemed to 
have worsened from negative 0.9 before to negative 1.7 after privatization. 
The nil impact on industrial performance can be attributed to mixed impact of 
TBs/NTBs regulation on firm performance already explained. 
 
7.2.3.2  Privatization and Trade and Services  
Once again, I investigated whether the Trade and Services sector was 
associated with better performance identified after privatization using two (2) 
state and four private firms also displayed in Table 7.7. There was reason to 
suspect such a relationship because the two (2) SOEs had a consistently lower 
APC/RPC value than the four (4) private firms in the TRSE strata.  
 
The results were all insignificant, p-value being 0.133 for RPC of ROS mean 
and median as well as APC of TFP median (see Appendix T.6). This implied 
that trade and services was not associated with the better performance 
observed after privatization which was also revealed by cost analysis. This 
implied that TRSE was not associated with the better performance 
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Table 7 7 TRSE Effect on Firm Performance 10 firms before and after Privatization 
1986-03  
Firm Performance 
Ownership  Statistics 
RPC of  
ROS mean 
APC of  
TFP median 
RPC of  
TFP median RPC of ROS median 
S Mean -0.63 -0.60 -0.35 -0.59 
  N 2 2 2 2 
  Std. Deviation 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 
P Mean 0.53 1.97 1.13 0.29 
  N 4 4 4 4 
  Std. Deviation 0.66 2.77 1.52 0.54 
Total Mean 0.15 1.11 0.63 0.002 
  N 6 6 6 6 
  Std. Deviation 0.78 2.52 1.40 0.62 
Note: 1) TRSE = trade & services; 2) 0.66 means 66 % for ROS and ROCE; -/+ 
means a reduction/ increase in profitability ROS and ROCE 
Source:  Author’s Calculations, 2004  
Observed after privatization which was expected anyway and supported by 
cost analysis that had shown a marginal change after privatization caused not 
only by CRR regulation but also excluding the non-PSOEs from the study.  
7.3     Summary  
The chapter set out to investigate the effect of privatization, FDI and sector on 
firm performance change. The results indicated that with the exception of 
when state firms were combined with mixed firms and then compared with 
private ones, there was no difference in firm performance before and after 
privatization on the one hand and between state and private firms on the other 
hand. In other words, both comparisons: 1) before and after privatization; and 
2) state compared with mixed and private firms yielded similar results of no 
difference in performance. While the lone success was attributed to falling 
wage bill as well as reduced waste that cut transport costs; the failure for 
privatization to deliver was due to: 1) NTBs/TBs selective protection that 
caused contradicting results in the industrial sector; 2) excluding non-PSOEs 
from the study that had spectacular non-profit contributions in terms of new 
investments, product variety and innovations in banking and 
telecommunications; and 3) failure to access funding after privatisation by 
most firms. In the exceptional lone case when privatization delivered, FDI 
presence played a key role explained by not only state subsidies and 
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oppression of workers on the negative side but also superior products such as 
mobile phones in telecommunication, ATMs and computer networked bank 
branches in banking that did not exist before privatisation on the positive side.  
Theoretical implications  
Although privatization is said be neutral (Omran 2002; Yallow, 1993); was 
positive (Boardman and Vining, 1989; Boycko, Schleifer and Vishny, 1993), 
and at times negative (Aharoni, 1986; Caves and Christensen, 1980); intra-
industry opposing effects in Uganda seems to suggest one needed to handle a 
zero–effect with care since they might hide contradicting effects.  In Uganda, 
there were intra-industry contradiction arising from selective-protection of 
industries that improved firm performance of the protected but left the 
unprotected either limping or closed. Basing on evidence; neutral results could 
hide either intra-sector (trade, services etc) or intra-industry (protected, 
unprotected) contradictions and therefore might indicate incomplete analyses 
especially in several firms’ case scenario. 
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Chapter 8 
 
8.   Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter re-caps the major issues raised in this study. Being an in-depth 
study, the summary chapter was thought necessary in order to bring together 
three investigations concerning the effect of privatization on budget deficits; 
the effect of privatization on the firm performance; and, the determinants of 
privatization effectiveness in order to form an opinion on the impact and also 
develop an assessment of this policy. The chapter has three parts. Part one is 
the discussion and two is the conclusion and assessment of the privatisation 
policy. While part three is the recommendation. 
8.1.    Discussion  
The comparison of theory and empirical evidence in this section does not only 
show  a sharp contrast of theoretical support of fiscal impact and firm 
performance arising from privatization on one hand, and contradiction of  
determinants of privatization effectives to improve firm performance on the 
other hand; but also indicate that out of the several determinants of 
privatization effectiveness mentioned by Galal et al, regulation and motivation 
played a bigger part than corporate governance in influencing firm 
performance in Uganda.  
 
8.1.1. Fiscal Impact 
Comparing the privatization impact on subsidies, budget deficit and 
privatization sales proceeds generally contradicted the theory regarding 
subsidies, but supported taxation and sales proceeds behaviour as found in 
other least developed countries (LDCs). a) While Madsen (1988) argues that 
subsidies fall with privatization and Rolands (1994) maintains that falling 
subsidies reduce the budget deficit; the Uganda experience contradicted this 
theory. In Uganda, subsidies in nominal prices remained more or less the same 
over the period 1992/3 to 2004/5 explained by bail-out operations, government 
guarantees to energy sector, and state contracts.  In addition, after 1998, 
central government budget rose although it de-linked from subsidies explained 
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by factors other than subsidies. Uganda evidence showed that in today's 
Uganda, however, there was no link between subsidies and the central 
government budget deficit explained by the ‘hard budget policy’ of 
government.   
 
Regarding budget deficit, the Uganda evidence again supported the theoretical 
positions of increasing budget deficits with privatization in majority of LDCs 
with exception of Mexico that managed to reduce the budget deficit. In the 
theory, privatization impact on budget deficit shows mixed results in DCs and 
minimal results in LDCs. In DCs, the deficit increased in Hungary but fell for utility 
companies in the United Kingdom. In East Germany, SOEs managed to move from 
the treasury to bank finance (Bos, 1993; Bager, 1993; Yallow, 1993).  In Uganda, the 
budget deficit multiplied four times from Shs. 427.3 to Shs. 1692.9 billion in 1992/3 
and 2006/7 respectively. The rise in budget deficit after 1998/99, unlike between 
1991/2 and 1997/8, seem not to have been linked to subsidies but other 
factors. 
 
In a similar manner privatization sales proceeds theory and evidence 
concurred. While most France was the only country that surpassed 
privatization targeted sales and the majority of countries did not realize their 
targets, so did Uganda. Privatization in Uganda failed to achieve the World 
Bank set sales target of US$500 managing only US$172 m accounting for 
35.6 % by end of June 2006 due to assets undervaluation and stripping. Lastly, 
privatization increased tax from PSOEs being four times as big as before 
overall with industry exceeding trade and services  
 
8.1.2. Firm Performance 
Although privatization theory argued that impact on firm performance was 
neutral (Omran 2002; Yallow, 1993), positive (Boardman and Vining, 1989; 
Boycko, Schleifer and Vishny, 1993) and at times negative (Aharoni, 1986; 
Caves and Christensen, 1980); the Ugandan evidence supports the Omran 
(2002) and Yallow (1993) views of a zero effect. 
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With the exception of only when state firms were combined with mixed firms 
and then compared with private ones, there was no difference in firm 
performance between state and private firms on the one hand and before and 
after privatization on the other hand. In other words, both comparisons: 1) 
‘before’ and ‘after’ and 2) mixed and private firms yielded similar results of no 
difference in performance. In the exception case, private firms tended to perform 
better than the combined state and mixed firms that were also supported by FDI, itself 
a result of  financial and other support that were accorded by the NRM government. 
While the lone success was attributed to falling wage bill as well as reduced waste 
that cut transport costs; the failure for privatization to deliver was due to: 1) 
NTBs/TBs selective protection that caused contradicting results in the industrial 
sector; 2) excluding non-PSOEs from the study that had spectacular non-profit 
contributions in terms of new investments, product variety and innovations in banking 
and telecommunications; and 3) failure to access funding after privatization by 
most firms; and 4) failure for transactions costs to change after privatization 
arising from opposing falling communication, on one hand; but rising 
advertising and legal costs on the other hand.. 
 
8.1.3. Determinants of privatization effectiveness 
While Galal (1994) theoretically argued that in monopoly conditions, the 
effect of privatization on firm performance was unpredictable and depended 
on how the public sector was managed and motivated, as well as how the 
private sector was regulated; the Uganda evidence contradicted with specified 
management but concurred with the regulation and motivation theories.  
 
8.1.3.1.  Corporate governance 
Galal (1994) theoretically argued that in monopoly conditions, the effect of 
privatization on firm performance was unpredictable and depended on how the 
public sector was managed and the argument was supported by Frydman et al 
(1999) argued further that for privatization to be effective, management had to 
change; Ugandan evidence seemed to refute Galal et al (1994) views except in 
a very rare situation when the SOE-maker was wound up. 
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The results indicated that with the exception of the rare case when the SOE-
maker (UDC) was wound-up to pave way from private sector led 
development; the impact of corporate governance on firm performance was 
nil. Regarding the rare case, the winding up of UDC with consequent 
abandoning of SOE-maker role in early 1990s caused both insufficient 
investments and neglected sectors such as in agro-processing, textiles and 
mining. Generally, however, corporate governance did not impact on firm 
performance explained by several factors: 1) although, there was an improvement to 
the statutory bodies objective-setting due to corporatization that separated 
commercial from non-commercial activities of the SOEs in preparation for their sale; 
several SOEs such as J-Vs and 100% retained their old objectives due to the 
remaining unsold 38 out of a total of 146 slated for sale as well as the partial 
privatizations. The SOEs that were, therefore, sold had commercial objectives while 
the non-commercial objectives were shelved with the regulatory bodies. 2) As board 
operations, however, corporate governance recorded: either no change in strategy -
making explained by capacity problems, colonial history and political 
appointments that recruited inferior staff. 3) There were opposing transaction 
costs, falling for communications, auditing, and entertainment but increased 
for advertising and legal. The reduction in communication was explained by 
reduced waste, competition and fall in over-billing by the UP & TC. On the 
contrary, while advertising costs increased due to increased competition in the 
oil trading sub-sector that necessitated Shell to increase advertising; the 
increased legal charges were due to change from public to private provision of 
legal services in the banking sub-sector.  
 
8.1.3.2. Regulation 
While Galal et al (1994) theoretically argued that for privatization to be 
effective it depends on how the private sector is regulated; Ugandan evidence 
seemed to support this view.  The results revealed that the various regulatory 
tools impact on firm performance was mixed. First, TBs/NTBs impact on the 
protected category justified for job creation, investment promotion, and tax 
revenue contribution to the government treasury; improved firm performance 
because firms were protected from competition. On the contrary, removal of 
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protective tariffs in the rest of industries after 1992 depended on whether a 
firm controlled a market or not resulting into limping and closing shop 
respectively. Second, licensing impact on firm performance did not only 
display marginal gains but also revealed several weaknesses in the tool. The 
gains included not only innovations in the banking sector through installation 
of ATMs and computer-networked branches, but also introduced mobile 
phones that were lacking and new investments in the telecommunication 
sector although the limited control in the latter hindered cost-cutting 
innovations such as VOIP. The rest of the licensing failed to deliver 
competition, product quality, and development explained by monopoly 
position in former UEB companies, politics in ENHAS, corruption in UNBS 
and ignored sectors in development. Generally, regulators lacked an agenda 
for connectivity and conflict resolution mechanism and needed target such 
objectives.   Third, while MCR limited entry policy ensured improved bank 
performance; CRR impact depended more on structure: whether a bank was a 
price-taker or maker. While price-takers deteriorated in performance, price-
makers improved, explained by passing on the higher interest rates to 
borrowers. Lastly, price control policy of ignoring the consumer and 
protecting the producer tended to maintain firm performance in the energy 
sector but economy-wide impact seemed to favour industries than domestic 
consumers but threatened international competitiveness. 
 
8.1.3.3. Motivation 
Galal et al (1994) argued that the effectiveness of privatization depends on 
how the public sector is motivated; the Uganda evidence showed that while 
motivation generally improved firm performance due to cut in wages and fringe 
benefits in all firms, the variable could also have either neutral or at negative impacts 
in special manual sectors that required some skill acquisition and indeed training such 
as in plantation agriculture in the tea and sugar cane harvesting. While there was 
general fall in the wage bill arising from changes in salary and fringe benefits 
subsequently improving firm performance; attempts to reduce job security 
tended to reduce product quality and subsequently cutting firm profitability in 
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special manual sectors that required some skill acquisition and indeed training 
such as in plantation agriculture tea and sugar cane harvesting.  
 
Impact of privatization on salary and fringe benefits is best expressed in total 
wage bill of 31 PSOEs surveyed that fell from 14.9 to 9.1 billion shillings, 
representing 38.9 percentage points, explained by several factors including 
lay-offs, lower salaries for temporary workers and bankruptcy although it was 
difficult to exactly say how much of the wages and redundancy were 
responsible for the fall in the total wage bill. 
 
The impact of reducing job tenure, however, caused falling product quality in 
the tea and sugar sub-sectors, pre-empting employers on the advice of trade 
union management to improve the job tenure length - since sugar-cane and tea 
harvesting required training that was not favoured by the temporary nature of 
tenure that these new owners offered.   
8.2. Conclusion and Assessment 
The study set out to answer the research question: What has been the effect of 
privatization on budget deficit and firm performance, and what factors have 
influenced privatization effectiveness to improve firm performance in 
Uganda? The study was justified in the fact that although three studies existed on 
the privatization assessment by ROU (1993), UMA (2000) and Ddumba-Ssentamu 
and Mugume (2001), they tended to ignore corporate governance and regulation and 
lightly touched motivation. These factors were found by Galal et al (1994) to be very 
important in influencing privatization effectiveness in the monopoly environments 
particularly in LDCs.  As such, the current study contributes to Ugandan 
privatization assessment not only due to the fact that empirical work contains 
new micro-level information based on data from official enterprise records 
from 1986 to 2003, but also includes factors that influenced privatization 
effectiveness such as corporate governance, regulation and motivation 
previously either ignored or lightly investigated.  
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The results are based on a sample of 31 privatized enterprises comprising 22 
industrial and 9 trade and service firms selected from a population of 117 
firms privatized, chosen on the basis of data availability. Sample size was justified 
on the basis of similar studies in Kenya by Grosh (1988) and in Malawi by Chirwa 
(2002) respectively. The Kenya and Malawi studies covered  77 firms over two years 
(totaling 154) and six firms over five years (totalling 30) respectively. By the same 
principle, the current study had 31 firms over 18 years from 1986 to 2003 (totaling 
527) looked good enough if not ambitious. While privatization was measured by 
‘before’ and ‘after’; ownership was measured by whether a firm was state (S), mixed 
(M) or privately (P) owned. Lastly, firm performance was measured by APC 
( 1−− tt pp ) and RPC ( 11 −−− ttt ppp ) of ROS and ROCE profitability.  
Corporate governance was defined differently as objective setting, board 
functions and transaction costs.  Post-privatization regulation was defined as 
NTBs/TBs, licensing, minimum financial requirements (MFRs) and price 
controls. Data was analyzed using Whitney-Man U non-parametric methods. 
Firm-level data from company records was collected mostly from the Ministry 
of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MOFPED), libraries and 
the firms themselves during the last quarter of 2002 and the entire 2003.  I 
employed four (4) research assistants to help in the collection of data. The four 
assistants were chosen on knowledge in accounting. I also interviewed trade 
unions between March and early May 2006. Company records were 
considered more reliable than interviews that harboured value judgments. 
 
Analysis was by both cost analysis and non-parametric methods. A Statistical 
Analytical package for Scientists (SAS) to carry out Kolmogolov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilks non-parametric tests on the data set in the appendix was used in 
chapters 5 and 7.  The non-parametric method was justified on nature of 
distribution of data as well as measurement of variables. With the exception of 
ROS, the distributions of most firm performance indicators were non-normal 
and there was no means of cleaning data any further. In addition, most 
variables such as ownership, privatization, regulation, and motivation could 
not be quantified in better ways other than nominal and hence the non-
parametric analysis.  
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The fiscal impact of privatization looks at expenditure and revenue. While 
expenditure was measured by subsidies on one hand; taxes from PSOE and 
sale proceeds from divestiture defined revenue on the other hand.  The 
findings revealed that the fiscal impact of privatisation was mixed: such as 
leaving the subsidies in nominal terms more or less the same from the period 
1992/3 to 2004/5 explained by bail-out operations, government guarantees to 
energy sector, and state contracts. In today's Uganda, however, there was no link 
between subsidies and the central government budget deficit explained by the ‘hard 
budget policy’ of government.  Secondly, privatization increased tax from PSOEs 
being four times as big as before overall with industry exceeding trade and 
services.  Lastly, privatization failed to achieve the World Bank set sales target 
of US$500 managing only US$172 m accounting for 35.6 % by end of June 
2006 due to assets undervaluation and stripping.  
The effect of privatization on firm performance change results indicated that 
with the exception of when state firms were combined with mixed firms and 
then compared with private ones, there was no difference in firm performance 
between state and private firms on the one hand and before and after 
privatization on the other hand. In other words, both comparisons: 1) ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ and 2) mixed and private firms yielded similar results of no 
difference in performance. While the lone success was attributed to falling 
wage bill as well as reduced waste that cut transport costs; the failure for 
privatization to deliver was due to: 1) NTBs/TBs selective protection that 
caused contradicting results in the industrial sector; 2) excluding non-PSOEs 
from the study that had spectacular non-profit contributions in terms of new 
investments, product variety and innovations in banking and 
telecommunications; and 3) failure to access funding after privatization by 
most firms. In the exception case, private firms tended to perform better than 
the combined state and mixed firms that were also supported by FDI, itself a 
result of  financial and other support that were accorded by the NRM 
government.  
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8.2.1. Theoretical Implications 
8.2.1.1.  Fiscal Impact of Privatization 
Although popular belief had it that SOEs in red were the some of the major 
causes of budget deficits, de-linking of the subsidies from budget deficits in 
1998/9 seemed to suggested that, in a way, SOEs partly financed the 
government activities in general and budget deficits in particular. In Uganda, 
after de-linking subsidies from budget deficits, the latter started rising steeply 
after 1998/9, seeming to suggest that although there might have been other 
causes such as import price swings, falling international prices for major 
exports such as coffee and inflation in donor countries, SOEs’ impact could 
not be completely ruled out as possible causes. This tended to suggest that 
SOEs partly subsidized or financed budget deficits.  
 
8.2.1.2.  Privatization and firm performance 
Although privatization is said be neutral (Omran 2002; Yallow, 1993), is 
positive (Boardman and Vining, 1989; Boycko, Schleifer and Vishny, 1993), 
and at times negative (Aharoni, 1986; Caves and Christensen, 1980); intra-
sector and intra-industry opposing effects in Uganda seem to suggest one 
needed to handle a zero–effect with care since they might hide contradicting 
effects.  
 
In the sectors, services were constant and industry tended to decline.  In 
addition, there were also intra-industry contradicting effects arising from 
selective-protection of industries that improved firm performance of the 
protected but left the unprotected either limping or closed shop. In summary, 
basing on Uganda evidence; neutral results hid either intra-sector (trade, 
services etc) or intra-industry contradictions (protected, unprotected) and 
might indicate incomplete analysis especially in several firms considered. 
 
8.2.1.3. Theoretical Implications: Corporate governance and firm 
performance 
While Galal et al (1995) argue that privatization effectiveness depends on 
corporate governance; Uganda’s evidence tended to refute this argument and 
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argued that withth exception of when the SOE-maker (UDC) wound-up 
corporate governance impact on firm performance was neutral. First, although 
privatization improved objective setting of some statutory SOEs, there remained more 
PSOEs such as J-Vs and 100 % state owned that did not change their objectives. 
Privatization that also used corporatization as a tool separated commercial from non-
commercial activities of the SOEs in preparation for their sale and thereby improving 
objective-setting. SOEs were, therefore, sold with commercial objectives while the 
non-commercial objectives are shelved with the regulatory bodies, suggesting that the 
private sector was not necessarily better than the public sector but just differed in 
objectives.  Second, corporate governance may not record any change in firm 
performance due to a failure to strategize or monitor PSOEs especially where 
the state still maintained minority shareholding but still wielded controlling 
interest. This could be due to either general lack of capacity due to colonial 
past that might have discouraged training local businessmen in management 
sciences such as strategic management or just political appointments that 
could not sack their inferior kinsmen. In this scenario, there would be no 
difference between public and private sector but the solution would not be 
following a mixed economy but rather emphasizing private sector discipline in 
recruitment and also training. Third and last, changes in corporate governance 
may negatively impact on firm performance due to a rise in advertising and 
legal costs themselves deriving from competition and industry under 
consideration after privatization respectively, suggesting a possible 
relationship between structure and the nature of business that is privatized on 
the one hand and corporate governance on the other hand. To begin with, 
privatization was likely to increase advertising costs if competition was 
allowed in sectors that previously used to enjoy a monopoly situation.  The 
assertion, however, has the limitation of a lone case - only one PSOE, Shell 
Limited, stepped up its advertising costs.  
 
Practically, unless SOEs were either sold to FDI or local firms contracted 
management, unlike Galal et al (1994) assertions, it was unlikely that 
corporate governance would improve firm performance for several reasons. 
First, if improved objective-setting was relied upon to improve firm 
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performance, it would be defeated by the fact that the number of SOEs that 
also acted as regulatory bodies was bound to be a small fraction of total SOEs 
giving limited impact. Second, improved PSOE strategies if they were not out-
sourced required not only monitoring and evaluation but also strategic 
management training that had to be inculcated in the minds of new managers 
first in order to expect any change. Third and last, like objective-making, 
transaction costs could either form a very small percentage of total costs to be 
relied upon to change firm performance or could have opposing each other and 
therefore cancel out. 
  
8.2.1.4. Theoretical Implications: Regulation and firm performance 
While Galal et al (1994) argue that for privatization to be effective it depends 
on how the private sector is regulated; Ugandan evidence seemed to suggest 
that this is true only for manufacturing industry and not all enterprises. While 
regulation is important in influencing firm performance in manufacturing as a 
result of opening up, it was not the case for the service sector whereby, in 
order to come up with better performance, competition was allowed.  
 
In manufacturing industry, selective protection in names of NTBs/TBs 
effectively influenced firms in a mixed manner. Firms in tobacco, beer and other 
beverage industries that were protected by NTBs/TBs in order to encourage new 
investments, employment and because of their tax contribution to the government 
treasury managed to improve their performance to the extent of even breaking into 
exporting to regional markets.  In the rest of industries where selective protection did 
not take place, however, the performance of these firms depended more or less on 
whether a firm controlled a market or not. This was because opening up also meant 
surrendering the local market to cheaper imports. Firms that used to thrive on local 
markets such as NYTIL closed shop while those that managed to break into   regional 
markets limped on. Hence NTB/TBs regulation effectively influenced firm 
performance in manufacturing. This was not the case in services. 
 
In the service sector, it took competition (more than just regulation) to bring 
results in both banking and telecommunications.  In these sectors, allowing in 
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new players did not only lead to innovations such as introduction of ATMs 
and computer-networked branches in banking but also caused a variety of 
products to be produced such as mobile phones that were lacking in the 
country and also brought fresh investments in the telecommunication sector 
that was under-funded.  This also meant that for meaningful results in the 
services sectors that suffered from under-funding, effectiveness after 
privatization was more successful if competition was allowed than mere de-
regulation.  
 
8.2.1.5. Theoretical Implications: Motivation and firm performance 
Comparing the three motivation types of wages, benefits, and job-security 
offers interesting lessons in manual jobs that also required some skills. In the 
lowest paid tea and sugar cane plantations sector, while wages and fringe 
benefits fell due to retrenchment of more highly paid and replaced them with 
relatively lesser paid could boost firm profitability; the bottom line to this 
labour exploitation was determined by adjusting job security. On the contrary, 
attempts to lower job tenure to lesser permanent levels threatened and indeed 
affected product quality, sales revenues and firm performance negatively 
forcing management to reach some agreements with the trade unions. The 
explanations of impact on firm performance lay in the fact that while laid-off 
people left and were replaced by new ones who accepted lower wages and 
fringe benefits, and thereby not affecting worker satisfaction, lower job 
security attracted and favoured untrained staff that led to sub-standard work 
hurting product quality and the firm’s revenue base.  
 
Galal et al (1994:12) also argued that in uncompetitive markets, effectiveness 
of privatization depended on how the private sector is motivated; while cutting 
wages and fringe benefits through layoffs and fresh recruitment could boost 
profitability, reducing job tenure in manual jobs that required training would 
harm sales revenues. This would tend to suggest that in the lowest paid 
industries that also used manual skills, cutting wages and fringe benefits 
through layoffs and fresh recruitment could boost profitability; but the bottom 
point was increasing temporariness in jobs that required training would harm 
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sales revenues and profitability and thereby put a limit to how motivation 
would be manipulated to improve firm performance after privatization. 
 
8.2.2. Assessing Privatization in Uganda 
Privatization in Uganda is a success or a failure depending on the criteria or 
objective to apply. First, if de-linking subsidies from the central government 
was the criteria, then privatization was a success. After 1998/9, government 
successfully de-linked subsidies from budget deficit. Thereafter, budget deficit 
increased but subsidies remained more or less the same. Second, if higher 
profits to the now privatized firms were the criteria, privatization was a failure. 
The profitability of industrial companies had decreased, whereas the 
profitability of trade and service companies remained constant. Third, if better 
working conditions for employees were the criteria, privatizations was a 
success for the active labour force who had obtained higher salaries. 
Alternatively, the laid off personnel got a raw deal in terms of lay off 
packages. So in terms of employment rates, privatization was a failure.  
8.3. Recommendations: Future Research 
Although, the primary objective was to investigate the effect of management, 
motivation on firm performance quantitatively, it was not possible to do it for 
lack of suitable quantitative measures for these variables. I ended up assessing 
the impact qualitatively and, as such, I recommend that for a complete 
understanding of privatization in Uganda, further studies are needed to 
investigate the effect of management, structure, motivation on firm 
performance using quantitative, non-categorical measures. I recommend that 
future studies should quantify corporate governance, regulation, and 
motivation using the bi-polar and summative Rensis Likert scale (1932).     
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Questionnaire 1 a 
 
General Enterprise characteristics 
1. Name of Enterprise…………Postal address............. 
Fax............................................... 
E-
Mail................................Telephone...........................Mobile...............................
........ 
Location of enterprise.............................................Town(s)............................. 
 
2. What structures best describe your business? (Tick) 
Public company (…), Private… (…), Partnership (…), Sole Proprietorship 
(….), Individual   (….), mixed government & private (…), Parastatal (…). 
 
3. How best do you describe your enterprise? 
Parastatal (100 % owned by government), 
Joint venture (minority government shares 50% -), 
Joint venture (majority government shares 50% +), 
Purely private 
 
4. What is the current share holding of the business? (Fill in) 
a) Government…………..Private………………… 
b) Local. …………………Foreign……………….. 
 
5. When was the business privatized? …………………… 
 
6. What sector do you operate in? (Tick) 
Industry (Mining & Quarrying, Energy, non-agro-processing manufacture); 
Agro-Processing; 
Commerce (Trade, Transport, communication, banking & insurance, 
warehousing); 
Services?  
Construction. 
 
7. List the major goods, which your business 
produces?……………………………. 
 
8. How many people does your firm employ? (Tick) Micro (1-5); Small (6-
20); 
Medium (21-50); Large (51-100); Very Large (100+) 
 
Public-Private Relationship 
9. List all enterprises, which supply you with raw 
materials………………………… 
 
10. From which country does your enterprise buy your major raw 
material?………… 
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11. To what country and company do you sell your major product (s) or 
output?…… 
 
12. Where do you sell your products? (Tick) 
Foreign market…………, Local market…………, both local and foreign 
13. a) Has your enterprise done work together with government or a 
government body? Tick) Yes No 
     b) If yes, please describe the nature of 
work………………………………………… 
 
14. Who are the buyers of your goods or services? (Tick) Government(      )  
Private sector (      ),  Both government and Private (      ) 
  
15. What proportion of your goods or services does the government buy/use?  
 
16. Which of these supports do you get from government? (Tick) 
Industrial Land  (   )   
Credit   (   ) 
Subsidy   (   ) 
Tariffs protection  (   ) 
Guarantee of monopoly market  (   ) 
Inputs    (   ) 
State contracts    (   ) 
Guarantee of capital/loan  (   ) 
Others (Specify)……………………………………… 
 
17. Do any of your directors work in government? (Tick) Yes. 
No……………. 
If Yes, as what? (Tick)   LC1         LC2               LC3     LC5                                     
Civil servant                  others (Specify)……………… 
  
18. a) Has government or a government Body ever sub-contracted your 
enterprise? (Tick) Yes No 
 
b) If yes, please describe the work…………………………………………… 
 
19. a) Has your enterprise subcontracted government or a government body to 
do any task for you? (Tick) Yes No       
 
 b) If yes, please describe the work…………………………………………… 
 
20. Where do you get information about developments in your business? 
(Tick) 
i. Private Newspaper or radio 
ii. Government Newspaper or radio 
iii. Business Association (UMA, UEPC, UNCC, UNFA etc) 
iv. Internet 
v. Trade Fares 
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vi. Head office abroad 
vii. Trade Journals 
viii. Trade association meetings 
ix. Informal newsletters 
x. Trade fares. 
xi. Others 
(Specify)……………………………………………………………… 
  
Obstacles to Industrialization 
21. What were your costs for the year 2001 in million shilling? 
Raw materials…………… Taxation………… wages………… 
Transaction costs………… loans Interest… ………Dividends……………… 
Profits/losses for the year……… Total costs………………………………… 
Total revenue……………………………………. 
22. Indicate how SERIOUS the listed problem is to your enterprise by ticking 
(x) whereby 1=no obstacle; 2=small problem; 3=moderate problem; 4=big 
problem; 5=severe obstacle.  
Item Score 
Problem to the enterprise 1 2 3 4 5 
Taxes      
Infrastructure      
Market      
Difficulty of penetrating the foreign market      
Competition from imported second hand goods      
Limited local market      
Competition from smuggled goods      
Competition from imported goods      
Corruption by the government officials      
High interest on loans/ advances      
Lack of person to borrow from       
Economic policy uncertainty      
Procurement of inputs/      
Labour market       
Business support services      
Trade Regulations/Licensing      
Healthy requirements      
Eviction from business premises      
Poorly trained labour force      
Low production in mining, fishing, and mining      
Insufficient and irregular supply of raw materials      
International Price swings of primary products       
Import price changes (oil)      
Demands for higher wages      
Foreign Exchange      
23. What solutions do you suggest to solve each of the problems enumerated 
above? 
24. How has you enterprise been solving the problems in Question 21? 
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25. Rank in order of importance (from the biggest =1 to the smallest=9) the 
problems you face in the business 
a) Taxation                                                                                (    ) 
b) Inadequate and irregular supply of raw materials                        (    ) 
c) Foreign exchange                                                                         (    ) 
d) Limited local market                                                                    (    ) 
e) Difficulty of penetrating the foreign market                                (    ) 
f) Corruption by the government officials                                       (    ) 
g) High cost of capital                                                                      (    ) 
h) Poorly trained labour force                                                          (    ) 
i) Foreign Exchange                                                                        (    ) 
 
26. If the problems you have enumerated are not solved, what will you do? 
(Tick):  
Reduce capacity or close; Maintain capacity, Expand capacity; Restructure    
27. Indicate how SERIOUS the listed infrastructure problem is to your 
enterprise by writing the appropriate number where: 1=no obstacle; 
2=small; 3=moderate; 4 =big; 5=severe. 
Item Score 
Obstacle to the enterprise 1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of Land or space      
Power breakdown      
Power fluctuation      
Telecommunication      
Water supply      
Waste disposal      
Industrial waste disposal      
Commercial transport      
Roads      
Railway transport      
Ports and shipping      
Air Freight services      
28. Indicate how serious the listed infrastructure problem is to your enterprise 
by writing the appropriate condition: where 1=not obstacle, 2=small 
problem, 3=moderate problem, 4=big problem, 5=severe problem. 
Infrastructure Obstacle Score 
Lack of Land or Space 1 2 3 4 5 
Power breakdown      
Power fluctuation      
Telecommunication      
Water supply      
Waste disposal      
Industrial waste disposal      
Commercial transport      
Roads      
Railway transport      
Ports and shipping      
Air Freight services      
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29. Indicate how your enterprise is solving the problem stated 
Infrastructure Obstacle Copying mechanism 
Lack of Land or Space  
Power breakdown  
Power fluctuation  
Telecommunication  
Water supply  
Waste disposal  
Industrial waste disposal  
Commercial transport  
Roads  
Railway transport  
Ports and shipping  
Air Freight services  
 
Suggest a possible solution to the indicated problem  
 
Infrastructure Obstacle Solutions 
Lack of Land or Space  
Power breakdown  
Power fluctuation  
Telecommunication  
Water supply  
Waste disposal  
Industrial waste disposal  
Commercial transport  
Roads  
Railway transport  
Ports and shipping  
Air Freight services  
 
30. a) Would you wish to expand your activities? Yes No. 
 
b) If yes, please, give a brief description of any specific objectives of the 
capital expansion 
proposed.......................................................................................................... 
c) What is your estimated capital cost of the proposed new project in 
Shillings? 
Land and Buildings……………………………………………………. 
Plant and Machinery……………………………………………………. 
Other items to be purchased………………………………………… 
Working capital………………………………………………………… 
Others (Specify).…………………………………………………………. 
Total………………………………………………………………………. 
 
c) How do you plan to obtain this capital? 
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Item Amount 
Retained profits and depreciation  
Partners' contributions  
Shares  
Bonds  
Bank Loans and Overdrafts  
Directors loans  
Mortgages  
Trade credits  
Hire-purchase  
Others (specify)...  
Total  
 
e) Have you been able to obtain the financing you want? Yes  No
 If Yes, from what sources have you been able to satisfy your need for 
finance?............ 
 
f) If not, describe the attempts you have 
made................................................................ 
g) Have you looked for any advice on how to finance your business? Yes No 
If yes, from where?........................................................................................... 
f) What interest would you be able to pay on the 
loans/advances?.................................. 
g) What do you think is a fair rate of interest for your 
business?................................... 
 
Post Privatization Performance 
31. Do you have competitors in your business? Yes………………No… 
 
32. What percentage of the market do you control?………………………… 
 
33. What changes have you undertaken since you purchased the enterprise? 
(Tick). 
Introduced new products in our old markets (product development)            (    ) 
Introduced new products in new markets (diversification)                            (   ) 
Selling our old product in markets (market development)                             (   ) 
Increased output of our old product for sale in old markets                           (   ) 
Others (Specify)…………………………………………………………… (   )   
34. Tick, the right number box for every question where: 1=increased; 
2=decreased; 3=same to the following variables. 
 1 2 3 
Capacity utilization    
Capital    
Markets    
Re-invested profits    
Employees    
 
35. a) Since privatization, our enterprise has transferred this activity to the 
private sector (tick). 
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Activity Yes No 
Some Production process   
Some distribution process   
Planning   
Regulation   
Mediation of conflict 
between employers and 
employees 
  
36. a) Since privatization, our objectives have changed. Yes                 No 
If yes, please list the new objectives…………………………………………… 
37. What is your projection/expectation of Uganda business environment? 
(Tick). 
1) Improve 2) remain unchanged  3) Deteriorate  4) I cannot 
tell 
38. Would you say you face 1) strong competition, 2) moderate competition, 3) no competition? 
 
Motivation 
39. What is the total number of people employed before and after 
privatization?  
Item Before  Present 
Unskilled (primary education or less)   
Skilled?   
Managerial and professional staff   
Total   
 
Management and Regulation 
39. State the capital structure of your enterprise for year ending 2002 (fill in 
million shillings). 
Ordinary shares…………Preferential shares………… 
Reserves (Premium)……………………Reserves (Revaluation)……… 
Retained Profit (Year 2001)……………Long Term Loans (Over 5 years)…… 
Short-term loans (less than 5 years)……….Others…………………… 
Total……………………………………………….. 
  
40. After privatization, THESE (tick) have changed: 
Directors;   Company secretary;  Objectives; Finances; 
Auditing; and  Staffing. 
 
41. (a) Since privatization our objectives have changed (tick)          Yes No
  
(b) If yes, to the above question, list the new Objectives of your enterprise… 
 
42. What plans do you have for your business in future? (Tick) 
Reduce capacity, Close,          Maintain capacity, Expand capacity 
 
43. Do you keep books of accounts? (Tick) Yes   No  
We request you to please attach audited accounts including balance sheets and 
profit and loss accounts and Annual Report from 1986 to 2002
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Questionnaire 1 b 
 
Name of Company……………………Local/FDI……………..Date  
Ownership…………………(S, M, P) ……………… 
Sector……………………… 
Date Privatized……………. 
 1986 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 
PBIT                
Sales                
costs                
CE                
ROS                
ROCE                
TFP                
Costs                
Interest                
Materials                
Wages                
Utilities                
Transport                
Overheads                
Taxation                
Profit/loss                
Total                
TCosts                
Transport                
Communication                
Advert & Prom                
Monit & Audit                
Legal Charges                
Entertainment                
Total                
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Appendix 1 Table of Dates and Buyers of Privatised Enterprises: 
No. Enterprise Buyer Date 
1 Uganda American Ins. Company American Life Insurance Co. Nov. 1992 
2 East African Distilleries International Distillers & Vintners Nov. 1992 
3 Shell (U) Ltd. Shell Petroleum Company Ltd. Dec. 1992 
4 Lake Victoria Bottling Co. Ltd. Crown Bottlers (U) Ltd.- Feb. 1993 
5 Uganda Securico Ltd. Securiko (u) Ltd Aug 1993 
6 Agricultural Enterprises Ltd. Commonwealth Development Corporation (James Finlays of 
UK. 
Oct. 1993 
7 Uganda Tea Corporation Metha Group  May 1994 
8 Steel Corporation of East Africa Ltd. 
(SCEWA) 
Madhvani Group May 1994 
9 Blenders (U) Ltd. Unilever Overseas Holding BVC Aug 1994 
10 Hotel Margherita Reco Industries Ltd. Aug 1994 
11 White Horse Inn Kabale Development Company Ltd-Dr. Suruma, Aug 1994 
12 Tumpeco GM Company Ltd.-Gordon Wavamunno?  Aug. 1994 
13 Mt. Moroto Hotel  Kodet International Nov. 1994 
14 Rock Hotel  SWISA Industries Ltd. Nov. 1994 
15 Uganda Cement Industry Rawals Group of Industries  Dec. 1994 
16 Lira Hotel Showa Trade Company Ltd-Sam Engola ?. Jan. 1995 
17 Soroti Hotel Speedbird Aviation Services Ltd-MP Soroti Municipality. Jan. 1995 
18 Acholi Inn  Ms. Laoo Ltd. May 1995 
19 Hilltop Hotel Three Links Ltd-Hon. Moses Kigongo?. May 1995 
20 Mt. Elgon Hotel Bugishu Cooperative Union May 1995 
21 White Rhino Hotel Dolma Associates Ltd. May 1995 
22 Uganda Fisheries Ent. Nordic- African Fisheries Company (Path Iceland) May 1995 
23 Ug. Leather $ Tanning Industry IPS (U) Ltd. July 1995 
24 Uganda Meet Parkers Ltd. (K’la Plant). Uganda Meat Industries Ltd. Aug. 1995 
25 Lake Victoria Hotel Windsor Ltd. Aug. 1995 
26 Mweya Safari Lodge Madhvani Group Aug. 1995 
27 Tororo Cement Works Corrugated Sheets Ltd.  Oct.  1995 
28 Winits (U) Ltd.  EMCO Works Ltd. Oct.  1995 
29 Uganda Hardware Ltd. Management Oct.  1995 
30 Uganda Motors Ltd. Management Nov.  1995 
31 Uganda Hire Purchase Company Tadeo Kisseka Nov. 1995 
32 K’la Auto Centre (Gomba Motors) Ltd. Management Nov. 1995 
33 Republic Motors Rafiki Trading Company Dec. 1995 
34 Total (U) Ltd.  Total Outre Mer Mar. 1996 
35 African Textile Mills (ATM) R. S.  Patel Mar. 1996 
36 NYTIL  Picfare Ltd. Mar. 1996 
37 Printpak (U) Ltd. New Printpak (U) Ltd. May 1996 
38 Agip (U) Ltd. Agip Petroli International May 1996 
40 Fresh Foods Ltd. Eddie & Sophie Enterprises Ltd. May 1996 
41 Foods & Beverages Ltd. James Mbabazi May 1996 
42 Uganda Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vivi Enterprises July 1996 
43 Kibimba Rice Company Ltd. Tilda Holdings Ltd. Sept. 1996 
44 Motor craft & Sales Ltd. Andami Works Ltd. Sept. 1996 
45 Stanbic (U) Ltd. SBIC Africa Holdings Ltd. Dec. 1996 
46 ITV Sales Assets Roko Construction Ltd. Dec. 1996 
47 Uganda Grain Milling Company (UGMC) Caleb’s International Dec. 1996 
48 Masindi Hotel Kabasekende Dec. 1996 
49 Ug. Bags & Hessian Mills Ltd. Bestlines (U) Ltd. Jan. 1997 
50 Comrade Cycles (U) Ltd. Uganda Motors Ltd. Jan. 1997 
51 Uganda Industrial Machinery Ltd.  F.B. Lukoma May 1997 
52 Uganda Crane Estates Ltd.  Buganda Kingdom  Jun. 1997 
53 Uganda Commercial Bank Ms. Westmont Asia plc Oct. 1997 
54 Uganda Meat Parkers- Soroti Teso Agricultural Industrial Co. Ltd. Oct. 1997 
55 Lango Development Corporation Sunset International Ltd. Nov. 1997 
56 Barclays Bank (U) Ltd. Barclays Bank Plc Sep. 1998 
57 Chillington Tool Company (U) Ltd.  Jun. 1998 
58 Associated Paper Industries Ltd.  May 1998 
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Appendix  2 Firms Liquidated/Struck off the Register of Companies 
No Enterprise No Enterprise 
1 Agro- Chemicals 15 Uganda Toni Services 
2 Domestic Appliances 16 Wolfram Investment Ltd. 
3 Hamilton 17 Ugadev Bank Ltd. 
4 Itama Mines 18 Uganda Transport Co. 
5 Lebel (EA) Ltd. 19 Peoples Transport Co. 
6 Sukulu Mines 20 Uganda General Merchandise Ltd. 
7 TICAF 21 Intra Africa Traders 
8 Uganda Air Ltd. 22 Lint Marketing Board 
9 Uganda Aviation Services 23 Paramount Manufacturers 
10 Uganda Fish Marketing 24 Toro Development Corporation 
11 Uganda Farm Machinery Ltd. 25 Ugandev Properties Ltd. 
12 Uganda Tourism Development 
Corporation 
26 Uganda Investments Ltd. 
13 Uganda Wildlife Development Co. 27 Ugadev Holdings Ltd. 
14 Gobbot (U) Ltd.   
Source: PERDS, 1993.290 
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Appendix 3 Histograms for distributions of mean TFP, ROS and ROCE 
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Appendix 4 Histograms for distributions of median TFP, ROS & ROCE 
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Appendix 5: Post and Pre-Privatization Mean Performance in Uganda 
Before Privatization After Privatization 
Beverages, Tobacco and Beer  
ROS   =  22.4 %,      N=27,  ROS   = 7.8 %, N=11 
ROCE =61.2 % ROCE= 8.1 % 
TFP    =2.5 TFP =n/a 
Food  
ROS   = 18.4 %, N=19,  ROS   = 1.5 %, N=12,  
ROCE = 140.6 % ROCE =3.9 % 
TFP    = 2.2 (8.3) TFP    =1.06 
Textiles and Apparels  
ROS   =  -3.9 %, N=12,  ROS   =  -239.9%,      N=1,  
ROCE =3.6 %,  N= ROCE = -6.5 % 
TFP    = 1.8 TFP    = 0.33 
Metal   
ROS   = 32.9 %, N=8,  ROS   =  -74.7%, N= 10,  
ROCE =41.2 % ROCE = -10.6 % 
TFP    = 1.4 TFP    = 1.3 
Pharmaceuticals  
ROS   =  23.2 %,      N=7,  ROS   = n/a %,  
ROCE = 16.9 % ROCE = n/a 
TFP    = n/a TFP    = n/a 
Construction  
ROS   =  9.5 %,      N=13,  ROS   = 21.2%, N=5,  
ROCE = 14.5 % ROCE = 11.8 % 
TFP    = 2.0  TFP    = n/a 
Energy  
ROS   =  -0.25 %, N=10,  ROS   = 10.7%, N= 1,  
ROCE =-0.07 ROCE = 5.7 % 
TFP    = n/a TFP    = 2.2  
Transport and Tele-communication  
ROS   = 14.1 %, N=18,  ROS   = 21.5 %, N=12,  
ROCE =9.1 % ROCE =46.1 % 
TFP    = 1.35 TFP    = 1.0 (4.5)  
Banking  
ROS   = 52.6%, N=26,  ROS   = 78.2 %, N=14,  
ROCE =56.2 % ROCE =32.5 % 
TFP    = 2.9  TFP    = 2.3 (4.1)  
Industry  
ROS   = 1.72% ROS   = -26.1 %,  
ROCE =53.8% ROCE =2.42  % 
TFP    =2.1  TFP    = 1.2  
TRSE Enterprises  
ROS   = 36.9 %,  ROS   = 52 %,  
ROCE = 35.7 % ROCE = 39 % 
TFP    = () ,  TFP    = () ,  
All Enterprises  
ROS   =  10.4 %,      N=140,  ROS   = 4.7 %, N=66,  
ROCE = 47.3 % ROCE = 15.7 % 
TFP    = 2.2 (2.8) , N= TFP    = 1.5 (3.1) , N= 
        Source: Field Findings,291 2004. 
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Appendix T  1  Ownership & Observed Average Firm Performance of 15 firms before and after Privatization 1986-03 
  Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-
tailed Sig.)] 
APC of 
TFPmean 4,000 7,000 -,387 ,699 ,857(a) 
RPC of 
TFPmean 4,000 7,000 -,387 ,699 ,857(a) 
APC of 
ROSmean 8,000 11,000 -,592 ,554 ,641(a) 
RPC of 
ROSmean 6,000 9,000 -,987 ,324 ,410(a) 
APC of 
ROCEmean 10,000 13,000 -,197 ,844 ,923(a) 
RPC of 
ROCEmean 8,000 11,000 -,592 ,554 ,641(a) 
APCof 
TFPmedian 2,000 5,000 -1,172 ,241 ,381(a) 
RPC of 
TFPmedian 2,000 5,000 -1,172 ,241 ,381(a) 
APC of 
ROSmedian 8,000 11,000 -,592 ,554 ,641(a) 
RPC of 
ROSmedian 6,000 9,000 -,987 ,324 ,410(a) 
APC of 
ROCEmedian 10,000 13,000 -,197 ,844 ,923(a) 
RPC of 
ROCEmedian 5,000 8,000 -1,184 ,236 ,308(a) 
a Not corrected for ties. , b Grouping Variable: State vs Private 
Author’s Calculations, 2004 
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Appendix T  2 Ownership effect on firm performance of 15 SOEs/PSOEs before and after privatization 1986-2003 
 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Wilcoxon  
W Z 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-
tailed Sig.)] 
APC of TFPmean 
4,000 7,000 -, 387 , 699 . 857(a) 
RPC of TFPmean 
4,000 7,000 -, 387 , 699 , 857(a) 
APC of ROSmean 
16,000 26,000 -, 783 , 433 , 489(a) 
RPC of ROSmean 
17,000 27,000 -, 653 , 514 , 571(a) 
APC of ROCEmean 
21,000 87,000 -, 131 , 896 , 949(a) 
RPC of ROCEmean 
18,000 28,000 -, 522 , 602 , 661(a) 
APCof TFPmedian 
2,000 5,000 -1,172 , 241 , 381(a) 
RPC of TFPmedian 
2,000 5,000 -1,172 , 241 , 381(a) 
APC of ROSmedian 
15,000 25,000 -, 914 , 361 , 412(a) 
RPC of ROSmedian 
17,000 27,000 -. 653 , 514 , 571(a) 
APC of ROCEmedian 
18,000 28,000 -, 522 , 602 , 661(a) 
RPC of ROCEmedian 
5,000 15,000 -2,219 , 026 , 026(a) 
Notes: a) Not corrected for ties. b Grouping Variable: State vs Private. 
Author’s Calculations, 2004 
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Appendix T  3 FDI Effect on firm performance of 10 firms before and after Privatization 1986-2003 
  
Mann-
Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-
tailed Sig.)] 
APC of ROSmean 5,000 8,000 -,783 , 433 , 533(a) 
RPC of ROSmean 8,000 44,000 -, 000 1,000 1,000(a) 
APC of ROCEmean 8,000 44,000 -, 000 1,000 1,000(a) 
RPC of ROCEmean 
,000 3,000 -2,089 , 037 , 044(a) 
APC of ROSmedian 4,000 7,000 -1, 044 , 296 , 400(a) 
RPC of ROSmedian 
,000 36,000 -2, 089 , 037 , 044(a) 
APC of ROCEmedian 4,000 7,000 -1,044 ,296 , 400(a) 
RPC of ROCEmedian 
,000 3,000 -2, 089 ,037 , 044(a) 
Author’s Calculations, 2004 
Appendix T  4 Local Effect on firm performance of 10 firms before and after privatization 1986-2003 
  Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed 
Sig.)] 
APC of TFPmean 
, 000 1,000 -1,225 , 221 , 667(a) 
RPC of TFPmean 
, 000 1,000 -1,225 , 221 , 667(a) 
APC of ROSmean 
2,000 8,000 -, 577 , 564 , 800(a) 
RPC of ROSmean 
2,000 8,000 -, 577 , 564 , 800(a) 
APC of ROCEmean 
2,000 8,000 -, 577 , 564 , 800(a) 
RPC of ROCEmean 
2,000 8,000 -, 577 , 564 , 800(a) 
APCof TFPmedian 
, 000 1,000 -1,414 , 157 , 667(a) 
RPC of TFPmedian 
, 000 1,000 -1,414 , 157 , 667(a) 
APC of ROSmedian 
2,000 8,000 -, 577 , 564 , 800(a) 
RPC of ROSmedian 
2,000 8,000 -, 577 , 564 , 800(a) 
APC of ROCEmedian 
2,000 8,000 -,577 ,564 , 800(a) 
RPC of ROCEmedian                                   
2,000 
                 8,000 -, 577                  , 564                                 , 800(a) 
a Not corrected for ties; b  Grouping Variable: State vs Private. 
Author’s Calculations, 2004  
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Appendix T  5 Industry Effect on Firm performance of 9 firms before and after Privatization 1986-03  
  
Mann -
Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Exact Sig.  
[2*(1-tailed Sig.)] 
APC of ROSmean 
7,000 35,000 , 000 1, 000 1,000(a) 
RPC of ROSmean 
7, 000 35,000 ,000 1, 000 1, 000(a) 
APC of ROCEmean 
4,000 25,000 -, 667 , 505 , 643(a) 
RPC of ROCEmean 
,000 3,000 -2, 000 , 046 , 071(a) 
APC of ROSmedian 
6,000 9,000 -, 293 , 770 , 880(a) 
RPC of ROSmedian 
, 000 28,000 -2,049 , 040 , 056(a) 
APC of ROCEmedian 
6,000 27,000 , 000 1, 000 1, 000(a) 
RPC of ROCEmedian 
,000 3,000 -2,000 , 046 , 071(a) 
a Not corrected for ties; b Grouping Variable: State vs. Private. 
Source:  Author’s Calculations, 2004 
 
 
Appendix T 6 TRSE Effect on Firm Performance 10 firms before and after Privatization 1986-03 
  
Mann -Whitney 
U Wilcoxon W Z 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Exact Sig.  
[2*(1-tailed Sig.)] 
APC of TFPmean 
2,000 5,000 -, 926 , 355 , 533(a) 
RPC of TFPmean 
2,000 5,000 -, 926 , 355 , 533(a) 
APC of ROSmean 
2,000 5,000 -, 926 , 355 , 533(a) 
RPC of ROSmean 
, 000 3,000 -1,852 , 064 , 133(a) 
APC of ROCEmean 
4,000 7,000 -, 387 , 699 , 857(a) 
RPC of ROCEmean 
2,000 5,000 -1,162 , 245 , 381(a) 
APCof TFPmedian 
, 000 3,000 -1,879 , 060 , 133(a) 
RPC of TFPmedian 
, 000 3,000 -1,879 , 060 , 133(a) 
APC of ROSmedian 
2,000 5,000 -, 926 , 355 , 533(a) 
RPC of ROSmedian 
, 000 3,000 -1,852 , 064 , 133(a) 
APC of ROCEmedian 
4,000 7,000 -, 387 , 699 , 857(a) 
RPC of ROCEmedian 
1,000 4,000 -1,549 , 121 , 190(a) 
Source:  Author’s Calculations, 2004 
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Appendix 6  List of Firms Studied 
1. Bank of Baroda U Limited (BOBU) 
2. Barclays Bank U limited  
3. British American Tobacco Uganda (BATU) 
4. Century Bottling Company Limited 
5. Grindlays Bank/Stanbic  
6. Hima Cement 
7. Kibimba Rice Scheme 
8. KiSW 
9. KSW 
10. Lake Victoria Bottling Company/Crown Bottlers Limited 
11. Nile Breweries Limited (NBL) 
12. Nyanza Textiles Limited (NYTIL) 
13. Sugar Corporation of Uganda Limited (SCOUL) 
14. Shell U limited 
15. Stanchart Bank Limited 
16. Total U Limited 
17. TUMPECO 
18. UEB/UEDCL 
19. UEB/UEGCL 
20. Uganda Airlines Corporation (UAC) Entebbe Handling Services (ENHAS) 
21. Uganda Breweries Limited (UBL) 
22. Uganda Clay Works Limited/Uganda Clays Limited 
23. Uganda Grain Milling Company (UGMC) 
24. Uganda leather and Tanning Industry (ULATI) 
25. Uganda Meat Industries, Kampala (UMI) 
26. Uganda Pharmaceutical Limited (UPhL) 
27. Uganda Garments Industry Limited (UGIL)/Phoenix International Limited 
28.  UGMA Engineering  
29. UP & TC/Posta Bank 
30. UP & TC/UPL 
31. UP & TC/UTL 
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Appendix  7 Raw Data of mean and median TFP, ROS, ROCE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TFP  ROS ROCE TFP ROS   ROCE    TFP ROS ROCE ROS ROCE         
BATU 2.9  36.8 7.8 133 28.1 2.9  32.6 7.3 59.7 29, 9 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Nile Breweries Limited 2.4  9.9 4.9 25 0 2.5  7.1 4.8 21.1  2 3 3 1 1 2 1 1 
Uganda Breweries Limited   3.4 8.9 15.9 17.3   4.2 10.6 8.1 25.9 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 
LVBC/Crown Bottlers   24.7 -5.2 58.9 -18   25.7 -5.7 45.6 -5.9 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 
Century Bottling Company   0 13.7 0 21.4   0 13.7  21.4 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 
UGMC 20.7  25.7 0 31.2 0 20.7  8.8 0 35.6  1 3 2 2 1 4 2 1 
Kibimba Rice Scheme   32.3 0 131 0   22.7 0 144  2 3 3 2 1 2 2 1 
Uganda Meat Parkers Ltd. (UMI) 2.3 1.1 57.3 9.7 328 5.4 2.3 1.1 78.1 9.5 412 5.2 1 3 3 1 1 2 2 1 
Kakira Sugar Works   0 0 0 0   0 0   2 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 
Kinyara Sugar Works   0 13.1 0 6.6   0 16.5  7.9 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 1 
SCOUL 2.2  -40 -29.9 -10 -4.1 2.2  -37 -24.8 -10 -9.7 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 
UGIL  0.3 -4 -239.7 12.5 -6.5  0.33 -0.5 -239.7 14.2 -6.5 2 2 2 2 1 3 3 1 
NYTIL 2.6  7.4 0 -1.1 0 2.7  13.5  1.3  2 3 2 1 1 3 3 1 
ULATI 1.1  -15 0 -0.7 0 1  -21  -23  2 3 2 1 1 1 3 1 
UGMA  1.3 0 -74.7 0 -11  0.9  -64.3  -8.5 2 2 3  1 1 4 1 
TUMPECO 1.4  32.9 0 41.2 0 1.5  56.8  30.9  1 3 2 1 1 1 4 1 
Uganda Clays Limited 2  9.5 16.2 15.1 11.8 2  14.2 15.9 9.7 12.8 1 3 1 2 1 4 5 1 
Hima Cement   0 28.7 11.7 0    28.7 11.7  2 3 1 1 1 2 5 1 
Tororo Cement Factory   0 0 0 0       2 3 2 1 1 2 5 1 
UPL   23.2 0 16.9 0   21.9  13.9  2 3 2 2 3 4 6 1 
UEB/UEDCL/UEDCL/UEGCL  2, 2 -0.2 10.7 -0.1 5.7  2.2 3.1 10.7 0.4 -5.7 2 2 1 2 4 1 7 1 
UAC/ENHAS 0.9  -14 0 3.4 0 1  3.5  2.4  1 3 2 1 3 1 8 2 
UP&TC/posts 1.6 1 32.1 11.5 10.8 1.5 1.7 1.1 33.2 14.5 11.4 1.9 1 1 3 2 3 1 8 2 
UP&TC/UPL 1.6 1.1 32.1 12.5 10.8 4.7 1.7 1.1 33.2 12.5 11.4 4.7 1 1 0 2 3 3 8 2 
Total    0 68.3 0 142.4    68.3  142 2 3 2 1 3 4 8 2 
Shell  8.1 0 12.3 19.3 43.1  8.4  10 19.3 42.1 2 3 3 1 3 4 8 2 
Grindlays/Stanbic 1.7 2.6 60.7 113.7 23.9 58.7 1.5 2.6 51.4 99 9.5 58.5 2 3 2 2 2 4 9 2 
Stanchart 2.4 7.7 37.8 72.8 27.4 21.5 1.8 7.9 63.5 73.4 27.1 8 2 3 2 2 2 4 9 2 
Baroda 1.6 1.8 83.7 45.5 47.2 4.7 1.6 1.8 76.8 49.1 9.9 4.8 2 3 2 2 2 4 9 2 
Barclays 5.8 2.3 39.1 69.8 131 62.8 1.8 2.3 47.3 69.8 72.5 62.8 2 3 2 2 2 4 9 2 
 
Bold mean before privatization, unbold mean after privatization 
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Appendix 8  Variable list and coding 
 
Variable Name: Coding: Meaning: 
 
TFPbefore numerical value means TFP before privatisation 
TFPafter numerical value means TFP after privatisation 
ROSbefore numerical value mean ROS before privatisation 
ROSafter numerical value mean ROS after privatisation 
ROCEbefore numerical value mean ROCE before privatisation 
ROCEafter numerical value mean ROCE after privatisation 
TFPmbefore numerical value median TFP before privatisation 
TFPmafter numerical value median TFP after privatisation 
ROSmbefore numerical value median ROS before privatisation 
ROSmafter numerical value median ROS after privatisation 
ROCEmbefore numerical value median ROCE before privatisation 
ROCEmafter numerical value median ROCE after privatisation 
local_for 1 local 
 2 foreign 
Stat_mix_priv 1 state 
 2 mixed 
 3 private 
mkr_lic 1 import tariffs 
2 minimum capital requirement 
3 licensing only 
4 price control 
mono_comp 1 monopoly 
2 duopoly 
3 monopolistic competition 
4 four or more 
SectType 1 Soft drinks, beer & tobacco 
2 Food 
3 Garments 
4 Metal 
5 Construction 
6 Pharmaceuticals 
7 Energy 
8 Transpt & Telecom 
9 Banking 
Ind_Ser 1   Industry 
 2   Trade & Services 
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Appendix 9  Raw Data from Firms’ Records 
Uganda 
Meat Parkers 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES     305.9 133.8 173.9 167.7 106.3      1180094 2193727 1452276 
PBIT     75.2 29.2 140 131.1 86.6      188726.4 88027.2 135511 
COS                  
TE     91.6 107.7         993060.2 2194959 1362618 
     -16.4 -78.5            
FA     57.8 51.5 49.1 45.7 43.6      1916671 1974634 1934863 
CA     67.5 59.1 55.7 54.4 35.8      763696.5 259174 656803 
CL     64.3 37.2 77 68.3 63.9      52435.7 31560 30265.5 
wk 0 0 0 0 3.2 21.9 -21.3 -13.9 -28.1 0 0 0 0 0 711260.8 227614 626537 
CE 0 0 0 0 61 73.4 27.8 31.8 15.5 0 0 0 0 0 2627932 2202247 2561401 
                  
WAGES               55334.1 2638.9 58392.8 
K/L #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### 34.63815 748.279 33.1353 
                  
ROS #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 24.58 21.82 80.50604 78.17531306 81.46754468 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### 15.99249 4.01268 9.33095 
ROCE #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 123.3 39.78 503.5971 412.2641509 558.7096774 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### 7.181557 3.99715 5.29051 
TFP #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 3.34 1.242 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### 1.188341 0.99944 1.0658 
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Ugil/Phoenix 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES 391.5 20.9 167.7 286 382 522           310.9 
PBIT -321.8 -9.9 -94.1 159 227 242           -745.4 
COS    157 155 280            
TE                 934 
                 -897.1 
FA    1396 1141 1167           10119 
CA    226 300 278           1657 
CL    -202 -157 -198           407.6 
wk 0 0 0 428 457 476 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1249 
CE 0 0 0 1824 1598 1643 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11368 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### #### ##### ##### #DIV/0! 
                  
ROS -82.197 -47.37 -56.11 55.59 59.424 46.36 ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### #### ##### ##### -239.8 
ROCE #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 8.717 14.205 14.73 ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### #### ##### ##### -6.557 
TFP #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### #### ##### ##### 0.333 
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Kibimba/tilda 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES 16.6 36.7 46.1 108.9 101 73 38           
PBIT   5.8 -19.4 23 42 33           
COS 15.5 23   68 33 15           
TE                  
                  
FA 10.1 9.5 8.2 6.7 8 8 8           
CA 4 23 46.7 64.7 32 32 26           
CL 9.8 13.2 34.8 35.2 24 24 22           
wk -5.8 9.8 11.9 29.5 8 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CE 7.4 18.7 20.2 36.2 16 16 12           
                  
WAGES                  
K/L ##### ##### #### ##### ##### ##### ##### #### ##### ##### #### #### #### #### #### #### #### 
                  
ROS 0 0 12.6 -17.8 22.77 57.53 86.84 #### ##### ##### #### #### #### #### #### #### #### 
ROCE 0 0 28.7 -53.6 143.8 262.5 275 #### ##### ##### #### #### #### #### #### #### #### 
TFP ##### ##### #### ##### ##### ##### ##### #### ##### ##### #### #### #### #### #### #### #### 
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BAT 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES    6300 9167 13104 18785 47439 57346 31302 34337 40190 48510 53702 1E+05 103988 136001 
PBIT    3267 4667 8602.2 10173 11151 10285 10212 11742 12440 11012 11097 7726 10019 9276.3 
COS          14177 14296 19625 25770 27790 45225 43968 72889 
TE    2098 3219             
                  
FA    1760 2124 2724.6 11358 11874 13785 14322 21160 22667 23094 27281 35662 34899 32503 
CA    5642 7927 10706 15636 18093 21388 23490 22265 25334 31462 57261 65475 65622 86606 
CL    6219 8803 11118 15111 15157 17967 17980 20057 22017 27075 53332 63324 67124 91814 
wk 0 0 0 -576.4 -876.4 -411.7 525.1 2937 3421 5510.1 2208 3317 4388 3929 2151 -1503 
-
5208.4 
CE 0 0 0 1183 1248 2312.9 11883 14810 17206 19832 23368 25984 27481 31211 37812 33397 27294 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
                  
ROS #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 51.86 50.91 65.644 54.15 23.51 17.93 32.626 34.2 30.95 22.7 20.66 6.994 9.6344 6.8208 
ROCE #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 276.2 374 371.92 85.61 75.29 59.77 51.495 50.25 47.88 40.07 35.55 20.43 29.999 33.986 
TFP #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 3.003 2.848 #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
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UGMC 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES 259 1021     10997 10659 334.1 229.7        
PBIT 29.4 222.4     1055 866.3 259.6 -16.8        
COS       161.1 359.2          
TE       814.8 382.1          
                  
FA       1726 1653.7          
CA       5480 4398.2 5338 4459        
CL       5251 3814.6 4540.7 1510        
wk 0 0 0 0 0 0 229.7 583.6 797.3 2949 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1955 2237.3 797.3 2949 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! #### #### #### #### ##### 
                  
ROS 11.351 21.783 ##### ##### #### ##### 9.592 8.1276 77.701 -7.314 #### #DIV/0! #### #### #### #### ##### 
ROCE #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### ##### 53.95 38.721 32.56 -0.57 #### #DIV/0! #### #### #### #### ##### 
TFP #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### ##### 13.5 27.895 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! #### #### #### #### ##### 
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Uganda 
Clay 
Works 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES 16382 38212 1E+05  444 815.4 938.1 1238 1442 1773 2042 2584 2820 3476 3743.8 3726 5039 
PBIT 2849 -22332 9429  47.7 179.7 134.1 7.7 347 432 395.1 324 284 697.7 588.6 408.3 1109 
COS                2416 2865 
TE                  
                  
FA     309.1 3324 3218 3203 3073 2955 2940 3096 2838 2940 4639 4259 8410 
CA     396.3 419.2 589.2 573 748 854 1063 1122 1306 1625 1062.7 960.3 1338 
CL     87.6 268.2 342.3 411.2 475 474 584 659 536 536.4 1097.8 782.6 1475 
wk 0 0 0 0 308.7 151 246.9 161.7 273 380 479 463 770 1089 -35.1 177.7 
-
137.5 
CE     617.8 3475 3465 3365 3347 3335 3420 3559 3608 4029 4603.9 4436 8273 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #### ##### ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! #REF! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### 
                  
ROS 17.391 
-
58.442 7.594 #### 10.74 22.04 14.29 0.622 24.06 24.37 19.35 12.54 10.1 20.07 15.722 10.96 22 
ROCE #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #### 71.87 5.171 3.871 0.229 10.37 12.95 11.55 9.104 7.87 17.32 12.785 9.204 13.4 
TFP #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #### #REF! ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! 2.076 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### 
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UEB 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES      10117 21956 30039 48310 50411 60176.1 73855.7 76040.9 87457.3 114595 100576  
PBIT      2319.5 3144.5 -2018 1883.7 1247.6 401.8 -13196 -26474 4063.6 9439.4 10826.5  
COS                  
TE                44994.9  
                  
FA      293016 326869 579241 598839 652366 599611 530304 599393 842010 948000   
CA      15607 21967.9 37383 46898.3 56589 77075.9 81769.3 82504.2 96667 128209   
CL      20997 28727.5 26388 28816.6 32753 46025.9 63192.9 67488.1 80268 76954   
wk 0 0 0 0 0 -5390 -6759.6 10995 18081.7 23836 31050 18576.4 15016.1 16399 51255 0 0 
CE      287626 320110 590236 616920 676202 630661 548881 614409 858409 999255 191160 0 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L ##### #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
                  
ROS ##### #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! 22.927 14.3218 -6.716 3.89919 2.4748 0.66771 -17.868 -34.816 4.64638 8.2372 10.7645 ##### 
ROCE ##### #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! 0.8064 0.98232 -0.342 0.30534 0.1845 0.06371 -4.8233 0.66138 0.47339 0.9446 5.66357 ##### 
TFP ##### #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 2.23528 ##### 
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LVBC-
Crown 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES 107.9 85.1 11907 3513 5619        30804 19933.3 18776.5 19062.4 18419.7 
PBIT 11.73 42.9 437.8 1162 1447        -4499.2 -309.1 -2250.4 -1201.6 1562.4 
COS                  
TE                  
                  
FA  186.9 276.1 3076 3141         14335.1 14033.6 14351.9 12653.1 
CA  75.1 366.9 563.8 1269         6480.9 7181.1 5805.9 7407.6 
CL  73.1 239.5           12450.6 17723.8   
wk 0 2 127.4 73.5 25.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -5969.7 -10542.7 5805.9 7407.6 
CE  188.9 403.5 3.1 3167        18421 8365.3 3491 20157.9 20060.8 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #### ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
                  
ROS 10.871 50.411 3.677 33.08 25.75 ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #### ##### ##### -14.606 
-
1.5506715 
-
11.985194 
-
6.3035085 8.4822228 
ROCE #DIV/0! 22.71 108.5 37487 45.69 ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #### ##### ##### -24.424 
-
3.6950259 
-
64.462905 
-
5.9609384 7.7883235 
TFP #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #### ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
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UPL 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES 46.3 152.8 351.1 535.6 1056.8 1778.7 1519     395.3 1265 1328.6 2964.5 4885.2  
PBIT 11.6 30.9 94 238.9 132.6 202.1 332.8           
COS 38.1 192.8 253.3 323.7 869.5             
TE                  
                  
FA 24.1 24.8 33.6 61 464 777.1 1236           
CA 10.3 196.3 475.1 1880 2143.8 1605 1280           
CL 4.8 80.3 163.9 347 400.3 1057.8 1266           
wk 5.5 -161.9 311.2 1533 1743.5 547.2 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CE 34.5 221.1 508.7 1941 2607.8 2382.2 1250    2775 3805.7 2708 2169.5 6461.3 6729.8  
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
                  
ROS 25.054 20.223 26.773 44.604 12.5473 11.362 21.91 ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 0 0 0 0 0 #DIV/0! 
ROCE 33.623 13.976 18.478 12.308 5.08475 8.4838 26.63 ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 0 0 0 0 0 0 #DIV/0! 
TFP #DIV/0! #REF! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
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ULATI 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES 420.4 30 57.5  307.5 323.9 399           
PBIT -195 -4.4 -5  -64.4 -124.3 57           
COS     163.8 208.7            
TE     231.4 318.5 404           
       -347           
FA     45.6 88.8 76.6           
CA     353.9 343.9 207.2           
CL     120.4 203 207.7           
wk 0 0 0 0 233.5 140.9 -0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CE 0 0 0 0 279.1 229.7 76.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! 
                  
ROS -46.38 -14.67 -8.696 ##### -20.94 -38.38 14.29 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! 
ROCE #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### -23.07 -54.11 74.9 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! 
TFP #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 1.3289 1.017 0.988 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! 
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Hima 
Cement 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES           23298 20592      
PBIT           8258.4 4523.6      
COS                  
TE                  
                  
FA           52402 54363      
CA           6180.2 7608.9      
CL           5075.2 6082.7      
wk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1105 1526.2 0 0 0 0 0 
CE           53507 55889      
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
                  
ROS #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! 35.446 21.968 ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
ROCE #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! 15.434 8.0939 ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
TFP #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
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Cable 
Corporation 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES            4600 2839.4 1831    
PBIT            -1152 231.4 -287.6    
COS            2368 2888.1 2177    
TE            3111 3001.2 2145    
            -760 2096.2     
FA            3474 2956.7 2482    
CA            5029 4713.8 3274    
CL            1801 2314.5 2140    
wk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3228 2399.3 1134 0 0 0 
CE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6702 5356 3616 0 0 0 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! #### ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! 
                  
ROS #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! #### ##### ##### ##### -25.05 8.1496 -15.71 #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! 
ROCE #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! #### ##### ##### ##### -17.19 4.3204 -7.955 #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! 
TFP #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! #### ##### ##### ##### 1.479 0.9461 0.854 #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! 
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UGMA 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES   116.5 206.8 499.3 433.2 728 669.2     767 906.1 769 961.8  
PBIT   -74.9 -297 
-
591.6 -800 -223 -246     -145.7 344.8 
-
356.1 
-
1369  
COS             1878.8 1441    
TE   103.9 45.4 654.3 859 468.5 634.8       1558 1640  
     
-
571.9 -762 -272 -395     -2732 -2390 
-
3781 
-
2829  
FA   1184 2513 3104 5846 6915 9631     9545.2 8884 8280 8359  
CA   130.8 245.9 419.2 823.2 894.9 1286     1036.5 947.2 852.5 775.9  
CL   240.8 590.9 1206 2247 602 1207     5219.9 6133 5626 4978  
wk 0 0 -110 -345 
-
786.7 
-
1424 292.9 79.2 0 0 0 0 -4183 -5186 
-
4773 
-
4202 0 
CE 0 0 1074 2168 2317 4423 7208 9710 0 0 0 0 5361.8 3698 3507 4158 0 
                  
WAGES 1 7.6 940 2509 81.6 120.5 64.2 153.1     870.3 811 826.3 874.3  
K/L 0 0 1.26 1.001 38.04 48.52 107.7 62.91 #### ##### ##### ##### 10.968 10.95 10.02 9.561 #DIV/0! 
                  
ROS #DIV/0! ##### -64.3 -144 
-
118.5 -185 -30.6 -36.7 #### ##### ##### ##### -19 38.05 
-
46.31 
-
142.3 #DIV/0! 
ROCE #DIV/0! ##### -6.97 -13.7 
-
25.53 -18.1 -3.09 -2.53 #### ##### ##### ##### -2.717 9.325 
-
10.15 
-
32.92 #DIV/0! 
TFP #DIV/0! ##### 1.121 4.555 0.763 0.504 1.554 1.054 #### ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! ##### 0.494 0.586 #DIV/0! 
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NYTIL/Nyanza 
Range 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES     2711.3 4376.8 6625.4           
PBIT     -337.9 592 1398.1           
COS                  
TE     1125.5 1620.3 2385.4           
                  
FA     2662.8 41230 38347.5           
CA     2791.9 2924.1 4806.7           
CL     1174.2 1813.7 2938.2           
wk 0 0 0 0 1617.7 1110.4 1868.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CE 0 0 0 0 4280.5 42340 40216 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                  
WAGES     269.1 789 1160.6           
K/L #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 9.8952 52.256 33.0411 ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### ##### #### ##### ##### ##### 
                  
ROS #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! -12.46 13.526 21.1021 ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### ##### #### ##### ##### ##### 
ROCE #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! -7.894 1.3982 3.47648 ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### ##### #### ##### ##### ##### 
TFP #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 2.409 2.7012 2.77748 ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### ##### #### ##### ##### ##### 
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Barclays 
Bank 
Ltd 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES  4445 1454      7158.4 10062 10568 11193 13794.4  22862 24511  
PBIT  413.2 922.7      -642.8 4768.1 6269.5 3694 9727.8  17021 15966  
COS                  
TE  145.4 892.3      5952.6 5567 5120.7 9142 6065.8  8810 11755  
                  
FA  44.2 2031      3716.4 3467.2 3295.1 3044 3052.9  4151 6645.6  
CA  2720 4960      62672 75618 72004 85741 106924  2E+05 173848  
CL  2697 5159      64015 72837 66658 77996 99457.7  1E+05 153266  
wk 0 22.7 -199 0 0 0 0  -1343 2781.3 5345.9 7745 7466.1 0 21236 20581 0 
CE 0 66.9 1832 0 0 0 0  2373.4 6248.5 8641 10788 10519 0 25387 27227 0 
                  
WAGES  66 538      3680.9 3392.6        
K/L ##### 0.67 3.774 #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### 1.0096 1.022 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### 
                  
ROS ##### 9.296 63.48 #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### -8.98 47.39 59.328 33 70.5199 #DIV/0! 74.45 65.14 ##### 
ROCE ##### 617.6 50.38 #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### -27.08 76.308 72.555 34.24 92.4784 #DIV/0! 67.04 58.642 ##### 
TFP ##### 30.57 1.629 #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### 1.2026 1.8073 2.0637 1.224 2.27413 #DIV/0! 2.595 2.0851 ##### 
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Baroda 
Bank 
Ltd 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES           4054.9 8306 8794.8 7502.9 9285.6 10509.1  
PBIT           4844.1 6381 4831.6 3954 127 8672.4  
COS                  
TE           3757.5 3888   5724.6 5260  
                  
FA          56204 71367       
CA          54142        
CL           67490       
wk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54142 -67490 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 110346 3877.9 64605 71094 81804 83980 95826.7 0 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L ##### #### ##### ##### #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! #### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
                  
ROS ##### #### ##### ##### #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! #### ##### #DIV/0! 119.46 76.83 54.937 52.7 1.3677 82.5228 ##### 
ROCE ##### #### ##### ##### #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! #### ##### 0 124.92 9.878 6.79607 4.8335 0.1512 9.05009 ##### 
TFP ##### #### ##### ##### #DIV/0! #### #DIV/0! #### ##### #DIV/0! 1.0791 2.136 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 1.6221 1.99793 ##### 
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Stanchart 
Bank Ltd 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES      1448 2374 4156.1 5637.2 6983.2 9218.3 14595 19255 26571 43639 49527  
PBIT      -1447 2023 2914.5 4885.7 1972.1 5239.6 9429.1 14238 18979 33230 38715  
COS                  
TE      3493 2273 2315.4 3047 997.3   8522.1 11393 16988 19682  
                  
FA      2969 3054 6621.1 6858.4 6933.2 7082.3 7199.2      
CA      10674 25809 3796.8 50238 51068 72945 105249      
CL      12884 28002   50476 70836 100202      
wk 0 0 0 0 0 -2209 -2193 3796.8 50238 592.1 2109.2 5046.1 0 0 0 0 0 
CE 0 0 0 0 0 760.1 861.2 10418 57097 7525.3 9191.5 12245 184758 285191 410773 464650 0 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
                  
ROS #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### -99.92 85.23 70.126 86.669 28.241 56.839 64.605 73.947 71.427 76.147 78.17 ##### 
ROCE #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### -190.3 234.9 27.976 8.5569 26.206 57.005 77.002 7.7064 6.6548 8.0896 8.3322 ##### 
TFP #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### 0.414 1.044 1.795 1.8501 7.0021 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 2.2594 2.3321 2.5689 2.5164 ##### 
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Grindlays/Stanbic 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES 41.2 129.2 246.2 441.9 1124.3 2126 2982 3391 4099 5613.2 8402 10748.3 14494.7 21761 15232.2   
PBIT 18 52.2 103.7 224.7 584.1 2153  3334.3 2810 2651.3 5289 9824.1 14360.9 20950 25644.1   
COS                  
TE 18.4 42.5 198.7 368.5 724.9 1225 1691 2439.1 2731 3602.8 5037 4815.1 4538.6 7200.2 7147.3   
                  
FA       5971 6299.2 6268 3835.5 74910 98036.2      
CA       25944 41925 37947 45294.9        
CL       31839 41920 37304 43610.8 66148 87113.2      
wk 0 0 0 0 0 0 -5894 5.3 642.6 1684.1 ##### -87113 0 0 0 0 0 
CE 390.2 710 2771.7 5040 9883.5 18412 37885 6304.5 6910 5519.6 8762 10923 42500.9 39895 0 0 0 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### 
                  
ROS 43.69 40.4 42.12 50.85 51.952 101.3 0 98.328 68.55 47.233307 62.95 91.4014 99.0769 96.27 168.355 ##### ##### 
ROCE 4.613 7.352 3.7414 4.459 5.9098 11.69 0 52.888 40.66 48.034278 60.36 89.9396 33.7896 52.512 #DIV/0! ##### ##### 
TFP 2.239 3.04 1.2391 1.199 1.551 1.736 1.764 1.3903 1.501 1.5580104 1.668 2.23221 3.19365 3.0223 2.13118 ##### ##### 
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Shell U 
Ltd 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES 558.4 1336      72559 92741 1E+05 133135   113197 168631   
PBIT 123.5 -646.8      6888 12449 10678 13319   27144 12415   
COS              68361 135706   
TE        7394 10264     19386 21679   
                  
FA 45.7 1140      3856 9190.1 14690 18731   45036 46674   
CA 367.6 969.4      21264 23576 23322 21803   36667 48567   
CL 335.1 1568      10047 12537 11565 10159   28844 45346   
wk 32.5 -598.7 0 0 0 0 0 11218 11039 11757 11644 0 0 7823.2 3221.1 0 0 
CE 78.2 541.3 0 0 0 0 0 18611 20229 26447 30374 0 0 52859 49896 0 0 
        15074      51159    
WAGES                  
K/L ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
                  
ROS 22.12 -48.43 ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### 9.493 13.424 9.738 10.004 ##### #DIV/0! 23.979 7.3624 #DIV/0! ##### 
ROCE 157.9 -119.5 ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### 37.01 61.542 40.38 43.85 ##### #DIV/0! 51.35 24.882 #DIV/0! ##### 
TFP ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### 9.814 9.036 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! 5.839 7.7786 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
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Total U 
Ltd 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES              60868 69079 71771 70154 
PBIT                48353 48679 
COS                  
TE                  
                  
FA              21319 22465 23717 22648 
CA              24121 17703 20321 20729 
CL              20015 11925 9167.5 10075 
wk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4106.1 5778 11153 10654 
CE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25425 28243 34871 33301 
                44038 43377 
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### #### #### ##### #### ##### ##### #### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #REF! 
                  
ROS #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### #### #### ##### #### ##### ##### #### ##### #DIV/0! 0 0 67.372 69.39 
ROCE #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### #### #### ##### #### ##### ##### #### ##### #DIV/0! 0 0 138.67 146.2 
TFP #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### #### #### ##### #### ##### ##### #### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### 
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UAC/ENHAS 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES     3848.9 4265.5 3032.1 4250 8316 13698 19514       
PBIT     -1854 -689.1 -2559 151.5 1268 1736 3309       
COS                  
TE     5702.9 4954.7 5562 4145 7664 11962 16205       
                  
FA     1447.8 1419 1363.7 1671 2236 4593 5505       
CA     2800.5 4915 6926.5 10923 12146 12762 9081       
CL     3454.9 3114.2 3071.1 6282 6138 8957 13441       
wk 0 0 0 0 -654.4 1800.7 3855.3 4641 6008 3805 -4361 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CE 0 0 0 0 793.4 3219.7 5219 6312 8245 8398 1144 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### 
                  
ROS #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! -48.17 -16.16 -84.38 3.565 15.24 12.67 16.96 ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### 
ROCE #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! -233.7 -21.4 -49.02 2.4 15.38 20.67 289.2 ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### 
TFP #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! 0.6749 0.8609 0.5451 1.025 1.085 1.145 1.204 ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### ##### 
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UP&TC/UPL 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  
SALES 247.4 882.3 2128.5 7667.8 14322 22862 36931 37841 42780 49197 49917  1860 7158    2021.7 
PBIT 82.3 390.5 852.7 -1409 -2814 12858 14189 3917 53453 6617.6 14972   896.8    -120 
COS                   
TE 105.1 491.7 1275.7 4661.5 9820.3 9622.2 20608 21371 30370 44534 55748   6307    2379.3 
                   
FA 128.8 2767 6997.7 6996.1 9658.9 41362 80793 51168 60289 75054 98484  16052 16718    7524.2 
CA 391.7 6913.1 8361.9 8046.1 17394 29828 53664 88055 122053 132616 128423  3549 6072    11042 
CL 216.6 7783.3 7892.6 4924.3 13752   60828 64308 76604 99513  1941 3749    13677.2 
wk 175.1 -870.2 469.3 3121.8 3641.9 29828 53664 27227 57745 56013 28910 0 1608 2323 0 0 0 -2635.2 
CE 303.9 1896.8 7467 10118 13301 71190 134457 78395 118034 131066 127394 0 17661 19041 0 0 0 4889 
                   
WAGES              3427    562.5 
K/L ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### 4.879 #### #### #DIV/0! 13.3764 
                   
ROS 33.27 44.259 40.061 -18.37 -19.65 56.24 38.422 10.35 124.95 13.451 29.995 ##### 0 12.53 #### #### #DIV/0! -5.9356 
ROCE 27.08 20.587 11.42 -13.92 -21.15 18.061 10.553 4.996 45.286 5.049 11.753 ##### 0 4.71 #### #### #DIV/0! -2.4545 
TFP 2.354 1.7944 1.6685 1.6449 1.4584 2.376 1.792 1.771 1.4086 1.1047 0.8954 ##### ##### 1.135 #### #### #DIV/0! 0.8497 
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UP&TC/UPL 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 POBANK99 POBANK00 POBANK01 
SALES 247.4 882.3 2128.5 7667.8 14322 22862 36931 37841 42780 49197 49917 754 1305.6 2021.7 
PBIT 82.3 390.5 852.7 -1409 -2814 12858 14189 3917 53453 6617.6 14972 132 299.6 -120 
COS               
TE 105.1 491.7 1275.7 4661.5 9820.3 9622.2 20608 21371 30370 44534 55748 715.4 1161.4 2379.3 
               
FA 128.8 2767 6997.7 6996.1 9658.9 41362 80793 51168 60289 75054 98484 5723.3 5752.6 7524.2 
CA 391.7 6913.1 8361.9 8046.1 17394 29828 53664 88055 122053 132616 128423 4661 6431.4 11042 
CL 216.6 7783.3 7892.6 4924.3 13752   60828 64308 76604 99513 3735.6 6233.2 13677.2 
wk 175.1 -870.2 469.3 3121.8 3641.9 29828 53664 27227 57745 56013 28910 925.4 198.2 -2635.2 
CE 303.9 1896.8 7467 10118 13301 71190 134457 78395 118034 131066 127394 6648.7 5950.8 4889 
               
WAGES            269.4 314 562.5 
K/L ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 21.245 18.3204 13.3764 
               
ROS 33.27 44.259 40.061 -18.37 -19.65 56.24 38.422 10.35 124.95 13.451 29.995 17.507 22.9473 -5.9356 
ROCE 27.08 20.587 11.42 -13.92 -21.15 18.061 10.553 4.996 45.286 5.049 11.753 1.9854 5.03462 -2.4545 
TFP 2.354 1.7944 1.6685 1.6449 1.4584 2.376 1.792 1.771 1.4086 1.1047 0.8954 1.054 1.12416 0.8497 
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Kinyara 
Sugar 
Works 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES          28 1581 19290 28054 28054 35927 45781 48377 
PBIT          6423 -3034 3246 423.8 423.8 7788 9546 8012.2 
COS          159.4   19418 19418 21197 25963  
TE                  
                  
FA          53949 68106 65010 67974 52524 50789 61154 58879 
CA          9111 10214 11068 11787 14135 17857 18457 20046 
CL          3223 10706 12944 21943 16830 13841 9429 3787.7 
wk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5888 -492 -1877 -10156 -2695 4016 9028 16258 
CE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59837 67613 63134 57819 49829 54806 70182 75137 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #### #### #### #### #### #### ##### #### #### #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! 
                  
ROS #### #### #### #### #### #### ##### #### #### 22941 -192 16.83 1.5107 1.511 21.68 20.85 16.562 
ROCE #### #### #### #### #### #### ##### #### #### 10.73 -4.49 5.141 0.733 0.851 14.21 13.6 10.663 
TFP #### #### #### #### #### #### ##### #### #### #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### #DIV/0! 
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Associate 
Match 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES             3.5 42.8    
PBIT             -223 -507.1    
COS             107 -377.2    
TE                  
                  
FA             3749 3470.7    
CA             415 428.9    
CL             20 17.4    
wk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 395 411.5 0 0 0 
CE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4143 3882.2 0 0 0 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### ##### #### #### #### ##### ##### ##### #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
                  
ROS ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### ##### #### #### #### ##### ##### ##### 
-
6371 -1185 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
ROCE ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### ##### #### #### #### ##### ##### ##### 
-
5.38 -13.06 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
TFP ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### #### ##### #### #### #### ##### ##### ##### #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
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Kakira Sugar Works 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES        20113 20445 24961 46005 47766 50743     
PBIT                  
COS                  
TE                  
                  
FA        19324 25792 107155 99625 113804 122352     
CA        23331 27699 25603 35245 28443 25098     
CL        6098 11723 28651 30873 16832 19875     
wk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17233 15976 
-
3048.2 4371 11612 5222.1 0 0 0 0 
CE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36557 41768 104107 103996 125416 127574 0 0 0 0 
                  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### #### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
                  
ROS #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### #### 0 0 0 0 0 0 #### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
ROCE #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### #### 0 0 0 0 0 0 #### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
TFP #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! ##### ##### ##### #### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
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Uganda 
Breweries 
Ltd 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES     6977.7 7921.1 9971 #### 15638 30121 44876 49706 70762 85985 90128 109851  
PBIT -2.8 41 140.2 722.6 630.6 338 714.7 -541 138.3 3024.4 6090.8 6026 9428.6 9577 -256 2732.5  
COS                  
TE                  
                  
FA 134 199.5 231.5 7242.2 7436.9 7291.9 8755 9834 9966 9935.3 11518 19108 30015 39583 37657 35589  
CA 19.2 89.1 289.8 1712.7 1909.8 2488 3892 4041 3444 5607.9 7468.2 9551 15036 17431 18949 25498  
CL 18.1 95.6 259.7 1352.8 1570.4 2200.5 3867 6034 4814 7140.4 4295.3 5442 10159 20897 23872 26620  
wk 1.1 -6.5 30.1 359.9 339.4 287.5 25.5 
-
1993 -1370 -1533 3172.9 4110 4876.9 -3466 -4923 -1122 0 
CE 135.1 193 261.6 7602.1 7776.3 7579.4 8780 7841 8596 8402.8 14691 23217 34892 36117 32733 34467 0 
        9061 7375      29669 30843  
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
                  
ROS #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 9.0374 4.2671 7.168 
-
4.26 0.884 10.041 13.572 12.12 13.324 11.14 -0.284 2.4875 ##### 
ROCE -2.073 21.24 53.59 9.5053 8.1093 4.4595 8.14 -6.9 1.609 35.993 41.46 25.95 27.022 26.52 -0.782 7.9279 ##### 
TFP #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
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tumpeco/GM 
TUMPECO 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES 1872 34 68.5 112.6 170.3 265.7  603.7 719 1248.4 1221 1293 1611.8     
PBIT 
-
1034.5 1.3 -6.4 75.5 96.1 151.8  455.9 489.3         
COS                  
TE    92.8 104.3 172.3            
                  
FA    102 100 1705  1584.8 1526.6 1533.9 1539 1504 1513.6     
CA    95 143 348  182.1 263.8 599.7 670 415.4 283.1     
CL    78 112 157  264.9 208.6 261.9 178.2 142.1 256.8     
wk 0 0 0 17 31 191 0 -82.8 55.2 337.8 491.8 273.3 26.3 0 0 0 0 
CE 0 0 0 119 131 1896 0 1502 1581.8 1871.7 2030 1777 1539.9 0 0 0 0 
            2430 2284.1     
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! ##### #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
                  
ROS 
-
55.262 3.824 -9.3 67.052 56.43 57.132 ##### 75.518 68.053 0 0 0 0 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
ROCE #DIV/0! ##### #### 63.445 73.36 8.0063 ##### 30.353 30.933 0 0 0 0 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
TFP #DIV/0! ##### #### 1.2134 1.633 1.5421 ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### 
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SCOUL 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES 10.3 5.6 925       22667.8 21181 20003 12365 19298 24450   
PBIT -7 -58.5 -341.9       -9107.2 
-
6279.9 -5417 -6280 3840.1 -4682   
COS          26107.7 24368 22640 14355 17393 20423   
TE          9859 9628.3       
                  
FA          64064.8 72946 68337 67971 59512 53753   
CA          20918.9 19563 18297 18565 18833 16998   
CL          13633.2 31334 16219 22056 55911 47202   
wk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7285.7 -11772 2078.5 -3492 -37078 -30204 0 0 
CE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 71350.5 61174 70416 64479 22435 23549 0 0 
            48731      
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
                  
ROS 
-
67.961 
-
1044.6 
-
36.962 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
-
40.1768 
-
29.648 -27.08 -50.79 19.899 -19.15 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
ROCE #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! -12.764 
-
10.266 -7.693 -9.74 17.117 -19.88 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
TFP #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 2.2992 2.1999 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
          2.6481        
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Nile 
Breweries 
Ltd 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SALES 2256    1893.8 4006.5 5188.7 11171 15876   66373 76084    102800 
PBIT -161.2    99 145.4 1153 1003 4203.8   3171 3116.3    6171.2 
COS     1053.2 2447.3 1892.2 6018.3 6953   45271 53370    66310 
TE     753.3 1560.7 4559.2 3679.8 5233.9         
     59.4 -277.8 1393.1 1393.1 3638.1         
FA     573.8 3421 4188.8 3957.8 18653   25824 23387    28596 
CA     820.6 1079.3 2537.4 5103 8454.1   12761 18271    22709 
CL     776.1 1867.6 4575.7 6510.7 10058   11619 23883    32267 
wk 0 0 0 0 44.5 -788.3 -2038 -1408 -1604 0 0 1141.9 
-
5612.1 0 0 0 
-
9557.8 
CE 0 0 0 0 618.3 2632.7 2150.5 2550.1 17050 0 0 26966 17774 0 0 0 19038 
             30443     
WAGES                  
K/L #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### #### #### #DIV/0! 
                  
ROS -7.147 #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! 5.22758 3.6291 22.221 8.9783 26.479 #### #### 4.7775 4.0959 #### #### #### 6.0031 
ROCE #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! 16.0116 5.5228 53.615 39.332 24.656 #### #### 11.759 17.533 #### #### #### 32.416 
TFP #DIV/0! #DIV/0! ##### #DIV/0! 2.51401 2.5671 1.1381 3.0359 3.0333 #### #### #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #### #### #### #DIV/0! 
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